



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NAVAL DOCTRINE COMMAND

Norfolk, Virginia



Navy Combat Leadership for Tomorrow:
Where Will We Get Such Men and Women?

by

Dr. James J. Tritten

July 1995

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NAVAL DOCTRINE COMMAND
Norfolk Virginia

Rear Admiral F.L. Lewis
Commander

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<p>ANALYSIS OF NEED FOR COMBAT LEADERSHIP DOCTRINE IN THE U.S. NAVY. REVIEW OF EXISTING LITERATURE WITH CONCLUSION THAT CURRENT STUDIES DO NOT ADEQUATELY ADDRESS DEPTH OR BREADTH OF TOPICS THAT MUST BE CONSIDERED BY NAVY TO PROPERLY ASSESS HOW IT WILL DEVELOP COMBAT LEADERS IN FUTURE. ANALYSIS OF SERIES OF MAJOR ISSUES INTEGRAL TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF COMBAT LEADERS:</p> <p>(1), DIFFERENCE BETWEEN COMBAT AND NON-COMBAT LEADERSHIP; (2), VARIATION IN LEADERSHIP REQUIREMENTS BY RANK AND POSITION; (3), ARE LEADERSHIP REQUIREMENTS DIFFERENT IN THE U.S. NAVY FROM THOSE IN ANY OTHER SERVICE?; (4), DOES LEADERSHIP VARY ACCORDING TO NATIONAL AND OTHER CULTURAL CONTEXTS?; (5), DO LEADERSHIP SKILLS NEED TO ACCOUNT FOR DIFFERENT COGNITIVE PREFERENCES; AND (6), DO WE NEED CHARISMATIC LEADERS? THE REPORT THEN GOES ON TO ASSESS THE PROBLEMS OF DEVELOPING COMBAT LEADERS IN AN ERA OF A LONG PEACE. SPECIFIC IMPROVEMENTS TO EXISTING METHODS OF TRAINING COMBAT LEADERS ARE THEN ADDRESSED. FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS INCLUDE:</p> <p>(1), THE NEED FOR NAVY COMBAT LEADERSHIP CASE STUDIES; (2), THE NEED FOR SUPPORTING RESEARCH; (3), THE DEVELOPMENT OF A NAVY COMBAT LEADERSHIP CONCEPT PAPER; (3), AND THE EVENTUAL DEVELOPMENT OF NAVY COMBAT LEADERSHIP DOCTRINE. THE FUNDAMENTAL PLACE FOR COMBAT LEADERSHIP DOCTRINE IS AS AN INTEGRAL ELEMENT OF COMBAT POWER. ANOTHER MAJOR CONCLUSION IS THAT THE NAVY OWES THE INDIVIDUAL SERVICE MEMBER AN OPPORTUNITY TO GROW AND NEEDS A PERSONAL GROWTH ELEMENT IN ITS COMBAT LEADERSHIP DEVELOPMENT. TWO ADDITIONAL "SPIN-OFF" DIMENSIONS ARE THE NEED TO ASSESS THE SPECIAL REQUIREMENTS OF COMBAT LEADERSHIP IN A MANEUVER WARFARE ENVIRONMENT AND TO ASSESS THE ROLE OF NDC AS THE LEARNING ORGANIZATION FOR THE NAVY.</p>				
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NAVY COMBAT LEADERSHIP FOR TOMORROW:
WHERE WILL WE GET SUCH MEN AND WOMEN?

by
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TABLE OF CONTENTS

NAVY COMBAT LEADERSHIP FOR TOMORROW: WHERE WILL WE GET SUCH MEN AND WOMEN?

Table of Contents	i
Introduction	1
Outline of Report	4
Notes	5
CHAPTER ONE: Reviews of Existing Navy Combat Leadership Studies	7
Existing Studies on Navy Combat Leadership	7
Problems with Existing Studies and Source Materials	7
Oral Histories	8
Autobiographies	9
Biographical Materials	9
Assessment of Source Materials	12
Davenport Study--1919	13
Assessment	15
Harsfield Book--1980	15
Assessment	17
Naval Academy Leadership Conference--1987	18
Assessment	19
Persian Gulf War Study--1991/92	20
Assessment	21
Summary	22
Notes	23
CHAPTER TWO: Should We Expand the Fields of Study?	29
Psychological/Historical Approach	29
Business School Approach	31
Political Science Approach	34
Summary	36
Notes	36
CHAPTER THREE: Basic Leadership Issues That Must Be Considered	39
Differences Between Combat and Non-Combat Leadership?	39
U.S. Air Force Studies	40
U.S. Army Studies	42
Assessment	45
Do Leadership Requirements Vary With Rank and Position? ..	47
U.S. Army Research	48
Assessment	52
Navy Leadership For a Unique Organization?	53
Leading at the Front	53
Differences in Navies	54
Assessment	56

Does Leadership Vary According to National and Other Cultural Contexts?	57
Types of Warriors	58
Foreign Examples	59
Assessment	62
Does Leadership Vary According to Cognitive Context?	62
Self-improvements Based Upon Cognitive Preferences	68
Assessment	70
Summary	70
Notes	71
CHAPTER FOUR: The Special Case of "Charismatic" Leadership .	83
Formal Theories of "Charisma"	83
"Transformational Leadership: A Better Idea"	88
Business School Studies	90
Military "Charisma"?	93
Assessment/Summary	101
Notes	103
CHAPTER FIVE: Problems Of An Era Of Long Peace	111
Can Warriors Be Promoted During Peacetime?	113
Assessment	115
Role of Doctrine	115
Assessment	117
Leadership as an Integral Element of Combat Power	117
Assessment	118
The Role of the Leader in Shaping Combat Technology	119
Assessment	121
Summary	122
Notes	123
CHAPTER SIX: Navy Combat Leadership Training & Education ...	127
Training in an Era of Long Peace	128
Improvements to Training Techniques	129
Personal Growth	131
Personal Growth in the U.S. Army	135
Personal Growth in the U.S. Navy	136
Can Intuition be Learned?	140
Assessment/Summary	142
Notes	143
CHAPTER SEVEN: Findings, Conclusions, & Recommendations	149
Findings	149
Conclusions	152
Recommendations	156
Basic Research	156
Navy Combat Leadership Doctrine	158
Navy Combat Leadership Doctrine Concept Paper	158
Supporting Activities	158
Leadership as a Fundamental Element of Combat Power ..	159
"Maneuver" Warfare	160

Naval Doctrine Command as the Navy's "Learning Organization"	161
Summary	161
Notes	161
Distribution List	163

INTRODUCTION

During the engagement off Samar Island at the Battle of Leyte Gulf in October 1944, a small task force, Taffy 3, was destined to enter the halls of combat glory by defending the landing force in some of the heaviest fighting ever seen at sea. Admiral Clifton A.F. "Ziggy" Sprague's small escort carriers, their embarked air groups, and the sailors on destroyers and destroyer escorts fought "against overwhelming odds from which survival could not be expected."¹

When Commander Ernest E. Evans, USN, commanding officer of the destroyer *USS Johnston* (DD-557), saw the pagoda masts of enemy battleships and cruisers on the horizon off Samar Island, he laid a smoke screen to protect the escort carriers and steered his small and outclassed ship directly toward the enemy. After closing within firing range, the *Johnston* fired all ten torpedo tubes, striking the enemy cruiser *Kumano* (which later sank). The *Johnston* then took evasive action and ducked into a rain squall.

After receiving hits on the bridge and elsewhere, the *Johnston* received a general order for all destroyers to make torpedo attacks. *Johnston* rejoined the fray, making dummy torpedo attack runs and fighting on with her modest complement of guns-- attempting to draw enemy fire and force the enemy to take evasive action. The *Johnston* took on the 30,000 ton battleship *Kongo*, scoring fifteen hits before ducking into her own smoke screen in safety. During the enemy counter-attack, Commander Evans lost two fingers and, in the force of a blast, all the clothing above his waist was blown off.

When an enemy cruiser engaged one of the escort carriers, Evans closed the cruiser and scored four hits with his guns. As a squadron of four Japanese destroyers and a light cruiser maneuvered to box in the escort carriers of the American defending force, Commander Evans seized the initiative by attacking the whole squadron. *Johnston's* furious close-in gunfire so startled the enemy that their torpedoes were launched prematurely, causing no damage to the escort carriers. The enemy forces singled out *Johnston* for their vengeance. After a series of mortal blows, *Johnston* was sunk. Commander Evans was never recovered. As *Johnston* slipped beneath the waves, a Japanese destroyer passed close aboard and her captain saluted his worthy adversary. For his inspirational leadership under the most severe combat conditions, Commander Evans was awarded the Medal of Honor.² Even today, the story of Evans' heroic leadership stirs the blood of anyone experienced in operations at sea. Indeed, such heroic stories inspire others and are vital to the building of Service identity and a warrior culture.

Great heroism was also displayed by the crews of many other ships that fought that day off Samar Island. Even after their ammunition was exhausted, aircraft pilots from the escort carriers continued to make attack runs into the teeth of the antiaircraft fire of enemy surface forces--attacks intended to force a reaction by the enemy and thereby upset opposing fire and maneuver. The mid-grade officers that inspired their men to self-sacrifice demonstrated the vital importance of the individual unit commander.

The annals of international naval history are filled with inspiring stories of combat leadership. France's Admiral Anne-Hilarion de Costentin, Comte de Tourville, maintained combat cohesion and led French Navy forces to major victories against combined English and Dutch fleets at Bévésiers [Beachy Head] (1690) and against a large multinational Smyrna convoy (1693).³ During the Second Battle off Cape Finisterre (1747), French Commodore Desherbiers, Marquis de Létenduère distinguished himself as an inspirational combat leader. With a significantly smaller escort force, he opposed one of the most aggressive and successful of English commanders, Rear Admiral Edward Hawke. Despite overwhelming odds, Létenduère successfully escaped with a convoy of 250 French merchants. Tourville and Létenduère are among the heroic leaders that midshipmen study to become officers in the French Navy.

The abortive amphibious invasion of Cartagena de Indias (1740-1741) was the worst defeat suffered by the British at the hands of the Spanish during the 18th Century. One of the defending Spanish naval commanders, Vice Admiral Blas de Lezo, fought with only 6,000 sailors and troops in defended fortifications against 30,000 British troops and 120 ships. Blas de Lezo, a Basque, fought with inspirational courage and tenacity--refusing to surrender. Despite physical challenges--Blas de Lezo fought with one leg, one arm, and one eye--his men responded to his leadership.⁴ Spanish Navy midshipmen learn of this brave officer, and others, who have earned places of honor in the Naval Museum in Madrid.

British Admiral Lord Horatio Nelson is, perhaps, the model of an inspirational--even "charismatic"--navy combat leader. Nelson took great personal risk, suffered the loss of an eye and an arm during combat, and yet remained on active service to lead his forces to victory and immortality. Nelson is only one among many heroic combat leaders in the Royal Navy. One of the First Sea Lords of the late 19th Century, Admiral Sir Arthur Wilson, earned a Victoria Cross while fighting ashore in the Sudan in 1884. In 1896, David Beatty earned a Distinguished Service Order for duty in gunboats on the Nile.⁵ Heroes of the Royal Navy have an important place in the enculturation of British midshipmen. Their exploits are documented at the National Maritime Museum in

Greenwich, England; at the Naval Historical Museum in Washington, DC; as well as on the pages of virtually all English-language navy histories.

How do we develop such distinguished combat leaders in the future? How do we find such men and women, who can inspire sailors and naval airmen to greatness when their country again calls? Can such combat leaders be cultivated or are they simply born and hopefully recruited into naval service? These difficult questions form the basis of this research study.

For example, what made Commander Evans such an exceptional combat leader? A full-blooded Cherokee Indian, he first served in the Oklahoma National Guard and then entered the U.S. Naval Academy, graduating in 1927. Was his combat leadership influenced by the difficulties he must have incurred because of his minority status at school, in society, or in the military? Was his desire to lead by example shaped by his experiences while in the National Guard, at the Naval Academy, or was it learned from some mentor in the fleet? Was Commander Evans inspired by the exploits of John Paul Jones, Admiral Nelson, or the heroes of his Native American culture?

Did his crew view him as a descendent of John Paul Jones, Admiral Nelson, or Sitting Bull? Consisting of mostly married draftees, eighty-five percent of the *Johnston* crew was "green" and only one-third of the officers had ever been to sea. Did the composition of his crew influence Commander Evans' actions while off Samar Island? U.S. Pacific Fleet tactical orders and doctrine, landing force operation orders, and pre-war battle simulations or exercises, presaged the combat in which most Navy ships and aircraft were engaged.⁶ Had he first talked with his wardroom about what they could expect in battle?

Did any of Evans' officers question the decisions that he made that fateful day? His gunnery officer, who survived the engagement, said of Evans' leadership "...that it made us all willing to follow him to hell." Why did each of those 327 men act as they did? Did the crew view Commander Evans as a "charismatic" leader or simply their commanding officer?

Did it matter who was in command of *USS Johnston* that fateful day of October 25, 1944? Are inspirational leaders born out of a crisis? Can individuals who have not exhibited any special "charismatic" traits be triggered by an external event? Are heroic traits latent in us all and merely await awakening? Are there ways which the Navy can better prepare its future combat leaders?

OUTLINE OF REPORT

This report is concerned with the development of combat leaders for the U.S. Navy. As the Navy enters a period of long peace (a period absent formal warfare), leaders may be thrust into combat without the opportunity to learn "on the job."

For the purposes of this report:

"leadership is the art of inspiring, guiding, and directing bodies of men so that they ardently desire to do what the leader wishes."

--War Instructions: United States Navy, 1944⁷

Although the subjects of non-combat leadership, total quality leadership (TQL), leadership ethics, etc., are all in themselves worthy subjects for investigation, they are all outside the terms of reference of the research conducted which produced this report.

The report will explore a variety of historical, social, and psychological dimensions of leadership. The report is divided into an introduction, six substantive chapters, and a final chapter with overall findings, conclusions, and recommendations.

Chapter 1 examines the existing literature on navy combat leadership. These studies are assessed with respect to the development of future navy combat leaders. Most, but not all, of the existing research into navy combat leadership is historically-based. Chapter 2 addresses the possibility of expanding the literature search to alternative research results from the fields of psychology, business schools, and political science.

Chapter 3 considers a series of extremely important questions which must be addressed (or at least assumptions made about) before limiting the types of research considered by this report. These questions include: what are the differences between combat and non-combat leadership? What leadership traits and requirements are associated with different ranks? Are leadership requirements in the Navy so unique that they may not transfer to other organizations? What is the importance of the cultural context of leadership? Can lessons be learned from examination of non-American combat? What is the importance of the cognitive preferences exhibited by individuals and organizations?

Chapter 4 develops the special concept of "charismatic" leadership and considers the implications of "charisma" for military and combat leadership. The myths surrounding the term "charisma" have attracted a great deal of attention by psychologists, business schools, and political scientists. A

study of "charisma" might help us learn what motivated the crew of *USS Johnston* off Samar Island and can help us address the major questions raised in chapter 3. Due to the special interest in "charismatic" leadership by Commander, Naval Doctrine Command, this chapter has been extremely well-developed.

Chapter 5 considers combat leadership during periods of long peace. It examines the role of doctrine in combat leadership, deviation from doctrine, and the role of the leader in creating doctrine. Chapter 5 also addresses the implications of leadership if it is considered an integral part of combat power. The chapter also discusses the issue of leadership, doctrine and combat technology before arguing that doctrine without leadership is an academic exercise (without leadership, doctrine will remain on the bookshelf).

Chapter 6 addresses the general paradigm of Navy leadership training and education and how that is at variance with the approaches used by the business world and the U.S. Army. A major section of this chapter will deal with the issue of personal growth as a vital element of leadership development. This chapter also analyzes current plans to upgrade prospective commanding officer leadership training in the U.S. Navy.

Chapter 7 summarizes the research findings developed in the report, considers conclusions from these findings and offers a series of recommendations based upon those conclusions.

NOTES

1. Woodward C. Vann, *The Battle for Leyte Gulf*, New York, NY: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1947, p. 175.
2. Eric Larrabee, *Commander in Chief: Franklin Delano Roosevelt, His Lieutenants, and Their War*, New York, NY: Harper & Row, Pubs., 1987, p. 407-408; Lieutenant Commander Thomas J. Cutler, USN (Ret.), *The Battle of Leyte Gulf: 23-26 October 1944*, New York, NY: Harper Collins Publishers, 1944, p. 244; and Leonard D. Ash and Martin Hill, "In Harm's Way," *The Retired Officer Magazine*, 50, no. 10 (October 1994): 42-47.
3. Étienne Taillemite, "Le chef charismatique: une alchimie mystérieuse," *Cols Bleus*, no. 2252, du 12 mars 1994, p. 7-8.
4. John D. Harbron, *Trafalgar and the Spanish Navy*, Washington, DC: Naval Institute Press, 1988, p. 108-109; and Vice Admiral P[hilip]. H[oward]. Colomb, RN, *Naval Warfare: Its Ruling Principles and Practice Historically Treated*, Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1990, vol. 2, p. 382-396.

5. Arthur J. Marder, *From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow: The Royal Navy in the Fisher Era, 1904-1919, Volume I: The Road to War, 1904-1914*, London, UK: Oxford University Press, 1961, p. 212, 409.

6. Current conventional wisdom says that the U.S. Navy never has had a centralized military doctrine. In point of fact, the U.S. Fleet in World War II operated under a series of hierarchical doctrinal publications. At the top was: Commander in Chief, United States Fleet, *War Instructions: United States Navy*, F.T.P. 143 and F.T.P. 143(A), Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1934 and 1944. Subordinate to these was: Chief of Naval Operations, *General Tactical Instructions*, 1934, F.T.P. 142, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1934. Next in the hierarchy was Commander in Chief, United States Fleet, *Current Tactical Orders and Doctrine*, 1941, U.S.F. 10, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1942. The U.S. Pacific Fleet created its own doctrine once war experience had been internalized: Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet, *Current Tactical Orders and Doctrine U.S. Pacific Fleet (PAC-10)*, Cincpac File Pac-32-tk, A7-3/A-16-3/P, Serial -1338, June 10, 1943. Additional type doctrines and tactical orders were prepared for each class of ship. For a schematic of all these different types of doctrines, see PAC-10, Figure 1 and p. v. Immediately following World War II, the U.S. Navy convened a Tactical Publications Panel which reviewed this hierarchy. A new series of doctrinal publications were commissioned. At the top was the Chief of Naval Operations' *Principles and Applications of Naval Warfare: United States Fleets*, 1947, USF-1, Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, 1 May 1947, signed by Admiral of the Fleet Chester W. Nimitz, USN, and applicable to both the Atlantic and Pacific Fleets.

7. Admiral E[rnest] J. King, Commander in Chief, United States Fleet and Chief of Naval Operations, *War Instructions: United States Navy*, 1944, F.T.P. 143(A), Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1 November 1944, p. 2.

CHAPTER 1

REVIEWS OF EXISTING NAVY COMBAT LEADERSHIP STUDIES

Chapter 1 reviews the existing literature associated with navy combat leadership and considers problems inherent with the basic raw materials (oral histories, autobiographies, and biographical materials) from which research results are drawn. It also considers the state of existing research into navy combat leadership. It includes an analysis of the methods used to gather materials used in navy combat leadership studies, and examines three existing studies and one U.S. Navy-sponsored leadership conference.

EXISTING STUDIES ON NAVY COMBAT LEADERSHIP

"Combat leaders must be historically minded, for military and naval history are the laboratories for understanding war."

--Major General Perry M. Smith, USAF (Ret.)¹

Leadership is a long-practiced art of navy officers. The Navy has an extensive history of leadership training and education as well as leadership books developed for its support.² The U.S. Naval Institute continues to play a major role in navy leadership development as a forum for discussion of leadership issues and in the publication of texts. The U.S. Naval Institute also sponsors an annual leadership essay contest for junior officers. Indeed, in 1982, the U.S. Naval Institute had to weather the wrath of Admiral Hyman G. Rickover, USN (Ret.) for devoting too much attention to leadership issues.³ Recent (1993-1994) emphasis on leadership in the U.S. Navy, has included an effort to address major ethical, administrative, personnel, and management issues facing the Navy.

Problems with Existing Studies and Source Materials

Existing navy leadership efforts generally lack serious scholarly consideration of combat leadership in a comprehensive and scientific manner. For example, a current U.S. Naval Academy textbook (published by the U.S. Naval Institute) was developed to prepare officer candidates from the various accession sources for duties as junior officers. While this excellent text discusses the Battle of Trafalgar, and the thoughts of both Medal of Honor Winner General Louis Wilson and Navy Cross winner James Webb, the thrust of this textbook is not the preparation of midshipmen for combat.⁴

Recognizing the importance of pre-commissioning education and training to at least conceptually prepare midshipmen for combat, the leadership courses at the Naval Academy use

additional materials for the student's assigned readings. Additional readings, films, videos, and discussions attempt to provide an understanding of the combat environment, but do not provide any education or training for combat.⁵

Literature which does address navy combat leadership in depth can be divided into three categories: oral histories; autobiographies; and biographies, chapters in edited biographical works, and other biographical articles. All these categories are essentially historical. Although each can be the result of or the basis for further excellent scholarly research, all are essentially anecdotal in nature, lacking the rigor of scientific analysis associated with other disciplines. Each of these types of evidence will be discussed in turn because they are the source materials for all existing studies on navy combat leadership.

Oral Histories

There are some specific difficulties with oral histories. According to one well-respected historian and biographer, many oral history participants are not as candid as the biographer and historian would like, unfortunately, leaving much unsaid.⁶ What is said, naturally, is said from the perspective of the single individual being interviewed. Without consideration of the views of seniors, peers, and subordinates, an extremely biased view of the importance of an individual leader is developed. This is especially true if researchers only consider individuals who inflate their own importance for posterity.

The review and the gathering of oral histories has generally been the province of historians who may not be skilled in the psychological dimensions of leadership issues or the sociological, organizational, etc., dimensions of the environment in which the leader operated. Oral histories focus on the individual and not his followers or the context--and these may be fatal flaws when we use such materials to study leadership.

A related issue is the content analysis of the histories themselves. Content analysis is a frequently used technique--but a specialized methodology not familiar to many traditional historians. Content analysis develops themes directly from the evidence and scientifically evaluates each instance of each different theme.⁷ Content analyses of oral histories is not a simple task and can result in incorrect findings if not applied properly.

Another drawback in using oral histories is the sheer volume of the written transcripts and the lack of indexing. Putting this material on CD-ROM would be a major aid in making the materials more accessible. Right now, oral histories represent a largely untapped source of valuable information--especially of non-flag

senior officers, the first rank of followers senior leadership would rely upon to execute tasks and who probably played a crucial role in advising the flag officer and setting his agenda.

Additionally, many individuals have not left behind their oral histories. Commander Ernest E. Evans, USN, of *USS Johnston* did not live to record his personal history. Seven out of ten awards of the Medal of Honor in the 20th Century were made posthumously. Unlike armies, there is scant naval tradition for journal and memoir writing by our great combat leaders--further complicating the task of defining what makes a combat leader. However, alternative sources of the thoughts of individual leaders, such as their letters and other correspondence, can hopefully provide us with some useful information for scholarly research.

Autobiographies

Autobiographies are another excellent source of materials but share one problem with oral histories--they tend to focus on the individual and not the context of events. Additional problems include the documentation of tactical and other combat details without addressing the larger issues and the absence of reflection and personal analysis.

However, autobiographies, like oral histories, remain an important source of information that can be studied.⁸ Even if the author did not reflect upon his actions in the larger context of major issues, readers and scholars can draw the necessary conclusions (we can only speculate if these conclusions would be the same as the individual would have made). Autobiographies are not written by all individuals, with a particular void being the non-flag senior navy officer or those who die in combat--a void similar to that of oral histories.

Biographical Materials

Some very interesting biographical books, chapters, and articles have been written which summarize the combat prowess of many battle-proven leaders.⁹ These works have used oral histories, biographies, and historical accounts as their primary source materials. Most biographical materials make one or two tentative conclusions about what characteristics are required for good combat leaders.¹⁰ A recent series of books published by the U.S. Naval Institute on navy leaders typifies this approach.¹¹ They provide excellent, but frankly only modestly in-depth, analyses of navy combat leadership. Since biographies do not generally focus on leadership nor are they written by individuals knowledgeable of the psychological/sociological dimensions of leadership scholarship, serious research into leadership cannot be conducted by reading only these books.

The classification of wartime data has been a considerable stumbling block for biographers in understanding the actions taken by great combat leaders. For years, scholars have questioned the decision of Admiral Raymond A. Spruance, USN, to fight his carrier battle groups on the defensive on the first day of the Battle of the Philippine Sea (June 1944). Many navy officers and scholars alike criticized Spruance for not being more offensive.

Only recently has it been learned that Spruance had a copy of the enemy battle plan, battle doctrine, order of battle, and readiness figures, and received code intercepts of the enemy executing their plan. Thus, Spruance wisely elected to fight on the defensive and secured his place in history as the commander of one of the most decisive engagements ever fought by the U.S. Navy.¹² Does this information create a different perception on Spruance's combat leadership abilities? Should we reevaluate past historical assessments of this battle?

Many historical accounts, oral histories, biographical materials, etc., are based upon records which have been deliberately altered. Oral histories contained in the U.S. Naval Institute demonstrate that certain surface warfare officers were "fired" during World War II without a record of failure in any official reports.¹³ Anecdotal reports of this process continue to the current day. Thus, we may not be able to rely upon official records to know when officers were fully successful or not. This makes it even more difficult to ascertain whether organizations, such as the U.S. Navy, "learned" during the war.

In certain cases, leadership performance has been deliberately falsified as a result of efforts made by relatives of officers and crewmen who have otherwise appeared to have committed punishable crimes. For example, the myth of Captain William Bligh, RN, as a tyrant appears to have been a direct result of a publicity campaign by the brother of Fletcher Christian and the ship's boatswain who were trying to portray their kin in a better light.¹⁴ Bligh may have had his faults, but he was probably more benevolent and humanitarian than most navy officers of the day. Yet, after years of socialization with books and motion pictures, Bligh is condemned to forever remain a blackguard in the eyes of Western naval officers, despite his subsequent excellent combat record at the Battles of Camperdown (1797) and Copenhagen (1801).

This same problem exists in biographical materials prepared in the Orient. The classical Chinese mold includes a recitation of the virtues of individuals, usually without any critical analysis. The wholesale destruction of files and documents following Japan's defeat in World War II and the reluctance to keep official records of deliberations in committee make an

accurate accounting of the role of Japanese leaders difficult, at best.¹⁵

The use of biographical materials specifically as case studies for current leadership has been called into question by serious scholars due to the focus on the individual leader and lack of attention on followers and context.¹⁶ Professor Elmer Belmont Potter, a world-class historian formerly at the U.S. Naval Academy, has assessed the quality of the finest biographies of our top navy World War II leaders and concluded that none of them really capture the essence of the individual.¹⁷ If this is true, do biographical essays and books have any utility other than providing the raw materials for hero worship or anecdotes of horrible behavior?

Another fundamental issue in assessing the value of these historical materials for leadership research is that the techniques used to motivate in combat may not generalize across cultures and time periods. For example, what motivates white males in the U.S. Army may be totally inappropriate for non-European females serving in the Russian Air Force, and vice versa. Even remaining within the case of white males in the Army, what motivated them previously may have little to do with what motivates them in the future.¹⁸ Certainly no one would expect a southern male in the 1990s U.S. Army to be motivated to fight for state's rights and a slave-based agricultural economy--yet at one point in our country's past, southern males left the U.S. Army to fight under the flag of the Confederate States of America for those very reasons.

Most scholars do not take such a skeptical view of historical biographical case studies and accept their value for current leadership teaching. While criticism of biographical materials raises some excellent points, acceptance of this view would have us discard virtually all existing case studies in favor of studies of cultural aspects of followers and sociological aspects of the context. Instead, we should consider these problems as we review the research in order to ascertain whether there are alternative materials available or alternative approaches to create the necessary data for serious leadership research.

Biographical materials also bring with them the cultural biases of the biographer. For example, British historical researchers emphasize the study of command more than the study of leadership. Hence any biographical studies of great leaders written by British authors tend to overlook the very factors of leadership that are of interest to this study. Thus, command is a separate area of inquiry that is not always present in a study of leadership.

Today we routinely use biographical descriptive studies of individual combat leaders as inputs to more comprehensive leadership studies.¹⁹ These in-depth studies seek to identify general principles of leadership by studying the actions of a series of successful past leaders--the case study approach with subsequent analysis. Analytic portions of these studies organize data--generally leadership characteristics and behaviors found in various individuals--and use these to address various leadership questions. Can we discover the behaviors, skills, and personality traits which helped someone be a better leader? Are there psychological patterns which can be used to replicate and control behavior? Is it wise to continue to focus combat leadership research on the individual or is there a special role played by the follower and the context?

This existing process of compiling lists of behaviors, skills, and personality traits from oral histories, autobiographies, biographies, chapters, articles, etc., is fraught with difficulties. First, there is no standardization of terms used to describe the behaviors, skills, and personality traits of combat leaders. What is termed "initiative" to one scholar may not be considered initiative to another. Second, cultural biases also contribute to inconsistencies among studies. For example, initiative is considered to be an essential element of French Navy defensive warfare, so if a scholar only analyzed examples of French Navy offensive operations, he would be oblivious to the great initiative often shown in defensive warfare.

The third difficulty is the lack of standardization among methodological approaches used and the basic disciplines being applied to the study of leadership. Using the same data, a historian would probably produce a report very different than a psychologist. Optimally, we need the historian to develop data, the psychologist to interpret behavior, and the warrior to interpret the actions in the context of combat. There are not many studies which have done this.²⁰

Assessment of Source Materials

There are few very good analytic sources to support serious and in-depth research into navy combat leadership. This stands in marked contrast to academic efforts and those of the U.S. Army which consistently sponsors descriptive biographies, histories, and in-depth analyses. There have been, however, at least three attempts to do a comprehensive analysis of navy combat leadership in the past. Two of these involved the U.S. Navy and one dealt with the Royal Navy of Great Britain. In addition, the U.S. Naval Academy and the Navy Personnel Research and Development Center sponsored a leadership conference in 1987. The conference serves

as an important benchmark of what leadership issues the Navy considers important.

Davenport Study--1919

Following the entry of the United States into World War I, the Carnegie Institution published a study on navy combat leadership. The focus of Charles Benedict Davenport's study, published in 1919, *Naval Officers: Their Heredity and Development*, was the proper selection of navy officers during periods of "prolonged peace" so that they would be able to perform successfully at the outbreak of another war. Comparing the situation with that of the earlier lessons from the U.S. Civil War, Davenport stated that the:²¹

"...[Civil War] showed the melancholy fact that the selections made at the outset were often inadequate, and many a colonel and even general confidently appointed at the outbreak of the war was recalled as a failure. The method of selecting exclusively by trial and error is a sure method, but one that is frightfully wasteful of lives and property. What is the best method of selecting untried men for positions as officers?"

Davenport studied some sixty-eight American, British, and Dutch senior and well-known navy officers--emphasizing those who had engaged in combat. Using autobiographies, biographies, and histories of their careers to guide his assignment, Davenport grouped these officers into eight major types:

1. combative warriors
2. combative adventurers
3. tacticians
4. strategists
5. combative tacticians/strategists
6. diplomatic administrators
7. explorers
8. inventors

Davenport described the behaviors and psychological traits associated with these officers and summarized the traits associated with each group as follows.

According to Davenport, most navy officers were combative and most **combative officers were generally**: active (perhaps overactive), ambitious, optimistic, given to planning, usually talkative, jolly, and often hilarious. Conversely, the combative officer was also excitable, irritable, nervous, a braggart, often profane, liable to fits of anger, destructive, assaultative (even homicidal), choleric, and hypererotic. The combative officer was also prone to start new work before completing old. Of their

heritage, Davenport found that most were basically nomadic, restless, fond of the sea, and adventurous or belligerent in their youth or childhood. These patterns also seemed to fit most adventurers and most tacticians.

The most important contribution of Davenport's study is the possibility of establishing a behavioral and psychological profile of navy combat leaders--profiles that could be used for selection of future leaders. The U.S. Navy eventually adopted this basic paradigm for the selection of flight candidates. "Correct" answers on the biographical index of the Flight Aptitude Rating (FAR) were based upon those responses given by a selected group of combat proven naval aviators rather than empirically correct solutions.²²

Davenport wrestled with the general consensus that the most successful navy combat leader of all time was Admiral Lord Horatio Nelson and the most admired U.S. Navy officer was John Paul Jones--although neither officer fit the ideal mold for a pure combative officer. Davenport examined other notable exceptions of successful combat leaders who did not fit the pure combative mold. Of these, the two most notable exceptions are Admirals Lord Richard Howe and Lord George Brydges Rodney--both excellent and successful Royal Navy combat officers during the age of sail.

Simultaneously with the above characteristics of a combative officer, both Jones and Nelson exhibited traits of: quietness, seriousness, and conservatism. They were also described as: unresponsive, given to worry, pessimistic, phlegmatic, "melanshoic," lachrymose, with self-feelings of being weak and incapable, feeling that life was a burden, and they often longed for death. Some of these traits are not well-known in the popular literature and certainly not those immortalized on canvas or in the cultural traditions of the British or U.S. Navy. Yet a full and in-depth study of these individuals, especially Nelson and Jones, can be quite revealing: both had a "dark side."²³

Although John Paul Jones gave to this country its earliest traditions of heroism and victory at sea, Davenport explains that Jones was also a jealous and vain egotist who failed to give sufficient credit to his subordinates. Although his tactical exploits reflect an adventurous personality and make good copy for heroic tales, Jones never fully adapted to peace and was disappointed that his vision for an American navy was not accepted. In point of fact, Jones was a heroic officer in single ship engagements; not the task groups and task forces that other navy combat leaders commanded or that are commanded today.

Nelson is a special case being the only officer in the study sample that met the criteria of being combative, a superb

tactician, and an excellent strategist. While there were a number of tacticians in the sample used by Davenport, there were six other strategists and only one of these was well-known for his combat successes. **Nelson's** characteristics of a strategist included: the **ability to plan** successful campaigns, the **vision** to foresee the enemy's probable plans, and **ability** to take the appropriate steps to block the enemy's plans and **organize** a series of offensive operations. Most strategists, like Nelson, showed fondness for sea and adventure in their youth and they may have even run away from home. Strategists also possessed greater intelligence than the pure combative officer.

Davenport found that administrative officers generally were interested in organization and the maintenance of discipline and sought various forms of shore-based administrative assignments. As youths, administrative officers shared nomadism and a fondness for the sea with their combative brethren, but they were less pugnacious in their boyhood and generally more good-natured. Most administrative or otherwise non-combative officers were described as "normal."

Assessment

The Davenport study is a good example of scholarly research into the subject matter being investigated in this report. It establishes that, even if we focus leadership research on the individual, scientific methods can be used to organize data and **fundamental differences in the behaviors and personality traits of warriors and administrators** exist. This approach transcends anecdotal recounting of incidents and focuses the researcher on the major issues of combat leadership. Davenport also established **that the most effective combat leaders had negative qualities which coincide with the positive.**

Harsfield Book--1980

Based upon existing autobiographies, biographies, and historical records, the Harsfield study was an excellent analysis of leadership in the Royal Navy during wartime. This study is not merely a recounting of the exploits of various leaders, but an attempt to focus on what constitutes excellence in navy combat leadership.

John Harsfield's *The Art of Leadership in War: The Royal Navy From the Age of Nelson to the End of World War II* (1980)²⁴ wrestled with the post-World War II prevailing view of social scientists that leadership effectiveness depended upon the way that a particular individual responded to the demands of a specific situation at one moment--the relationship between the group and the leader. Expressed another way, Harsfield investigated whether **successful combat leadership in the Royal**

Navy was mostly a case of the right man, at the right place, at the right time rather than the result of any specific attempt to cultivate good combat leaders. In general, Harsfield validated the opinions of the social scientists.

Harsfield incites historians, who generally write most of the accounts of combat leadership, to **concentrate less on the qualities of genius of one specific individual** and recognize the context and the environment in which the successful combat leader had acted. Harsfield believed that an otherwise mediocre individual could sometimes be stirred to greatness by his surroundings or companions. This message seconded similar recommendations in the United States to focus less on the individual actions of past leaders.

Harsfield concluded from the British naval leadership he considered that the most successful individual acts of leadership arose from an individual spark of genius in suitably favorable situations. Harsfield concluded that **genius-type combat leadership**, such as that displayed by Admiral Lord Horatio Nelson, **was not related to either training or experience. Officers such as Nelson were capable of both greatness and disaster.** They could ensure total victory or the annihilation of one's own force, whereas the less gifted leader might not fully exploit favorable opportunities, but would probably play it safe and follow established doctrine. Harsfield stated that there was, as yet, no way known of artificially producing the spark of genius--one cannot produce genius; one can only produce, at best, good professionals.

Does a nation require genius-type combat leaders? Harsfield concluded that **without such men as Nelson, Britain would still have defeated France on the sea--**perhaps taking longer to do so and having paid a slightly higher price.

"Substitute all the top echelons of the Admiralty in the First World War by other products of the same background, and **the result would have been much the same**, for the navy in the First World War was making the trained response of a generation. It is indeed important to be cautious about the impact of individual leaders, since a redress is needed of the balance of writing on leadership, writing that hitherto has placed such emphasis on the great man."²⁵

Harsfield also attempted to deal with whether a navy could survive if every officer were a genius--concluding that **only a few officers such as Nelson could be tolerated at any one given time.** He further stated that in a certain perverse sense, unorthodoxy and genius could only flourish in orthodox soil.

Harsfield also attempted to deal with some of the qualities of good combat leaders that might, today especially, make them unacceptable for peacetime service. Echoing Davenport's earlier study, Harsfield concludes that Nelson is the navy combat leader who stands out as the all-around yardstick of excellence. Indeed it is commonplace to cast subsequent combat leaders as inheriting the mantle of success from Nelson.²⁶ Yet Nelson had a sordid private life resulting in **controversy and scandal**. Harsfield concludes that this type of behavior is to be **expected** if one wants leaders of Nelson's caliber. But if a nation decides that it needs a Nelson, if it chooses to empower such individuals despite the full "baggage" that they bring, then deviant behavior must be considered part of the price to be paid for services rendered.

Also addressed by Harsfield is the transferability of leadership skills from combat to non-combat situations. The Duke of Wellington is cited as an example of someone who transferred his leadership abilities from the combat army to the civil government. General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower is another excellent example from our own history. Harsfield concluded, however, that such transferability is a very hit-or-miss proposition.

Harsfield criticized tests used to help identify good wartime leaders. He concluded that the artificiality of testing could not account for situational fluctuations and risks that only war itself could provide. If true, then the only crucible for the cultivation of combat leaders would be war itself. Since not all widely-acclaimed successful combat leaders were actually in combat prior to their endeavors which established them as very successful, it is not clear from Harsfield how they develop the right skills.

Harsfield's final conclusions include three basic **behaviors and personality traits common to all of Britain's successful navy combat leaders**. First, they shared a common **understanding of past battle experiences**. Second, they had a **harmonious working relationship**. Third, and most importantly, they shared a breadth of **vision** in both the military and political arena.

Assessment

The Harsfield book is an example of excellent research by a historical scholar. However, Harsfield only began to touch the tip of the iceberg with regard to transferability of leadership skills from combat to non-combat and vice versa. Since Harsfield wrote for a British audience, it raises the question if leadership lessons can be generalized from the Royal Navy to the U.S. Navy. Could they be further generalized to the Peoples Republic of China Army (Navy)? Also important is the emergence of

a pattern of behaviors and personality traits that appear to be shared by successful senior navy combat leaders--notably **vision**.

Naval Academy Leadership Conference--1987

In June 1987, the U.S. Naval Academy and the Navy Personnel Research and Development Center sponsored a three-day leadership conference at Annapolis, Maryland. The introduction to the conference proceedings notes that the last major leadership conference sponsored by the Navy, the Office of Naval Research, had been held more than a quarter century earlier at Louisiana State University--and at that conference, only academics participated and few said anything about military leadership.²⁷

At the 1987 gathering, the participants included the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), eleven other serving and retired flag officers, other military officers, and academics. Papers presented by military officers usually raised the issue of combat at some point, but generally did not focus directly on combat leadership, dealing instead with topical issues. Papers presented by civilians mostly talked about leadership in general. When civilians did use successful military leader examples, they generally were army and often foreign officers.

One paper described leadership education and training at the U.S. Naval Academy, although it was devoid of any mention of combat leadership. A subsequent paper (the longest and most thorough of any paper in the proceedings) described leadership training at the U.S. Air Force Academy. Although the paper did discuss leadership in the context of air power employment, the most interesting aspect was the recognition of the need of the Academy to provide opportunities for **personal growth**. A third paper described leadership development at the U.S. Military Academy--describing instructional use of case studies of actual military leadership situations, presumably some of which involved combat. A fourth paper described the Command Excellence Seminar, held at the Naval Amphibious School, Little Creek. This last paper was interesting because it described the use of a classic American film--"Twelve O'Clock High"--as the concluding case study of how an effective leader transformed a combat unit during war. It was pointed out that the Command Excellence Seminar did not use films focusing on the U.S. Navy--such as "Hellcats of the Navy"--primarily because "Twelve O'Clock High" had more leadership learning points.

One of the two papers that was devoted to combat leadership was delivered by Admiral Thomas H. Moorer, USN (Ret.)--a combat veteran, former CNO, and also former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.²⁸ Admiral Moorer stated that there were three levels of wartime leaders--the heads of state, the senior strategic and operational-level commanders, and the tactical-level leader. He

stated that the most demanding characteristic for the latter was to hold the confidence of those being led. Admiral Moorer then used a British Army anecdote to illustrate his point. **Admiral Moorer also stated that there was little difference between the fundamentals of leadership as applied in war or peace.**

The second paper, devoted to leadership in war, was delivered by Lieutenant General Clyde D. Dean, USMC.²⁹ General Dean spoke from his experience in Vietnam and made some general observations on the differences between combat and non-combat situations. **General Dean also concluded that the principles and traits of leadership do not change between peace and war--during wartime, priorities and the focus of attention change.** One interesting comment in General Dean's paper was that leaders in combat make decisions more comfortably based on **intuition** and immediate assessment.

One of the most interesting papers at the conference was delivered by a Navy Captain assigned to the Industrial College of the Armed Forces--Dana P. French.³⁰ Captain French bemoaned the lack of serious attention paid to leadership by the Navy and recommended a systematic developmental approach to the subject. Captain French demonstrated a solid awareness of the applicable current literature and argued that **combat required "transformational" leadership--the vision and an ability to marshal support to attain the desired future--rather than the standard "transactional" leadership found and taught by the military.**³¹ Captain French also noted that U.S. Navy leadership styles were inherited from the Royal Navy--with appropriate changes imprinting an American approach. He also noted the influence of two wars on leadership in the U.S. Navy.

Another interesting paper was delivered by a member of a management consulting firm (also a member of the Marine Corps Reserve).³² This paper presented a slide with the core profiles of combat commanders and staff strategic planners--noting that there were measurable differences. While the **combat commander is more action oriented and the staff officer driven to conceptual end products, the author noted that neither model should be developed to the exclusion of the other.** In short the author argued that the skills of the warrior are insufficient for success in today's military--especially during peacetime, and that staff skills are insufficient if we go to war. The military needs individuals who can function effectively in a broad range of situations using both their innate attributes (of which there are few) and learned skills (of which there can be many).

Assessment

The immense value of the Naval Academy Leadership Conference is that it represents a major data point on the depth and breadth

of issues which have been presented to the most senior uniformed leaders of the U.S. Navy and to the Department of Leadership at the U.S. Naval Academy. It also demonstrates that some leaders in the U.S. Navy are aware of the contemporary literature from academe and have considered the application of new ideas in leadership training and education.

Persian Gulf War Study--1991/92

The next comprehensive study of navy combat leadership was attempted following the 1991 Persian Gulf War.³³ The study was sponsored by the Bureau of Naval Personnel and primarily conducted by naval reservists who brought the necessary research skills but were subject to availability and funding constraints. Additional research was performed by individuals at the Naval Air Warfare Center, Training Systems Division at Orlando, Florida, with the assistance of consultants from the Navy Personnel Research and Development Center (NPRDC) in San Diego, California, and academics from the State University of New York at Albany and at Binghamton University, also in New York.

The Persian Gulf War study has been unofficially circulated within the Navy since early 1992. The research, primarily based upon interviews, generally focused on junior officers and senior enlisted personnel in a combat environment and sought to discover lessons for improved leadership training. Research results will be evaluated for inclusion into existing and new navy leadership courses. It represents what, hopefully, will be an initial systematic study of U.S. Navy combat leadership that should be followed-up with additional and new studies. The draft report observes:

"...that effective leaders, whether in civilian organizations or in military combat or noncombat situations, display similar behaviors and possess comparable traits and skills."

The report then goes on to document those cases where there might be differences between effective leadership in combat versus non-combat environments. One key finding is that:

"the effective combat leader was not a reactor, but rather an initiator."

The study distinguished between **effective leadership traits/characteristics, effective leadership behaviors, and skills and competencies that marked effective combat leaders**. In the first group, the authors included as most important: flexibility, the ability to remain open to new ideas/solutions and to vary procedures as required by changing situations. Additional leadership traits/characteristics rated as contributing to combat

leadership effectiveness were: self confidence, consistency, a positive attitude, and responsibility. The authors noted that these additional traits/characteristics also mattered in non-combat situations.

Effective leadership behaviors included: dealing decisively with crises and making time critical decisions (more important in combat situations than non-combat); remaining calm and composed under pressure; communicating clearly and precisely (although this was rated as more important in non-combat); planning and organizing assets to accomplish goals (equally important in non-combat); taking charge and setting the tempo; and using interpersonal skills to develop cooperative relations (although most enlisted personnel rated this as more important in peacetime whereas officers thought it was more important during combat). Other behaviors normally associated with accomplishing work through others was rated as important, but more important in peacetime. Concern for subordinates was viewed as more important in combat than in peacetime. The Persian Gulf War draft study also revealed that, in a combat situation, subordinates view the technical and tactical competence of their seniors as being extremely important.

The authors of the Persian Gulf War study argue that we should consider non-navy research results, when navy case studies are lacking, in order to improve navy combat leadership. On the other hand, if naval warfare is unique--or at least different--then it would seem that inferring lessons from the study of non-naval warfare may be fraught with problems. The study further concluded that existing Navy leadership programs did not adequately address the combat environment and some total quality leadership (TQL) goals were not necessarily in conformance with combat leadership traits and behaviors (i.e., bias for taking quick action). This study is in the process of being revised and completed and should be available by the end of 1995.

Assessment

The value of the Persian Gulf War study is that it demonstrates that the **U.S. Navy has the internal capability to research major issues of leadership** and to focus on the issues facing leadership training and education today. It is not clear, however, if the **need for combat leadership research has been accepted by all of the senior leadership of the U.S. Navy.** Although the Persian Gulf War study had the blessing of senior leaders at the time, it is not certain whether the U.S. Navy has a policy which specifically requires researching combat for leadership lessons learned. If there had been an official policy, such studies would have been routinely requested and supported. On the contrary, the U.S. Navy does not appear to have previously funded a special study on combat leadership and the priority for the completion of this study has been somewhat low.

SUMMARY

The lack of serious scholarly research into navy combat leadership is somewhat surprising since the major roles and functions of the navy are related to combat missions. Most treatises on navy combat leadership are interesting thoughtpieces authored by individuals who care about the subject but base their work upon anecdotal observation rather than systematic research. What is not so surprising is the controversies over the raw materials themselves which are used as the basis for leadership research. Simply put, **the use of autobiographical, oral history, biographical, and historical data for leadership research is totally insufficient for any combat leadership research project.**

The few existing studies of navy combat leadership reveal a few behaviors, skills, and traits that appear consistently associated with successful navy combat leaders. The most important of those for senior leaders appears to be **vision**, although the more junior leaders studied in the Persian Gulf War study did not yield a similar result. Even if consensus can be reached on all of the behaviors, skills, and traits involved, leadership research must also address the relationship of the leader to the follower and the context in which leadership was exercised.

Just as Sherlock Holmes noted the "dog that did not bark" in the "Case of Silver Blaze,"³⁴ we should note that there has been **no general study of navy or even combat leadership that focuses on "charisma."** The term "charismatic" has often been used to describe military and combat leaders, but with absolutely no precision. Additional materials must be used if we are going to investigate this aspect of leadership. "Charisma" will be addressed in Chapter 4 due to interest in this issue by the Commander, Naval Doctrine Command.

The Navy has long recognized the need for leadership training and education, but the lack of research into combat leadership causes this researcher to conclude that **the U.S. Navy does not consider the field of combat leadership a discrete field of inquiry.** Alternative conclusions include that combat leadership is a discrete field of inquiry but one that either: (1), lacks priority; or (2), does not have a sufficient doctrinal base for ensuring that research is in fact carried out. The doctrinal basis for combat leadership research will be addressed later in this report.

The researcher must also face the obvious question of whether he can consider the questions to be addressed in this report with only the modest amount of research results that are available, or he should expand the data considered by using materials available from research into other non-navy and non-

combat leadership studies? Rather than assuming that non-navy and non-combat leadership studies are valid until proven otherwise, it is to these type questions that this report will now turn.

NOTES

1. Major General Perry M. Smith, USAF (Ret.), *Taking Charge: A Practical Guide for Leaders*, Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1986, p. 60.

2. Perhaps the most significant early work done on general leadership used navy officers as the study sample. See C.L. Shartle and R.M. Stogdill, *Studies in Naval Leadership: Methods, Results, and Applications*, technical report, Columbus, OH: Ohio State University, Personnel Research Board, 1953.

3. Admiral Hyman G. Rickover, USN (Ret.), "Leadership: Again and Again" [Comment and Discussion], U.S. Naval Institute *Proceedings*, 108, no. 10 (October 1982): 129-130.

4. Karel Montor, et al., *Naval Leadership: Voices of Experience*, Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1987. Only 3 of the 487 pages of text are devoted to the specific subject of combat leadership (p. 78-80). In the opening section of those three pages, the discussion begins with the question of motivating troops to leave their foxholes. It is surprising an example was not selected which would appeal to all naval midshipmen. The follow-on sections devote some attention to the opinions of one proven combat U.S. Navy officer, Vice Admiral John Bulkeley, and one very unique U.S. Army combat leader, General Douglas MacArthur. The student is given the names of a few other combat leaders--four of these are U.S. Navy combat admirals all from the Pacific theater of World War II, two are U.S. Army generals, one is a British and another a German field marshal. All ground force examples are from the European theater of World War II.

5. Dr. Karel Montor, Professor of Leadership, U.S. Naval Academy, letters to the author of February 19, and April 23, 1995.

6. Thomas B. Buell, "Oral Histories Help Tell the Tale," U.S. Naval Institute *Proceedings*, 120, no. 7 (July 1994): 44.

7. For excellent introductions to the methodology of content analysis, see: Bernard Berelson, "Content Analysis," *Handbook of Social Psychology*, vol. 1, Garner Lindzey, ed., Cambridge, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1954, p. 488-518; Ole Holsti, "Content Analysis," *Handbook of Social Psychology*, 2nd ed., vol. 2, Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1968, p. 601; Ole Holsti, *Content Analysis for the Social Sciences and Humanities*, Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1969, p. 14; Fred Kerlinger, *Foundations of Behavioral Research*, 2nd ed., New York, NY: Holt, Rinehard and Winston, 1973, p. 525-

535; and Klaus Krippendorff, *Content Analysis: An Introduction to Its Methodology*, Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 1980.

8. Rear Admiral Eugene B. Fluckey, USN (Ret.), *Thunder Below!: The USS Barb Revolutionizes Submarine Warfare in World War II*, Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1992. This is an excellent example of a good book which should be studied today. Admiral Fluckey won the Congressional Medal of Honor and four Navy Crosses for duty in submarines during the Pacific theater of World War II. Anyone who has met him cannot help but be struck by the similarity his personality has with aggressive fighter pilots or an armored cavalry officer.

9. An early example of this book type is Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan, USN, *Types of Naval Officers: Drawn from the History of the British Navy*, Boston, Little, Brown, and Co., 1918. Mahan studied six combat leaders and intertwined a history of their combat achievements with his analysis of combat in the age of sail. Mahan excluded Admiral Lord Horatio Nelson from his study because he felt that the genius of Nelson deserved a separate treatment. Mahan did little analysis of the subject of combat leadership other than to conclude that it was the men and not the material that mattered. Other books like this appear from time to time. Most follow the same pattern of chapters devoted to individual leaders without any attempt to get to the heart of naval combat leadership. For example, see: Stephen Howarth, ed., *Men of War: Great Naval Leaders of World War II*, New York, NY: St Martin's Press, April 1993. We also need to study cases of failure in combat leadership--such cases are more difficult to find chronicled. One recent example is Neil Sheehan, *The Arnheiter Affair*, New York, NY: Random House, 1971.

10. For example, Dean C. Allard, "Nimitz and Spruance: A Naval Style of Command," *Military Leadership and Command: The John Biggs Cincinnati Lectures*, 1988, Henry S. Bausum, ed., Lexington, VA: The VMI [Virginia Military Institute] Foundation, Inc., 1989, p. 109-126.

11. Christopher McKee, *A Gentlemanly and Honorable Profession: The Creation of the U.S. Naval Officer Corps, 1794-1815*, Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1991; James C. Bradford, ed., *Command Under Sail: Makers of the American Naval Tradition 1775-1850*, Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1985; James C. Bradford, ed., *Captains of the Old Steam Navy: Makers of the American Naval Tradition 1840-1880*, Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1986; and James C. Bradford, ed., *Admirals of the New Steel Navy: Makers of the American Naval Tradition 1880-1930*, Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1990.

12. John Prados, "Basting the Turkey to Shoot: Intelligence at the Battle of the Philippine Sea," presented at the World War II in the Pacific Conference, Alexandria, VA, August 11, 1994.

13. The interview that serves as the basis for this comment is not available for citation until the officer in question dies and the records are released by his estate (this illustrates the problems associated with the use of oral histories).

14. Bernard M. Bass, *Leadership and Performance Beyond Expectations*, New York, NY: The Free Press, 1985, p. 180.

15. David C. Evans and Mark R. Peattie, *Kaigun [Navy]: Strategy, Tactics and Technology in the Imperial Japanese Navy, 1887-1941*, December 1994 draft book manuscript, introduction.

16. Lieutenant Thomas B. Grassey, USNR, "Outcomes, Essences, and Individuals," *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, 102, no. 7 (July 1976): 72-75.

17. E.[lmer] B.[elmont] Potter, "The Command Personality," *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, 95, no. 1 (January 1969): 18-24.

18. This point has recently been made in the business world. See: John Huey, "The New Post-heroic Leadership," *Fortune*, February 21, 1994, p. 42-50.

19. One recent example is by Rear Admiral Joseph F. Callo, USN (Ret.), "Nelson: Character Counts in Combat," *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, 121, no. 6 (June 1995): 60-62.

20. Michael Shaara's Pulitzer Prize-winning novel *Killer Angels*, New York, NY: Ballentine Books, July 1975, comes close.

21. Charles Benedict Davenport, *Naval Officers: Their Heredity and Development*, Washington, DC: The Carnegie Institution, 1919, p. 1.

22. For example, if a flight candidate correctly identified London and Paris as the location for *A Tale of Two Cities*, this answer was graded against him. I took this test in 1965 as a flight student candidate and again in 1967 when I was on recruiting duty. I routinely administered the test and analyzed the types of questions that were being asked.

23. For example, see: Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan, USN, *The Life of Nelson: The Embodiment of the Sea Power of Great Britain*, 2nd ed., Boston, MA: Little, Brown and Co., 1899; and James C. Bradford, "John Paul Jones: Honor and Professionalism," *Command Under Sail: Makers of the American Naval Tradition 1775-1850*, James C. Bradford, ed., Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1985, p. 18-45.

24. John Harsfield, *The Art of Leadership in War: The Royal Navy From the Age of Nelson to the End of World War II*, Westport, CT:

Greenwood Press, 1980, especially p. 5-6, 64, 160-162, and 167-170.

25. John Harsfield, *The Art of Leadership in War: The Royal Navy From the Age of Nelson to the End of World War II*, Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1980, p. 162 (emphasis added).

26. This was done by Harsfield himself with Admiral Andrew Brown Cunningham, RN, of Mediterranean World War II fame. Such comparisons find their way into the American literature, with apologies for the comparable officers lacking such a colorful personal life. For example, see: William N. Still, Jr., "David Glasgow Farragut: The Union's Nelson," *Captains of the Old Steam Navy: Makers of the American Naval Tradition 1840-1880*, James C. Bradford, ed., Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1986, p. 166-193.

27. Leanne Atwater and Robert Penn, eds., *Military Leadership: Traditions and Future Trends*, proceedings of a conference held at the United States Naval Academy, 10-12 June 1987.

28. Admiral Thomas H. Moorer, USN (Ret.), "Leadership in War," *Military Leadership: Traditions and Future Trends*, proceedings of a conference held at the United States Naval Academy, 10-12 June 1987, Leanne Atwater and Robert Penn, eds., p. 86-89. Admiral Moorer's paper is less than 2½ pages in length--his biography took another 1½ pages.

29. Lieutenant General Clyde D. Dean, USMC, "Wartime Versus Peacetime Leadership," *Military Leadership: Traditions and Future Trends*, proceedings of a conference held at the United States Naval Academy, 10-12 June 1987, Leanne Atwater and Robert Penn, eds., p. 90-92.

30. Captain Dana P. French, Jr., USN, "Milestones in Naval Leadership Development: Past, Present, and Future," *Military Leadership: Traditions and Future Trends*, proceedings of a conference held at the United States Naval Academy, 10-12 June 1987, Leanne Atwater and Robert Penn, eds., p. 115-121.

31. "Transformational" leadership will be further developed in Chapter 4 on "charismatic" leadership. Of note, however, is that these concepts are thoroughly covered in current Navy leadership training courses.

32. Major Charles A. Leader, USMCR, "Organizational Effectiveness: Acid Test of Successful Leadership," *Military Leadership: Traditions and Future Trends*, proceedings of a conference held at the United States Naval Academy, 10-12 June 1987, Leanne Atwater and Robert Penn, eds., p. 135-141.

33. John E. Hassen, Carol F. Denton, Captain Fred Reis, USNR, and CDR John R. Ronchetto, USNR, "Navy Leadership Lessons From Operation Desert Storm: Effective Combat Leader Behaviors," draft Technical Report 92-005, Orlando, Florida: Naval Training Systems Center, January 1992. Comments on this study were supplemented with a telephone interview with Dr. Larry Pugh, Navy Personnel Research and Development Center, San Diego, CA, February 7, 1994; comments on a draft of this report provided by Dr. Robert F. Morrison, Navy Personnel Research and Development Center, dated 7 April 1995; a meeting with Captain Reis in Arlington, VA on May 1, 1995; a revised executive summary sent to the author on May 10, 1995; and comments on a draft of this report provided by the Director, Personal Excellence and Partnerships Division (PERS-60), dated 12 May 1995, prepared by Captain Reis.

34. Sir Arthur Conan Doyle, *The Complete Sherlock Holmes*, New York, NY: Doubleday, 1930, p. 349.

CHAPTER 2

SHOULD WE EXPAND THE FIELDS OF STUDY?

"In the area of combat leadership it is important to remember that war is not a technological problem, it is fundamentally a human problem."

--Major General Perry M. Smith, USAF (Ret.)¹

With only three published sets of studies and one Navy-sponsored conference which address combat leadership--and conspicuous weakness in each of these and their basic source materials--we obviously must consider whether other types of leadership or combat research and literature should be reviewed to study the issues being considered in this report. Fortunately there are a number of excellent studies on various other forms of leadership as well as combat leadership in the other Services and in other nations. Before we accept these studies, however, there is a fundamental question which must be answered--**should we expand the fields of study outside of navy combat leadership?**

In order to answer the question of whether we should expand the fields of study, this report will first consider the relevance of current non-navy combat leadership research done by psychologists, by business schools, and by political scientists. Each of these groups will again be considered when this report reviews the literature associated with "charismatic" leadership.

PSYCHOLOGICAL/HISTORICAL APPROACH

Although most studies of leadership have been biographical or based upon biographical materials, the field of leadership research has been invaded by psychologists. Psychologists analyze historical figures based upon available records. Thus, a counselor today makes fundamental assessments about personality and behavior of historical individuals. This approach can make fundamental improvements to the current type of historical research which primarily records events. Although psychological research into leadership addresses more than these type issues, it will be these that we will focus on initially.

The different approaches used by historians and psychologists to assess historical figures, in general, have led to an effort within academe to bring these two disciplines closer together in the area of leadership research.² Pilot studies have been conducted on U.S. presidents in which psychologists worked with historians to produce individual and comparative psychological profiles with an eye toward improving methods to eventually address leadership styles.

The blending of history and psychology expanded into the area of military history with assessments of the combat leadership skills of successful generals. The first of these studies was done by a psychologist and resulted in a model with the ability to predict the victor in historical land battles 71% of the time and being able to predict, in general, relative casualties.³ The study found that victory generally went to the more experienced and cautious general rather than the risk taker and the general who operated on the offensive. The winning side also tended to use a divided command structure rather than a centralized command.

Another psychological study focused on a specific American military commander--General Robert E. Lee.⁴ This in-depth study concluded that Lee could master complexity and, when faced with a less-capable opponent, Lee was the victor even against a superior force. The study authors defined complexity as innovativeness, tactical flexibility, a desire to search for and accept new information, and what Napoleon called *coup d'oeil*--an inner eye's ability to quickly assess and master the situation.⁵ Although the authors found that relative complexity was a predictor in battle, complexity itself was not an absolute predictor. There were situational factors that the most capable general was not going to be able to overcome. Furthermore, there are ample examples of following established doctrine and simple straight-forward tactics also leading to victory.

Should psychological combat leadership studies be limited to military combat leadership? One scholar raised the idea that leadership is amoral--good leaders exist in non-traditional, perhaps illegal, combative occupations and perhaps there may be lessons learned from a study of their behavior as well.⁶ Although one might not expect to find military relevance by looking at criminal justice research, there appears to be some value in doing just that.

The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) routinely creates psychological profiles on individuals at-large in order to predict possible future behavior and thus apprehend them. FBI efforts are built upon analyses of past behavior and actions, identification of key decisions and why they were made, and eventual construction of a personality profile.⁷ This is essentially what we would do if attempting to complete a study of past leaders not available for personal meetings with psychological evaluators. In fact, such **psychological assessments would help us understand the full dimensions of the behavior of our successful combat leaders.** Rather than the historical biographical treatments, which are good for building heroic case studies, we need to follow the FBI example and learn more about the individual.

Similarly, the intelligence community builds psychological profiles on enemies in order to predict what they might do next. Although these are not used directly to assess the leadership potential of enemies, the techniques suggest some value to the field of leadership study. The Defense Personnel Security Research Center (PERSEREC), in Monterey, CA, builds similar profiles for use in military counter-intelligence. PERSEREC teams include social and industrial psychologists and organizational behavior specialists. Private consulting firms have also been used to support military research into issues which require the development of psychological profiles.⁸

Psychological research has included analysis of the related concepts of inspirational, "charismatic," and "transformational" leadership.⁹ Extensive studies have been conducted to ascertain both the psychological profiles of "charismatic" leaders and understand the motivations of followers to such leaders. While engaged in this type of research, social and organizational psychologists have focused on leaders in smaller groups and complex organizations.¹⁰ Other psychologists have affiliated with business schools and leadership research organizations (such as the Center for Creative Leadership in Greensboro, NC). These psychologists have emphasized the organizational climate and team building in which good leadership thrives. The data from such studies is an extremely important source of information for combat leadership studies.

From this brief review of the psychological approach to leadership research, and considering the existing state of navy combat leadership research which already include a psychological dimension, it would appear that **psychological research into leadership represents one of the most fruitful areas for further development.** In addition, the government already has the tools to provide the essential raw materials necessary for in-depth leadership research. However, we must remember well-developed psychological profiles on individual leaders represent only part of the overall data--the other major aspects which must be investigated are the followers and the context of leadership. In short, the field of psychology can play an extremely important role in the study of leadership--a role so vital that it simply cannot be ignored.

BUSINESS SCHOOL APPROACH

Business school academic literature has long focused upon the differences between leaders and managers. Recently, more emphasis has been placed on leadership skills due to the increasing importance these schools place on leadership traits. The literature is generally supportive of the simplistic premise that managers and leaders are two distinct personality types with different attitudes toward themselves, their careers, and their

relationships with others. These opinions are generally derived from psychological testing of a wide variety of individuals classified either as leaders or managers.

However, most leaders, especially military officers, need to develop good management skills, especially as they advance in rank. If an officer is incapable of managing his¹¹ own time and resources, what are the chances that he would make an effective leader? Perhaps the distinctions between leadership and management have been overemphasized--we actually need both skills. Thus, the simplistic distinction between leaders and managers is just that--simplistic. In reality, the roles are as intertwined as personality characteristics.

Recently, the business world has increased its interest in military leadership with an eye toward developing lessons for the private sector. Current management literature points out that the military has generally been doing the same job for centuries, hence it spends more time on execution rather than planning.¹² This literature recognizes that the combat leadership part of the execution phase of military leadership has implications for the aggressive competitive business environment.¹³ Conversely, should we study aggressive competitive business leaders in order to learn techniques for military combat leadership? The business world has well-developed case studies of success and failure of top-level leaders. They have also invested heavily in the development of tests which attempt to measure the inherent personality of individuals seeking jobs.¹⁴

Other business studies focus on learning by very intelligent and successful individuals. Although business leaders often appear supportive about the concept of continuous improvement, it is often they who are the obstacles to change. Leaders who have not been allowed to fail (and deal with the consequences of failure) often develop "brittle" personalities which cannot immediately handle situations for which they have no experience or training. This is the type of individual who often reacts to new ideas defensively.¹⁵

The business world has recognized that leadership matters, in part due to problems with major corporate giants (such as IBM [International Business Machines]) attributed to senior leadership. The phrase "CEO [chief executive officer] disease" refers to senior business leaders who believe they already have mastered everything they need to know about leadership (or any subject) and are not receptive to new ideas. Lieutenant General Walter F. Ulmer, Jr., U.S. Army (Ret.), President and CEO of the Center for Creative Leadership (CCL) in Greensboro, North Carolina, also refers to this as the "general's disease."

The business school leadership approach brings with it the added dimension of understanding the organizational context of leadership. What works in one organization does not necessarily work in another. A major contributor in such work has been Peter Senge. His investigation of the "learning organization" focused on organizations that have a shared vision and an ability to seek improvement. As part of his study, Senge examined what it takes to lead a "learning organization." Leadership in such organizations is more like that required of designers and teachers charged with building an organization "...where people continually expand their capabilities to understand complexity, clarify vision, and improve shared mental models..."¹⁶ Many business school studies have actually been done by psychologists.

Another strength of business school studies is that they focus on the leader in the context of his followers. Hence it is common that the business leader who attends leadership development training will have undergone a "360°" review of his/her own skills as a leader--a review by seniors, peers, and subordinates. Again, many business school studies have actually been done by psychologists. Business schools have also devoted a considerable amount of attention to the question of "charismatic" and "transformational" leadership--both of which accept that the role of the leader must be within the context of the followers and the environment.

Many corporations have made a commitment to send their senior executives to special leadership training and education courses provided in the civilian sector. These centers often have well-qualified staffs that publish research results which may be of interest to the military--under the assumption there are no significant differences between the combat and non-combat leadership. Although it is obvious that the environment in which combat occurs is not the same as non-combat, it is not clear if the personality traits and behaviors that make a good leader are identical in each case. The subject of the differences between combat and non-combat deserve additional attention and will be addressed in the Chapter 3.

Researchers at the Center for Creative Leadership have published some extremely interesting materials that have been used by senior executives, professionals, and managers interested in the development of executives. The high turnover rate of senior executives in the business world has resulted in a search for methods to prevent "burnout" and turnover. One of the major areas of contribution is the notion of **personal development**--efforts for self-improvement based upon introspection and analysis. For the individual to better him/herself (personal development), he/she must develop goals beyond that of raw ambition.¹⁷

One major contribution to the literature focused on the experiences of successful business executives.¹⁸ Findings substantiated the need for continued self-development which starts from an understanding of self. According to this study, some of the major life lessons that had to be learned are: recognition of personal limits, sensitivity to others, coping with events beyond one's own control, and the balance between life and work. Once empowered with an understanding of shortcomings, an individual has choices of accepting responsibility or denying it, diagnosing shortcomings and what to do about them (if anything). Choices for the latter category include: building new strengths, anticipating situations, compensating, or self-change.

Business school studies on leadership appear to represent a major area for materials of interest to any study of navy combat leadership. Just because the case studies used in business schools will primarily be non-combat oriented, that does not mean that the theory, findings, and conclusions will have no value for the military.

POLITICAL SCIENCE APPROACH

There are extremely well-developed political science studies that examine the subject of military leadership--albeit in primarily non-combat contexts. Most of this research has studied world class leaders. In the United States, there is ample research into leadership styles and performance of U.S. presidents. Such research is extremely mature and has blended psychology with the historical recording of events. More Presidential, and other political, leadership research has also included investigation into the concept of "charisma" (addressed in Chapter 4).

Other political scientists look at the role of the military in society--leadership in the non-combat domain. One of the major theorists to consider the role of the non-heroic military leader in society was Morris Janowitz.¹⁹ Janowitz was part of a major debate over the role of the military in politics that occurred during the end of the 1950s. Janowitz and others argued that the military officer should be apolitical and concern himself with professional matters. An opposing school of thought proposed that the military was already politically aware (able to mix military considerations with political ones) and this tendency would increase as officers rose in rank.

Janowitz wrote about the "heroic fighter" but admitted that armed forces already included a group of managers that operated outside of the combat environment. He predicted that the modern military would give birth to one additional type of officer--the technologist--of which Admiral Hyman G. Rickover, USN, was

probably the epitome. The idea of Rickover as a technologist leader might explain why he criticized the U.S. Naval Institute for its support of leadership articles.²⁰ To Rickover, the "system" provided the leadership guidance to the junior and the junior need only follow established doctrine.

Janowitz also found that "the effectiveness of military leaders tends to vary inversely with their exposure to a routinized military career" and that "rule-breaking military leaders are characterized by pronounced unconventionality in their career lines."²¹ This finding would support the theory that the peacetime military is less likely to produce officers willing to take risks. What has not been established, however, is whether risk-takers actually seek unconventional careers.

Janowitz's thesis has had wide acceptance in the West despite the obvious leadership success demonstrated by traditional "heroic fighters" still operating in the non-technological environment during the past century. One scholar points out the traditional leadership skills practiced by Lenin, Stalin, Hitler, and Mao which undermines the Janowitz thesis.²² Such findings also point to the cultural differences in leadership.

In addition, political science has made an enormous contribution in understanding the power motivation of political leaders. For example, Harold Lasswell suggested in his book *Psychopathology and Politics* that the political man actually sought power in the form of deference from others. Such behavior, Lasswell argued, was essentially the displacement of an individual's private conflicts into the public domain.²³ If such a hypothesis is substantiated, it should be considered by those who study military leadership, since power is also a motivator in this domain as well.

A recent book by the Director of the Leadership Project at the John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, addresses a series of interesting political issues in the field of leadership. In his recent book, *Leadership Without Easy Answers*, Dr. Ronald A. Heifetz, a psychiatrist, has evaluated political leadership in democracies. Heifetz notes that the linguistic root of the word "to lead" is "to go forth, die." Heifetz further states that military leadership has recently changed from manipulating behavior by coercion to influencing behavior by leadership style.²⁴ Although *Leadership Without Easy Answers* contains only a few military and combat case studies, it does raise a number of issues that are of interest to those concerned with combat leadership.

The value of political science leadership studies is that they generally accept the importance of context. Leaders are

studied not in isolation but rather in relationship to followers and others and for the effect they have on the political environment. Since much of that effect has to do with instituting change, the **political science approach also appears to have much to offer.**

SUMMARY

This chapter is not all-inclusive, it only samples the on-going research of interest to the military. Its intent was merely to introduce the reader to the idea that fields other than history should be consulted to adequately research topics of interest to combat leadership. The field of leadership is multidisciplinary. Conventional wisdom amongst many Navy line officers that only a few good autobiographies or history books are needed as resources for leadership teaching is incorrect.

Any serious research on the subject of combat leadership must include the fields of psychology, business, and political science. **Each of these has value.** There may be additional academic disciplines which should be considered in leadership research, but those addressed herein were developed to demonstrate the need to supplement the historical paradigm. Recognizing the value of these three, and perhaps other disciplines, we must now turn to some basic questions that must be considered before we can decide which literature has value.

NOTES

1. Major General Perry M. Smith, USAF (Ret.), *Taking Charge: A Practical Guide for Leaders*, Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1986, p. 60.
2. The Historical Figures Assessment Collaborative, "Assessing Historical Figures: The Use of Observer-Based Personality Descriptions," *Historical Methods Newsletter*, 10, no. 2 (Spring 1977): 66-76.
3. Dean Keith Simonton, "Land Battles, Generals, and Armies: Individual and Situational Determinants of Victory and Casualties," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 38, no. 1 (1980): 110-119.
4. Peter Suedfeld, R.S. Corteen, and C. McCormick, "The Role of Integrative Complexity in Military Leadership: Robert E. Lee and His Opponents," *Journal of Applied Social Psychology*, 16, no. 6 (1986): 498-507.
5. Karl von Clausewitz, *On War*, O.J. Matthijs Jolles, trans., New York, NY: The Modern Library, 1943, p. 33-35. German Field Marshal Helmuth Graf von Moltke [The Elder] referred to this same phenomenon as *blick*, literally a glance. German military

literature frequently used this term to mean the ability to make a quick estimate of the situation. Daniel J. Hughes, ed., [Field Marshal Helmuth Graf von] *Moltke on the Art of War: Selected Writings*, Harry Bell and Daniel J. Hughes, trans., Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1993, p. 196.

6. Lieutenant Thomas B. Grassey, USNR, "Outcomes, Essences, and Individuals," U.S. Naval Institute *Proceedings*, 102, no. 7 (July 1976): 74.

7. Richard L. Ault, Jr. and James T. Reese, "A Psychological Assessment of Crime Profiling," *FBI [Federal Bureau of Investigation] Law Enforcement Bulletin*, March 1980; "Offender Profiles: A Multidisciplinary Approach," *FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin*, September 1980; John E. Douglas, et al., "Criminal Profiling from Crime Scene Analysis," *Behavioral Sciences & the Law*, 4, no. 4 1986, p. 401-421; John E. Douglas and Alan E. Burgess, "Criminal Profiling: A Valuable Investigative Tool Against Violent Crime," *FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin*, December 1986; and a telephone interview with Supervisory Special Agent Gregg McCrary, Behavioral Sciences Unit, National Center for the Analysis of Violent Crime, Federal Bureau of Investigation Academy, Quantico, VA, October 17, 1994.

8. Telephone interview with Dr. Jerry Hedge, Chief Operating Officer, Personnel Decision Research Institute (PDRI), Minneapolis, MN, 28 October 1994 and follow-up letter of November 2, 1994 with associated introductory materials. PDRI has a staff of primarily industrial organizational psychologists.

9. These concepts will be addressed later in this report, in Chapter 4.

10. An example of such research includes: Gary A. Yukl and David D. Van Fleet, "Cross-situational, Multinational Research on Military Leadership Effectiveness," *Organizational Behavior and Human Performance*, 30, 1982, p. 87-108.

11. Where "his" or "he" is used in this report, it should be understood to include "hers" and "she."

12. Jack Scarborough, "Revisiting the Military Stereotype: Take Another Look!" *Journal of Management Inquiry*, 2, no. 3 (September 1993): 26*-271.

13. Al Ries and Jack Trout, *Marketing Warfare*, New York, NY: McGraw-Hill, Inc., November 1986.

14. One source of such psychological testing is the Institute for Motivational Survey in Redwood City, California. In a telephone interview with their Director, William Winslow, on March 9, 1994, the basic process was explained--33 measurable behavior

characteristics compared to the characteristics desired for any occupation. Hence, if it is possible to identify the characteristics desired in navy combat leaders, as well as those not desired, it is possible to test for such behavior preferences.

15. Chris Argyris, "Teaching Smart People How to Learn," *Harvard Business Review*, 69, no. 3 (May-June 1991): 99-109.

16. Peter M. Senge, *The Fifth Discipline: The Art and Practice of the Learning Organization*, New York, NY: Doubleday, 1990, p. 340. See also Paul Bracken, "The Military After Next," *The Washington Quarterly*, 16, no. 4 (Autumn 1993): 171, for a discussion of the need for "organizational learning;" and Peter M. Senge, et al., *The Fifth Discipline Fieldbook: Strategies and Tools for Building a Learning Organization*, New York, NY: Doubleday, July 1994, p. 50-52.

17. Robert E. Kaplan with Wilfred H. Drath and Joan R. Kofodimos, *Beyond Ambition: How Driven Managers Can Lead Better and Live Better*, San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass Publishers, 1991.

18. Morgan W. McCall, Jr., Michael M. Lombardo, and Ann M. Morrison, *The Lessons of Experience: How Successful Executives Develop on the Job*, Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1988, p. 7, 92-93, 96, 136, 137-143.

19. Morris Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier*, New York, NY: The Free Press, 1960.

20. Admiral Hyman G. Rickover, USN (Ret.), "Leadership: Again and Again" [Comment and Discussion], *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, 108, no. 10 (October 1982): 129-130.

21. Morris Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier*, New York, NY: The Free Press, 1960, p. 151.

22. Robert B. Bathurst, *Intelligence and the Mirror: On Creating an Enemy*, London, UK: Sage Publications for the International Peace Research Institute (PRIO), Oslo, Norway, 1993, p. 50-51.

23. Harold Lasswell, *Psychopathology and Politics*, New York, The Viking Press, 1960, p. 300.

24. Dr. Ronald A. Heifetz, *Leadership Without Easy Answers*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1994, p. 15.

CHAPTER 3

BASIC LEADERSHIP ISSUES THAT MUST BE CONSIDERED

The dearth of navy combat leadership studies forces a choice about whether to include non-navy and non-combat research results in this study. Should we extrapolate the lessons of leadership from the studies on General Robert E. Lee to the maritime environment? How about the lessons of "charismatic" business leader successes and failures? Do these apply in the navy combat environment?

In order to further consider basic leadership issues, we must first answer five key questions. First, is combat leadership inherently different than non-combat leadership? The answer to this question appears to be the single most important one which must be dealt with in this leadership research project. We will first review literature associated with this issue.

The obvious second question is whether the demands of leadership vary by the rank and position of the leader. Were the leadership demands of General Robert E. Lee the same as those facing the Southern lieutenants in the trenches? Third, does navy leadership, or leadership in a maritime environment, have any unique requirements which remove it from other forms of leadership? Fourth, can leadership studies be generalized across international cultural boundaries, i.e., are studies of Royal (British) Navy combat leaders valid for the U.S. or Russian Air Forces? Fifth, do individual and organizational cognitive (learning) preferences influence leadership? Each of these questions will be considered in turn before "charismatic" is addressed in the next chapter.

DIFFERENCES BETWEEN COMBAT AND NON-COMBAT LEADERSHIP?

The previously cited, but limited, studies of navy combat leadership provide mixed messages on the differences between combat and non-combat leadership. Davenport stressed the psychological differences in officers that made good warriors--with notable exceptions. Harsfield did not specifically address the issue, but, from his conclusions, we can infer inherent differences in the two types of leaders.¹ The Persian Gulf War study implied that what would make a good non-combat leader would not necessarily make a good combat leader.

The U.S. Army and Air Force have devoted a considerable effort to studying the differences between combat and non-combat leadership. U.S. Air Force research has centered about student theses at the Air University at Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama. The U.S. Army studies range from anecdotal case studies to more

theoretical treatments in the academic environment. In addition, there have been other types of leadership treatments that we may want to consider in an analysis of combat leadership for the U.S. Navy.

Unfortunately, there has not been a large number of combat leadership studies. To validate the expansion of information that can be considered in any study of navy combat leadership, we must determine whether research results from non-combat environment can be generalized to combat.² If one accepts the value of non-combat leadership research, or at least substantial parts of it, there is a wealth of data available. If one does not, the researcher is stymied due to the paucity of adequate materials.

U.S. Air Force Studies

Major Thomas L. Lentz, USAF, studied the most successful American fighter group in the European theater of operations during World War II.³ He surveyed three surviving aces from that group and based his 1986 report on the historical evidence from these P-47B flyers. Lentz studied the impact of good leadership on the performance of the organizations. Lentz described the most important traits as aggressiveness, the desire to **lead from the front** (by example), and the capability of team building. Lentz concluded that combat leaders were not born but emerged by necessity from the available pool of leaders at the time.

In 1986, then Commandant of the National War College, Major General Perry M. Smith, USAF, prepared and published *Taking Charge: A Practical Guide for Leaders*. This book discusses the differences between combat and non-combat leadership and General Smith concludes that there is a strong parallel between leadership in combat and that in a crisis. Smith states that there are the "same tensions, the same need for flexibility and innovation, and the same need to keep things basic and simple."⁴

The differences between combat and non-combat leadership was also addressed in three 1989 studies at the Air War College. Lieutenant Colonel Robert Mabus, USAF, studied the articles, biographies, autobiographies of five senior U.S. Army and Army Air Corps combat leaders of World War II.⁵ His conclusion was that **combat leadership was a special talent** requiring distinct personality traits from those of the manager.⁶ Mabus criticized Air Force training for its tendency to emphasize peacetime management and gave specific recommendations for including in a variety of Service schools and courses the study of the great historical combat leaders. He also recognized the vital role of **mentoring** by senior officers.

Mabus' findings were echoed in another Air War College thesis by Lieutenant Colonel Robert P. Hansen, USAF.⁷ Hansen also

used historical evidence of previous successful senior combat leaders, but included one foreign officer in with the mix of eight others from the U.S. Army, Army Air Corps, and Confederate armed forces. Hansen attempted to compile a list of common leadership traits, but concluded that these **traits were often not tolerated during peacetime**. He then further concluded that the **Services were doing everything except preparing leaders for combat**. Hansen noted that good combat leaders were not prone to behaviors which would assist researchers (a problem as researchers attempt to understand and document their behavior).

The third thesis from 1989 took an entirely different approach.⁸ Lieutenant Colonel Donald H. Watts, Jr., U.S. Army, concluded we should focus more attention on the overall attributes of leadership rather than stressing the differences between combat and non-combat leadership. Watts conceded that during combat approaches and techniques may change as the level of friction and uncertainty increases. He added that the two most important leadership qualities required in combat are the ability to quickly assess the situation (*coup d'oeil/blick*) and to motivate subordinates--traits required of all good leaders. Watts also concluded that good leaders may be a product of genes rather than training.

Two additional theses on combat leadership appeared in 1990 at the Air War College. The first of these was by Lieutenant Colonel James M. Fisher, U.S. Army.⁹ Fisher's study focused on ground combat and officers of field grade rank or below. He emphasized the overt display of physical **courage** required of the leader in this environment. Fisher's thesis did not employ a rigorous methodology, but rather looked at the autobiographies of two officers whose field heroism is the "stuff that dreams are made of," as well as some of the secondary literature dealing with leadership. Fisher accepted the differences between combat and non-combat leadership and concluded the subjects that he studied had difficulty in adapting their behaviors between the two areas. Thus Fisher concluded that the skills acquired in non-combat situations are not necessarily transferrable into combat.

The second 1990 Air War College Study was prepared by Lieutenant Colonel David J. Semon, USAF.¹⁰ Semon accepted the differences between combat and non-combat leadership and added another dimension--the need for combat leadership training and education due to personnel losses from retirements and force downsizing. What Semon did not address (and perhaps should have) was the role that doctrine could play in capturing the lessons of combat for others to share.

Captain Charles T. Barco, USAF, education consultant at the Quality Institute at Maxwell AFB, wrote a rather interesting article in the Fall 1994 *Airpower Journal*.¹¹ Although not

specifically stated, his basic premise is that combat leadership is fundamentally different than non-combat leadership. Barco concludes that the Air Force is moving away from personal development (self-growth and mastery) and "transformational" leadership styles.

U.S. Army Studies

In 1984, at the U.S. Army Command & General Staff College, Major Jerry D. Morelock, U.S. Army, prepared a thesis on combat leadership by senior officers.¹² He examined the records of an army, corps, and division commanders and assessed their personal leadership, technical competence, organizational leadership, and management abilities. Morelock concluded that, although each exhibited different personal leadership styles, all were able to articulate well-defined **goals** and issue mission-type orders and all made regular visits to forward locations.

In 1986, Colonel Bennet S. Jones, U.S. Army, wrote a leadership research report for the Industrial College of the Armed Forces.¹³ Jones' premise was that the Army did not promote or reward the combat leaders--**risk takers**--that it would need to fight the next war. His assumption was based upon the poor record of risk-takers in the peacetime Army. Jones used a job competency assessment model and existing U.S. and foreign literature to determine traits desired of a combat leader. He also employed a performance characteristics inventory survey of Army officer students at the National Defense University. Jones assembled a list of behavior characteristics and traits that would make a successful combat leader and argued--but **did not prove--that such traits would not serve an officer well in the peacetime Army**. Jones believed two factors in particular--breaking with doctrine and tradition and not relying on convention--were essential in combat and less likely to be rewarded in peacetime.

Indeed, Jones concludes that, in most instances peacetime, performance ratings do not reward officers who have high potential as a combat leaders. Whether an individual's behavior characteristics and traits benefit the organization at various different times is an organizational values problem which is generally ignored by researchers studying individuals.¹⁴ The lack of proof supporting his premise was explained by the tremendous amount of secondary literature by individual officers indicating agreement. Jones did not measure the percentage of officers who have written articles arguing that warriors were not getting promoted, nor did he measure the number who chose not to write--perhaps because they had contrary opinions.

In an effort to determine generic competencies, Jones did not identify the rank of the leaders exhibiting combat associated traits (perhaps a fatal flaw in his research). Jones assumed in

his job competency assessment that individual competencies were separate from the demands of the job and the organizational environment. Unfortunately, he did not address the demands of the job and the organizational environment in his study. Although a very interesting paper, Jones' study did not apply scientific methodology nor achieve the author's aims.

Lieutenant Colonel K.E. Hamburger, U.S. Army, at the History Department of the U.S. Military Academy, led a study team of seven officers in the preparation of an assessment of past combat leadership successes. Hamburger's report looked at over 200 foreign and domestic combat leaders throughout recorded history who had met with success as well as failure.¹⁵ The Hamburger study then evaluated those personal characteristics that were present in every single case of success and, when they were absent, resulted in failure. Identified traits were: terrain sense, single-minded tenacity, audacity, physical confidence and health, and practiced and practical judgement. In many respects, this report resembles the Davenport study.

Report results correlated tenacity with high moral courage and scrupulous ethical behavior; audacity with a strong real and projected **self-image**; and superior judgment with *coup d'oeil*. These traits were present in the combat leaders regardless of the historical period, the country involved, or the conditions of combat. The Hamburger study concluded that these traits had been observed in the combat leaders being studied even at a very early age. Thus, these traits **were not learned**. Of note is the fact that many of these officers had the opportunity to exhibit and hone these skills in a non-combat environment prior to being tested under fire.

In evaluating units that were unsuccessful, the Hamburger study concluded that in no case which they studied was a unit able to overcome, in combat, the deficiencies of its leader. However, in the cases of successful units, the leader was able to overcome the problems of deficient troops, orders, or unforeseen obstacles. Two characteristics commonly considered to be a part of the American character--strong religious convictions and a tie to one's troops--were found to be irrelevant to success in combat. The study further concluded that **successful performance in even the most stressful of non-combat assignments was not a predictor of successful performance on the field of battle.**

The Hamburger study team narrowed down the initial population of 200 combat leaders to a smaller group for more in-depth analysis.¹⁶ They chose to discard some of the initial group because the cultural setting of the society and military was so different from the modern U.S. Army that some of the leadership lessons would simply not apply. The study team did not consciously overlook female combat leaders, however their

historical research did not uncover any that met the basic criteria for inclusion in the study group--leadership exhibited under actual combat conditions. The study highlighted that **two types of leaders generally failed--the "one man show" and the "driven man."**

In June 1991, an Army officer and two academics from New Mexico State University presented a paper at a conference sponsored by the Center for Creative Leadership. This paper reported on general leadership, but the authors made the assumption that combat versus non-combat would be an "obvious" situational modifier in any study of leadership.¹⁷

Lieutenant Colonel Kenneth R. Knight, U.S. Army, authored an individual study project at the U.S. Army War College in 1992 that attempted to deal with the differences between combat and peacetime leadership.¹⁸ Knight used the 1991 Persian Gulf War as a case study and based his research on interviews with available combat commanders. His conclusions were that the **requirements of non-combat and combat leadership were essentially the same**, although the circumstances varied.

In 1993, Major Arthur J. Athens, USMC, prepared a leadership monograph while attending the School of Advanced Military Studies at the U.S. Army Command & General Staff College.¹⁹ Athens analyzed intuitive decision-making to determine its application to the battlefield commander's need to rapidly survey a situation, making quick assessments and decisions (*coup d'oeil*). He used the memoirs of two successful combat-experienced general officers as case studies--neither of whom were Americans. Athens concluded that **intuitive skills** correlated strongly with *coup d'oeil*.

Athens noted that *coup d'oeil* has been a frequent topic of many noted military theorists of all nationalities. The key characteristics of *coup d'oeil* appear to be: the ability to operate in **ambiguous and uncertain environments**; the ability to recognize the essential elements of a problem; rapid decision making; the inability to articulate a rational decision making process; and a solid foundation of comfort with this process--trust in themselves. Athens failed to draw the conclusion that a leader must also have trust in his subordinate--trust being a two-way street.

Major Athens noted that the military as an organization tended to operate within the more comfortable framework of rational decision making, thus making it difficult for the intuitive leader to survive. He therefore **recommended that officers be introduced to intuitive decision-making earlier in their careers** and pointed out the value in studying historical combat leadership lessons.

Doctrinal publications on leadership offer the most definitive statement of U.S. Army views. The 1987 publication *Leadership and Command at Senior Levels*, FM [Field Manual] 22-103,²⁰ clearly addresses the issue of peace and war. It states "the concepts discussed in this manual make no distinction in applicability for peace or war" because there will be little time to learn new skills in wartime--hence leadership must be the same in peace or in war.

Assessment

"There is no substitute for actual battle experience for the commander in acquiring knowledge of his own ability and the capabilities and the limitations of his subordinates."

--*War Instructions: United States Navy, 1944*

The differences between combat and non-combat leadership can be examined using an analogy of automobile tires.²¹ All tires have basic traits--ratings for load, speed, durability, traction, and temperature. Yet, there are two basic types of tires--radial and bias-ply. If the load is light, the speed never excessive, and in good weather, the less expensive bias-ply tire is sufficient. With heavier loads, excessive speeds, and adverse weather conditions, the radial tire is the better buy. We can only guess which type of tire to purchase based on predictions of road and weather conditions or how long we will own the car. Thus, some of us buy bias-ply (to save money) and learn from experience that we should have bought radials. Others learn, however, that the bias-ply was in fact just good enough.

Although non-combat leadership is probably less demanding than combat, the same leadership traits are needed in both situations. That does not mean the successful non-combat leader will automatically make a good combat leader. Until the individual is placed in a combat situation the outcome is unknown. Do we simply put leaders in harm's way awaiting their performance? Or can we, in the absence of continuous hostilities, use the full range of simulations and combat training centers to attempt to replicate combat (fully recognizing that nothing can do this perfectly). Humans can and do learn to perform better under stress; an automobile tire cannot.

There are obvious differences in combat conditions and the non-combat environment. Leading in combat is vastly different from leading in peacetime.²² Yet, is there a difference in the personality traits and behaviors expected of a combat leader in each circumstance? In peacetime, we emphasize personnel concerns ahead of mission accomplishment--partly to ensure that we have good people around when the shooting starts. In combat, a leader may have to take decisive action which will knowingly doom the

lives of good men and women. An extremely compassionate leader may invite disaster if he delays.

Are there personality characteristics needed for effective leadership? Do these characteristics transfer from non-combat to combat? Unfortunately, most of the time this distinction is interpreted as the relationship of combat to non-combat. According to Lieutenant General Walter Ulmer, U.S. Army (Ret.), who formerly headed the Center for Creative Leadership (CCL), the equating of business with combat demeans the soldier and confuses the businessman.²³

Yet there are more similarities in the environment that one expects. When combat leaders fail to perform as expected, they are often relieved of command. In the business world, leaders and managers that fail to deliver are fired. While in non-combat situations, failures in leadership may generally be less catastrophic than in combat in some parts of the military, the failure of one leader (for example, the submarine commander), can lead to catastrophes similar to combat.

In the business world, leaders and managers often enter an organization at the top (lateral entry). This also occurs in combat. When a commander is killed or relieved, a new commanding officer may be assigned to the unit, one who has not brought the unit through its training cycle. Indeed, this new officer may not have ever been in a similar, or any, combat situation.

The differences between types of combat clearly needs further research. Is Marine Corps artillery combat essentially the same as naval gunfire support from a warship anchored off the coast? Is the hand-to-hand combat of special forces equivalent to firing a missile from a submerged submarine? Does the highly technical environment of modern combat make the lessons of historical combat leaders less relevant today?²⁴ Do leadership skills vary between situations? In the absence of any hard research on these questions, we can only look to the behavior of the military to ascertain the answers.

Based upon the actual behavior of the U.S. Navy in its existing training and education of leaders, one must **conclude** that, as an institution, the **U.S. Navy does not accept the differences between combat and non-combat leadership or leadership skills for different forms of combat**. If the U.S. Navy did accept the differences, there would be explicit development (mentoring programs or special notations on fitness reports) of combat leaders and curricula to support such development.

However, it appears that the U.S. Navy did once accept the importance of combat leadership. The series of Navy doctrinal *War Instructions* issued from 1924-1944 are quite revealing. The *War*

*Instructions: United States Navy, 1924, F.T.P. 43,*²⁵ were a part of an overall hierarchy of Navy doctrine which included general guidance directed at specific combat arms. The *War Instructions: United States Navy, 1934, F.T.P. 143,*²⁶ expanded doctrine to include the functions of the Navy in the context of joint warfare with the Army. Neither the 1924 nor 1934 versions contain any reference to leadership-only command. With the outbreak of World War II, the U.S. Navy again revised their combat doctrine--presumably with the benefit of three years of long and hard combat experience.

The *War Instructions* of November 1944²⁷ opened with a chapter devoted to "The Human Element in Naval Strength." This chapter points out that with the transition from the age of sail to modern war:

"...great important, and often inordinate value, has been attached to material developments. Material represents the means, but not the end."

--*War Instructions: United States Navy, 1944*

This chapter emphasizes the role of the commander leading his personnel. In order to do that, the commander must "not neglect to evaluate himself."

DO LEADERSHIP REQUIREMENTS VARY WITH RANK AND POSITION?

"For each rank, from the lowest upward, in order to render distinguished services in war, a particular genius is required."

--Karl von Clausewitz²⁸

The need to motivate troops in the face of combat obstacles--to develop their fighting spirit (*élan*) is obvious. At the outbreak of World War I, the French Army was committed to the defense of France. They anticipated a decisive engagement, against German troops, fought under an offensive doctrine on foreign soil. France envisaged a short, exciting, offensive war of annihilation. During this war, French soldiers were encouraged by their superior *élan* and told to get out of the trenches and face the enemy in offensive tactical combat actions. When the war did not develop as planned, millions of men died in operational-level offensive military operations that had no significant political purpose.²⁹ Such behavior suggests that, to be successful, organizations, in addition to individuals, must have the capability to learn.

The mindless offensive spirit perhaps once appropriate in the trenches does not have a place today at the operational or strategic-levels of war. *Élan* can, and should, be exhibited only at the tactical-level of warfare.³⁰ If this offensive warrior

spirit appears at headquarters or in a supreme commander, it has proven catastrophic. The most senior leadership of the World War I French Army has earned the criticism of scholars, and the distrust of foreign militaries sent to assist France, for being more concerned with maintaining the image of the warrior rather than knowing how to run a war.

In 1588, when the Spanish commander of the Armada learned that the English did not intend to fight a close-in battle, but would stand-off and use long-range artillery, he felt that Spain's religious and moral superiority would make up the difference.³¹ This is a maritime example of misplaced faith in *élan* that should have never left the deck plates.

Similarly, the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) developed an emphasis on *seishin*, or spirit, which led to overconfidence in battle. *Seishin* was an outgrowth of pre-modern Japanese martial emphasis. The IJN counted on *seishin* and an offensive doctrine to be decisive in combat during their war against the United States. As events were to prove, their confidence was unfounded and resulted in an arrogance which discounted potential or proven American capabilities and a blindness to material conditions.³²

Yet, when the national political leadership chooses the military as an acceptable tool to obtain decisive political results, the military often favors offensive combat to obtain decisive and positive results.³³

"Good leadership is synonymous with inspiring confidence in those who follow, and confidence is born of [positive] results."

--Norman Dixon³⁴

What kind of leaders can transcend what they learned as second lieutenants in the trenches and address complex political, diplomatic, judicial, economic, or environmental, issues when in the most senior of combat military leadership positions? Are leaders within our own ranks able to distinguish what is required at the various levels of war?

U.S. Army Research

The U.S. Army has sponsored a series of research projects³⁵ on the subject of leadership under the centralized supervision of the U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences.³⁶ These research projects generally conclude that studies of leadership relative to rank have only been conducted within the last twenty years--hence there is not a great deal of research at all.

Of the studies that do exist, some of the more interesting examine the requisite skills and developmental process for general officers. Using rigorous interview techniques, and follow-up content analysis of interviews, the Army has identified the basic and requisite skills necessary for general officers at the one and two as well as at the three and four-star levels. For this study, the Army interviewed about one-quarter of the one and two-star generals and about two-thirds of the three and four-star officers on active duty.

The Army recognized that the skills required of leadership varied tremendously with the rank of the individual. The ability to master skills at various levels are not the same--more capability is required at the higher ranks. In short, what made an excellent colonel did not make an excellent general officer. As an organization, the Army recognized that it needed to groom four-star officers and assist the colonel to make the transition to general officer status.

To set the differences in skills and behaviors into a more readily understandable context, the Army used the reasonably familiar Meyers-Briggs Type Indicator (MBTI) test. The MBTI measures bi-polar preferences derived from Carl Gustav Jung's theory of personality types.³⁷ The dimensions of this test show preferences for the following behaviors:

<u>E</u> xtrovert.....	I.....	<u>I</u> ntrovert
<u>S</u> ensing.....	I.....	<u>I</u> ntuitive
<u>T</u> hinking.....	I.....	<u>F</u> eeling
<u>J</u> udging.....	I.....	<u>P</u> erceiving

The pattern exhibited by most active duty colonel/Navy captains is that of an "ESTJ," or someone whose behavior is more extroverted (E) rather than introverted (I), more sensing (S) rather than intuitive (N), more thinking (T) rather than feeling (F), and more judging (J) rather than perceiving (P).³⁸ An individual whose behavior is more extroverted than introverted will turn to others vice his own judgment when in need of an input to problem solving. Individuals who are more intuitive appear more capable of **building complex cognitive maps**. Although the average colonel may be an "ESTJ," that by no means implies that all good leaders have this pattern--indeed careful analysis reveals leaders with every possible combination of MBTI test results. The "E" or "I" score does not appear to be particularly interesting in assessing leadership.

This opinion appears to be shared by the former Director of the U.S. Naval Historical Center:

"...effective leaders do not need to be endowed with warrior-like personalities...commanders with

understated or even introverted demeanors can be highly successful."

--Dean C. Allard³⁹

Indeed, the independence of the United States owes itself to the successful leadership of General George Washington, who was anything but a "charismatic" combat leader.

Testing at the Center for Creative Leadership (CCL) in Greensboro, North Carolina, reveals that only about twelve percent of general officers test as "ESTJs" by the time that they reach the three-star rank.⁴⁰ Indeed, 41% of all Lieutenant Generals no longer exhibit the characteristic "TJ" at all. Army-sponsored studies also make it extremely clear that **the "ESTJ" pattern is not exhibited by most three and four-star general officers** and that "ESTJ" is not a desired pattern at this rank.⁴¹

The more successful senior general officers demonstrate skills in consensus building, **envisioning**, climate setting, **self-evaluation**, sharing frames of reference, **risk-taking**, and dealing with uncertainty. They are more willing to trust their **intuition**, use both feelings and thinking to attack problems, and are far **less judgmental** than those officers still within their "stovepipes." Army reports conclude that **cognitive ability and conceptual complexity skills are among the most critical**. If anything, **the desired MBTI pattern at the highest levels of the military are "NT" (intuitive-thinking)**.⁴²

Additional studies demonstrate that even the newly promoted general officer has already evolved beyond the "ESTJ" colonel, but has not yet exhibited the same behaviors and preferences as the three and four-star general.⁴³ Indeed, even junior general officers have more developed cognitive skills (mental mapping, problem management, planning/envisioning), dispositional skills/traits (dealing with uncertainty/risk taking, controlling through indirect means), interpersonal skills (networking, consensus building, getting feedback, using communications technology, interfacing effectively with the external environment, and communicating cross-culturally and precisely), and resources management (personal and material).

The MBTI "typing" of an individual as, for example, an "ESTJ" is merely a measurement of current preferences. Classification as an "ESTJ" does not preclude their ability to empathize or recognize and develop intuition. Hence assessments, such as the MBTI, can facilitate personal growth through self-awareness and continued learning. MBTI test categories compare favorably with the cognitive preference models developed in support of business.⁴⁴ MBTI test results also compare favorably with other tests which measure creative style.⁴⁵

In general, these studies demonstrate that there is an upward **progression of growth** required of the individual as he moves from the "ESTJ" colonel to the more open and less judgmental four-star general. The Army requires flexible and cognitively agile general officers who have **vision**, deduce or infer, trust their **intuition**, have imagination, and are **innovative and creative** in thought.

In a recently published vision of the future battlespace, the U.S. Army has offered its views on the tasks of the future combat leader. According to this Army visionary pamphlet:

"...future battle command starts with competent commanders and non-commissioned officer leaders who have developed an intuitive sense of battle gained from study and experience."

--Force XXI Operations⁴⁶

This statement highlights the value of intuition in combat leadership, but does not limit its value to the upper echelons of command. If the U.S. armed forces are serious about "maneuver" warfare doctrine, then they must develop junior officers and senior non-commissioned officers with a sense of *coup d'oeil*.

Meyers-Briggs Type Indicator (MBTI) test results, which measure intuition, are not predictive of success in any organization or as a leader.⁴⁷ What they are, however, is a useful tool for an individual to take stock of who he or she thinks he is and to compare that with assessments provided by others as well as the types of behavior exhibited by individuals who have successfully occupied positions to which the individual aspires. When used in conjunction with other instruments and techniques, the MBTI can play an important role in facilitating personal growth and continued learning.

MBTI scores have not been specifically linked to combat leadership. There is no evidence that any one particular type is better at combat than any other. Another area lacking rigorous research is correlation of MBTI scores by entry-level officers with their later scores as general officers. If such a study were undertaken, one might be able to speculate on the degree to which different career environments may have shaped personal growth.⁴⁸

The Army has generally accepted a model for unique leadership requirements that includes three basic organizational levels. The first level is direct leadership, battalion and below. The second level is indirect-organizational leadership, brigade through division. The third level of leadership is indirect-strategic, corps and above. The skills required of leaders at each of these levels are different and parallels are

drawn in the Army literature with civil service, industry, and commerce.

The Army recognized that it could either improve identification of candidates who would be more successful at higher rank or to enhance the quality of the pool from which officers were selected for higher rank. **The Army paradigm for leadership training and education includes sequential and progressive personal growth and personal development.** Methods to improve the quality of the pool will be addressed later in Chapter 6.

The traditional leadership model is task and people oriented ("get the job done and take care of your personnel"). The Army has accepted the third aspect of leadership development--**personal growth**. Incidentally, Army leadership studies recognize that the traits desired of a four-star general could very easily lead to problems if exhibited too early in an officer's career.

Assessment

"Inside this field of military activity, the knowledge required must be different according to the position of the leader...There are commanders-in-chief who would not have shone at the head of a cavalry regiment, and vice versa."

--Karl von Clausewitz⁴⁹

It seems clear that **there are significant differences in leadership skills dependent upon level of responsibility.** In virtually all organizations, there is less discretionary decision-making at lower levels than at higher levels. Generally this is because there is less uncertainty at lower levels in the organization. Thus, as leaders advance in rank, they need to develop the skills to better deal with uncertainty.

In the military, there appears to be differences in dealing with uncertainty between various combat leadership environments. For example, decision-making which orders ships, planes, and submarines into harm's way is very different from responding to the dangers thrust upon personnel in the field. This can be seen in two historical examples. When deciding who to place in command of the Boulogne flotilla prior to the invasion of Great Britain, Napoleon Bonaparte stated that all his admirals thought "that war can be made without running risks."⁵⁰ Conversely, German Field Marshal Helmuth Graf von Moltke [The Elder] stated that:

"...great successes in war cannot be gained without great dangers."

--Field Marshal Helmuth Graf von Moltke⁵¹

In order to develop officers who must advance in rank and responsibility and learn to run risks, the organization itself must foster a climate for risk taking and allow individuals to grow.

The Army has made personal growth and development via leadership training and education a goal--a goal which is being achieved. The Army has leadership development processes through and including the general officer ranks, but the development process and substance varies with rank. U.S. Navy leadership training and education also varies by rank, hence by inference, we can conclude that the Navy also accepts that the skills of leadership change with rank. However, the Navy has not yet articulated clear leadership development policies which include doctrine, training and education through the flag officer level.

NAVY LEADERSHIP FOR A UNIQUE ORGANIZATION?

Is the physical maritime environment or the organizational construct of the U.S. Navy so different that the leadership behaviors at sea are fundamentally different from other Services ashore? Is the organizational climate or technical skills required of leaders within the U.S. Navy so different that there may not be any parallels?⁵²

The U.S. Marine Corps has recently published a leadership doctrine manual, *Leading Marines*, FMFM [Fleet Marine Force Manual] 1-0, which states that service in the U.S. Marine Corps is "different," "unique," and "special" amongst the other military Services.⁵³ FMFM 1-0 argues that their:

"self-image sets Marines apart from others and requires a special approach to leading."

--FMFM 1-0 *Leading Marines*

We should consider how one Service could be so different to see if the case also applies to the U.S. Navy.

Leading at the Front

It is fairly easy to argue that there are significant differences between the leadership environment of the Navy and other Services. One of the first obvious differences is exemplified by a Marine Corps second lieutenant attempting to motivate his troops out of the trenches in World War I, propelling them toward the murderous machine gun fire of the enemy. This was a difficult task, since every single Marine or soldier fighting in France was probably contemplating whether to expose himself to heavy fire or disobey the order.

Most sailors aboard a ship have no such decision to make at the time of actual commitment to combat--they have been placed in harm's way by others. In some circumstances, the firing of a long-range missile from a submarine in combat may not be very different than firing at a training range during peacetime. Although the firing of a missile while not actually being at risk is combat, this report considers primarily combat involving personal risk.

Because of the need to motivate men and women to place themselves directly in harm's way, the U.S. Army still places its senior leaders at the front and in direct danger--even at the corps level.⁵⁴ Previously mentioned Air Force studies acknowledge the importance of the aviation commander leading by example. The aviation combat commander flies combat missions and does not remain at headquarters. If this leadership context applies to the U.S. Air Force, it probably also applies to the aviation components of the other armed Services.

Obviously aviation force leaders can only exercise direct on the scene combat leadership when they fly missions. If we accept the idea of an "air campaign," or recognize the possibility of air operations exceeding 30 days, then the aviation combat leader has no choice but to expose himself to the risks of actual combat to exert direct combat leadership. Naturally, this will depend upon rank and specific combat arm.

Differences in Navies

This style of leadership has no real place, however, in many other parts of the U.S. Navy. When Admiral Lord Horatio Nelson appeared on the quarterdeck of flagship *HMS Victory* in his undress uniform with medal replicas and a patch over one eye, he directly inspired his captains to greatness. However, it is simply impossible for many modern navy officers to be seen directly by most of his subordinates during combat, let alone to personally lead the charge into battle.

Consider the case of the submarine. The commanding officer is probably the only officer who fully understands the tactical picture, his orders, and needs to make decisions in order to engage the enemy. Does this combat officer need to develop the skills and talents necessary to motivate privates and lance corporals in the trenches? Are the leadership skills associated with *auftragstaktik* (task-oriented tactics) and "maneuver" warfare really necessary for the senior chief petty officers in a submarine as they appear to be for senior non-commissioned officers in the ground forces? For that matter, are these skills necessary for the non-commissioned officers and petty officers that back up the aviator officer-warrior?

On the other hand, the technical skills required of a leader involved with submarine duty are so demanding that technical competence has often been considered the single most demanding skill of submarine officers. After all, failure to manage the nuclear propulsion plant could have catastrophic consequences. Leadership duties in an army barracks have no parallel requirement for technical skill.⁵⁵ Does this set apart the U.S. Navy from any other Service?

Another difference between the Services is the length of major exercises in maritime and land warfare. During the Cold War, it was not unheard of for an operational-level maritime exercise, such as "Ocean Safari" to go on for approximately two weeks. Under such conditions, leaders have to delegate since they have to sleep--approximating wartime behavior. For the U.S. Army, however, the traditional operational-level exercise runs around 72-hours. The army leader has a choice between staying awake for the entire exercise and sleeping/delegating. Army officers can, and have, continued to exert personal control, if they desire, during all phases of an operational-level exercise, whereas their maritime colleagues cannot.⁵⁶

Let us consider some other aspects of the importance of the specific organization on leadership. In the British Army, a soldier enlists in a regiment and tends to remain with that unit for the rest of his career. The British Army takes great pride in developing *esprit de corps*, and men have been known to fight for the honor of the regiment--not necessarily for king, country, or their colonel. Indeed, there is ample evidence that soldiers often fought for their comrades or their sergeant more than they did for the great causes for which politicians send young men off to war. The U.S. Army recognized that some years ago and devoted considerable effort to keep small groups of soldiers together for long periods of time. The Soviet Navy has had this same tradition--officers and men often served the bulk of their careers on the same ships.

Generally the U.S. Navy, however, forms its crews from officers and men with diverse backgrounds. In peacetime, the Navy tends to rotate these individuals so that there is a constant change of personnel. Yet remarkably, Navy crews develop a comradeship that rivals that of ground units. However, do transfers during combat shatter whatever unit cohesion exists? Obviously the Navy thinks not. During the Persian Gulf War, the Navy component commander for the U.S. Central Command went ahead with a scheduled change of command.⁵⁷ Although this is only one event, the scheduling of a change of command during combat gives us some clue to the Navy's organizational attitude of the uniqueness of combat leadership.

Anyone who has had experience with the U.S. Marine Corps has noticed the extreme *esprit de corps* exhibited by its membership. *Esprit de corps* includes both the devotion to a cause among the members of a group as well as the concept of a "family" unit. Many small units within military Services also have the same advantage. Can leaders of organizations such as the Marine Corps, routinely depend on their personnel responding in a set fashion which is different than if those same leadership techniques were employed on sailors, airmen, or soldiers from other Services?

What about the differences, if any, between leadership for active component (AC) forces versus leadership for the reserve component (RC)? Do leadership requirements vary between the U.S. Navy and the U.S. Naval Reserve? Put another way, would the effective AC leader function the same way if assigned to the RC or assigned to a command where most of the personnel came from the RC upon mobilization? Under today's combat scenarios, AC combat leaders can fully expect to use certain forces that have been primarily drawn from the RC. Will they have to adjust their leadership style because of this reduction in AC forces?

Assessment

There are predictable behaviors demonstrated by individuals based upon the organization to which they belong. What may be appropriate behavior in one organization may be viewed as totally out of place in another. For example, in general--but only in general--authoritative leadership with centralized decision-making is more appropriate in the military context than it is in civilian life. The outstanding uniformed leader may prove a less than satisfactory leader of civilian subordinates employed by the military--Admiral Ernest J. King, USN, had this problem while he was Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Fleet.⁵⁸ Similarly, the military has less tolerance of civilian leaders who make a lateral entry into the military chain of command unless they have first been socialized as an officer and gained experience on active duty.

Organizational behavior studies have demonstrated the existence of a **"learning organization."** "Learning organizations" are those where the individuals within:

"...continually expand their capacity to create the results they truly desire, where new and expansive patterns of thinking are nurtured, where collective aspiration is set free, and where people are continually learning how to learn together."⁵⁹

--Peter M. Senge

The German Army during World War I is an example of a learning organization. They assessed recent combat experience and then made changes to their combat doctrine while the war

progressed. Can only "learning organizations" successfully adopt "maneuver" warfare as doctrine? Does failure to "learn" lead to doctrinal stagnation? The skills normally associated with military officers are not those required of leaders in "learning organizations."⁶⁰ Is leadership fundamentally different in a "learning organization" vice in one that has a tradition of having external influences force change against their will?

Does the military employ the same techniques in its motivation of officers as it does for its enlisted personnel? Is the training of ground forces senior non-commissioned officers in *auftragstaktik* really necessary in a submarine or in an aircraft squadron? The uniqueness of the maritime combat leadership environment deserves further attention.

Based on the use of non-naval and non-navy heroic examples in navy leadership textbooks, one must conclude that as an institution **the U.S. Navy apparently believes that leadership at sea is not fundamentally different than leadership ashore. The U.S. Navy is not such a fundamentally different organization that it must draw its lessons only from its own history.** Although this author concurs with the apparent opinion of the U.S. Navy on the lack of uniqueness to maritime leadership, he does **not concur with ignoring the organizational context.** Simply put, leadership styles exhibited by one organization are not necessarily transferrable to another. Perhaps the best way to look at this is in the overall context of cultural differences.

DOES LEADERSHIP VARY ACCORDING TO NATIONAL AND OTHER CULTURAL CONTEXTS?

Anyone who has traveled to another nation has noticed the differences among national groups regarding initiative, obedience, or freedom. For example, after years of submission and the execution of millions of citizens who exhibited the slightest tendency toward challenge to the existing regime, Russia is populated with individuals who demonstrate a reflex of obedience, i.e., if told what to do by an authoritarian figure, it is likely that the population will generally submit. Indeed, the average Russian may even be looking for that authoritative *bogatyr* leader today who will restore order--another Peter the Great or Stalin.⁶¹ Russians describe the *bogatyr* as a leader with power and mastery--remote, mysterious, powerful, and terrible. The U.S. equivalent is a clever man with sex appeal, on the frontier, with very little but his wits and inventiveness to help him survive.

On the other hand, the U.S. is populated by millions of citizens whose genetic stock included the initiative to escape from such conditions in their homeland and who treasure freedom and individual expression of ideas and behavior. Americans are not looking for an authoritative leader to increase order and

they have taken great steps in their federal constitution to limit the power of government.

Would it be appropriate to study Russian, or the behavior of other nations with a similar culture, leadership examples to glean lessons for the West? Or, for that matter, will Western business leadership practices apply in Russia today?⁶² One noted scholar of both nations has warned us of being seriously guilty, in the past, of making the behavior of other nationalities fit into our preconceived notions.⁶³

These are two extremes, naturally, but illustrate that there is a significant cultural component to leadership. Given these fundamental differences in attitude toward leadership, authority, obedience, and freedom in these two countries, it is likely that leadership styles exhibited in the armed forces of Russia would not work well in the U.S. and vice versa. Studies have demonstrated that the performance of leaders are a result of the personality and skills of the individual leader as well as his ability to influence the situation.⁶⁴ The situation in which leadership is exercised is very much influenced by its culture and there are many dimensions to cultural differences.

Types of Warriors

Another dimension of cultural context is the use of volunteers versus conscripts in combat. Are there differences in how these different types of forces must be led? For example, today France has very different policies for the employment of volunteers and conscripts. French leaders are not as willing to risk the lives of conscripts as they are of volunteers. In America, do we have sensitivities in how we will lead reservists called up involuntarily to participate in a major regional contingency like the Persian Gulf War? Were there differences in leadership of American draftees that were abandoned when we shifted to the all volunteer force?

With the recent assignment of women to combat units in the American armed forces, is there a need to study past examples of female units in combat to note any differences in leadership requirements? We could study the female combat aviation units operating with the Soviet Air Force during World War II⁶⁵ or the Somalian armed forces which had women soldiers. Scholars have reported that there are significant differences in the ratings of male and female managers who do similar work. Will these differences apply to combat leadership?

The U.S. Army has recently taken notice of the fundamental differences between soldiers and "warriors"--making the distinction that "warriors" are like mercenaries, habituated to violence and with no stake in any civil order. One author has

suggested that the soldiers of the U.S. Army must become more used to fighting "warriors" (vice soldiers) who will act in combat in a manner unlike themselves.⁶⁶ Such a cultural distinction suggests that the leadership by "warriors" may not resemble that of standing armies. Should we then study the leadership of criminal organizations in order to learn more about how "warriors" will be led in combat?

On the other hand, the ease with which heads of navies appear to interact with each other, and discuss common issues, suggests that at the highest levels of leadership some of these cultural problems may be more easily overcome. After all, if most four-star officers are more open to different points of view (have grown beyond the "ESTJ" paradigm), then it would stand to reason that we might be able to share strategic-level leadership experiences more directly than at combat levels.

Foreign Examples

Today, we use leadership examples from foreign allied nations as examples of how to motivate our own forces. The British and French have had colonial and other foreign troops in separate units for years. Did they modify their leadership techniques to accommodate cultural differences? Most men entering the armed forces in the 1960s heard how bravely the Turks fought in the Korean War and endured prisoners of war treatment by the North Koreans. Do these lessons bear significance to someone attempting to lead American soldiers or do they simply make good heroic stories--of value nonetheless?

Most militaries have expressed respect and admiration for the successes of the Israeli armed forces. When the U.S. Army attempted to review Israeli leadership doctrine, they found that very little was written because it was essentially an internalized aspect of their culture.⁶⁷ The essential element of leadership doctrine in the Israeli armed forces is that the lowest level of command will take immediate action when confronted with a situation. Decision-making is forced down to the lowest levels of the chain of command. When a combat leader reports to his superior in the chain of command, the senior asks the junior what it is that he can do to assist him. Juniors do not look up the chain of command for guidance or solutions to their dilemmas, they problem-solve themselves. Would such a leadership style work in the U.S. armed forces?

There is value in considering the behavior of our major enemies in World War II to illustrate contextual differences in how men act under combat conditions depending on their nationality. For example, Japanese leaders were able to routinely exhort their men to fight to the death, to engage in suicidal advances, and to engage in *kamikaze* missions. Japanese leaders

also were able to convince their men to perform acts in violation of the laws of war and in ways that were later judged to be crimes against humanity. Japanese leaders and troops also showed a lack of respect for any enemy prisoners of war who had "dishonored" themselves by being defeated and surviving or for having surrendered.

These leadership styles and methods of Imperial Japan are obviously not appropriate for America today. However, there are some interesting examples in the development of the Imperial Japanese combat soldier that may be of interest to us. In recent U.S. history, the soldier-scholar has been generally disregarded. Yet in Japan, the "soldier-scholar" has been treasured, suggesting to some that the extraordinary military successes of such a small nation may be due to this difference.⁶⁸ Israel may be the best current example of a culture which reveres the "soldier-scholar."⁶⁹

The study of other nations can also lead to some interesting observations on cultural differences in combat leadership styles. In the early days of World War II, the catastrophic and unexpected failure of the French Army can be attributable, in great part, to the senior leadership, their views on strategy, and doctrine for war.⁷⁰ The French Army attempted to fight a defensive series of sequential, methodical, and somewhat static battles which were centrally-controlled and culturally appropriate for France at the time. On the other hand, the *Wehrmacht* had adopted a doctrine of offensive maneuver warfare visualizing one continuous battle with decentralized execution.

Wehrmacht doctrine emphasized the *auftragstaktik*, or task-oriented tactics that permitted the lower-echelon commander to operate within his senior's intent. An officer could ignore standing directives (naturally at his own risk) if he were responding to local conditions. While the French Army needed to be ordered into a counterattack, the *Wehrmacht* could as a result of their doctrine, count on locally-initiated counterattacks even while fighting on the defensive.

The U.S. Army and U.S. Marine Corps have heavily researched the tactical and operational-level combat behavior of the *Wehrmacht* during World War II--including their phenomenal successes at the beginning of the war using "maneuver" warfare doctrine. Discussions of "maneuver" warfare emphasize the initiative of the individual leader in the context of a flexible military doctrine that seeks to exploit opportunities. Another German technique currently being resurrected is the *fingerspitzengefühl*, or finger-tip feel for the battlefield, by the combat leader.⁷¹ Championed by General Hermann Balck and General Major Friedrich von Mellenthin, the commander's

fingerspitzengefühl would appear to be a Teutonic version of *coup d'oeil*--a concept fully consistent with "maneuver" warfare.⁷²

Anyone studying the lessons of the *Wehrmacht* must consider the crucial role of German combat leadership during the 1930s and 1940s. The combat leaders used their initiative and exploited opportunities as they presented themselves. Such free-thinking "maneuverist" combat leaders will be difficult to find in a traditional hierarchical and bureaucratic military in which the "ESTJ" is found in command of major units.

It may be difficult to recruit, retain, and nurture creative thinkers and risk takers in the lower levels of the military officer corps. This is certainly not a new problem for the military, but, as the organization accepts warfare doctrine which requires the development of individuals who bend established policies, there can be serious unintended consequences.

There are additional and more serious issues with the national and organizational culture of the *Wehrmacht* that developed "maneuver" warfare. *Wehrmacht* officers were often members of the Nazi party as were many of their men. Was there an inherent difference in the behavior of *Wehrmacht* officers and men by nature of the bond of party membership? Was there a difference between *Wehrmacht* leadership and that displayed by leaders of *SS* [*Schutzstaffel*] units? Both *Wehrmacht* and *SS* officers were able to convince their men to routinely perform acts that were knowingly in direct violation of the laws of war. Many of these *Wehrmacht* and *SS* officers were also judged to have committed crimes against humanity. These were officers and men that bent established policies in a major way.

How could these *Wehrmacht* officers convince so many of their followers to violate the international norms for war? Did they do this to enhance the ability of the *Wehrmacht* to conduct *auftragstaktik* or "maneuver" warfare? If the American soldier fights within the established norms for the laws of war, does this make him less likely to become the visionary who can successfully execute "maneuver" warfare? Or did the presence of Adolf Hitler, a "charismatic" leader, play a pivotal role in the behavior of *Wehrmacht* officers thus explaining their behavior instead?

Tough contextual questions such as these have been considered in other studies. David P. Campbell conducted a study of general and flag officers in the Department of Defense noting that these officers are "dominant, competitive, and action-oriented." Within the context of American society and the parallel core values of personal integrity and social responsibility, these officers serve their country well. However,

with a different set of core values, "dominant, competitive, and action-oriented" could describe a set of men who could become threats to society.⁷³

Assessment

During the Cold War, American military operations research analysts used a multiplier to develop effective equivalent division values, a more sophisticated measure of combat power, which accounted for national differences. Combat potential was calculated by a combination of hardware capabilities and subjective ratings of troops. This implies a cultural bias to combat power and its corollary that **cultural differences do matter**. If they do, then the leadership styles may vary so significantly that research based on foreign case studies may be fatally flawed.

On the other hand, the acceptance of leadership case studies from foreign sources by the U.S. Navy tends to support the conclusion that leadership is a universal commodity. Thus, the Navy parallels behavior found in other U.S. military Services. However, the cultural context of leadership becomes more important if "maneuver" warfare military doctrine is promulgated.

What about cultural differences within our own Service? According to one author in the U.S. Naval Institute *Proceedings*, black and chicano males do not respond to the traditional leadership style of white males.⁷⁴ Although years of effort have resulted in more understanding between the races in the U.S. Navy, cultural differences in leadership still matter!

DOES LEADERSHIP VARY ACCORDING TO COGNITIVE CONTEXT?


A final, and extremely complex, area that needs to be considered is the cognitive context in which leadership exists. This dimension refers to the preferred manner of learning--not measurements of intelligence. Referring back to the Meyers-Briggs Type Indicator test, an example of the cognitive context problem is an "ESTJ" colonel having difficulty dealing with an "INFP" visionary because they do not share the same concern over the importance of deadlines. Neither type is wrong in their preferred view of the world, but there are often miscommunications because of cognitive preferences.

Furthermore, if we wish to understand "learning organizations," we must comprehend the differences in cognitive preferences exhibited by individuals in such organizations. "Learning organizations" (such as the German Army of World War I) must have leaders who are more receptive to new ideas, are skilled at communicating those ideas throughout the entire organization, and thus can effect change.

Psychological researchers have explored the differences in the various types of thinkers--individual cognitive preference for using either the left or the right hemisphere of the brain.⁷⁵ Individuals who favor one hemisphere over the other can be categorized as follows:

LEFT HEMISPHERE	RIGHT HEMISPHERE
Rational	Intuitive
Logical	Gestalt
Deductive	Imaginative
Directed	Free
Analytic	Synthetic
Convergent	Divergent
Sequential	Simultaneous
Digital	Analogical
Verbal	Nonverbal, visuo-spatial
Temporal	Spatial
Western thought	Eastern thought

The U.S. Navy has internalized the importance of the differences between hemispheric preferences as a method of increasing classroom learning. The Navy Leadership Instructor School makes use of materials developed by Jacquelyn Wonder and Priscilla Donovan in their book *Whole-Brain Thinking: Working from Both Sides of the Brain to Achieve Peak Job Performance*.⁷⁶ Instructional materials used at this school attempt to show leadership instructors that they can be more effective if they understand their own preferences as well as those of students. Wonder and Donovan have developed a Brain Preference Indicator (BPI) Test which measures the degree to which an individual favors left or right brain thinking on a Likert scale of 1-9:



Preferred methods of learning at the Navy Leadership Instructor School are also developed by the use of the Learning-Style Inventory (LSI) developed by David A. Kolb.⁷⁷ The LSI helps the individual recognize four stages of the learning cycle: learning from experiences, learning from watching and listening, learning by thinking, and learning by doing. The individual then uses LSI results to place him/herself into four learning-style types: the converger, the diverger, the assimilator, and the accommodator. These LSI learning-style types are as follows:

<i>CONVERGER</i>	<i>ASSIMILATOR</i>
technical tasks defining problems problem-solving decision-making evaluate consequences deductive reasoning engineering science	conceptual tasks defining problems developing theories creating models planning abstract ideas researcher professor
<i>ACCOMMODATOR</i>	<i>DIVERGER</i>
action tasks execution of plan experiential learning leadership risk-taking rely on others for info "gut" feeling carry-out marketing accounting	people tasks recognizing problems gather information different points of view observations imaginative ability brainstorming sensitivity social work arts

Using the LSI, or similar instrument, an individual discovers his/her own preferred styles, and is better able to select problems to solve; visualize alternative solutions; evaluate possible results; and implement results. This does more than improve instruction, it promotes personal growth.

Similarities to left and right brain theory exist in cerebral (forward) lobes or limbic (rear) domains research.⁷⁸ Ned Herrmann pioneered the whole brain concept by describing the preferred learning methods of individuals in regard to one or more of their brain quadrants.

Herrmann calls each of the four "selves" the: rational, safekeeping, feeling, or experimental. The four "selves" would exhibit the following behaviors:

<i>CEREBRAL LEFT</i>	<i>CEREBRAL RIGHT</i>
<u>RATIONAL</u>	<u>EXPERIMENTAL</u>
analyzes quantifies is logical is critical is realistic likes numbers knows about money knows how things work	infers imagines speculates takes risks is impetuous breaks rules likes surprises is curious/plays
<i>LIMBIC LEFT</i>	<i>LIMBIC RIGHT</i>
<u>SAFEKEEPING</u>	<u>FEELING</u>
takes preventive action establishes procedures gets things done is reliable organizes is neat timely plans	is sensitive to others likes to teach touches a lot is supportive is expressive is emotional talks a lot feels

Another way to describe these four different types is that individuals who favor their cerebral brain tend to display more cognitive and pragmatic traits and those who favor their limbic brain prefer more visceral and instinctual traits. Those who favor their left brain tend to be more realistic and exhibit common sense while those favoring their right brain are more idealistic or intuitive.

Herrmann argues that the most successful individuals in their careers are those who have a high degree of correlation between their personal and job profiles. Hence a good drill sergeant would probably test in the limbic left while a strategic planner would probably test in the cerebral right. Engineers favor their cerebral left while good instructors favor the limbic right brains. The individual who tests equally in all quadrants is ideally suited for command.

Other researchers have used Herrmann's work, assigning different names for the four "selves."⁷⁹ Another view of the overall pattern is as follows:

<p style="text-align: center;"><i>CEREBRAL LEFT</i></p> <p style="text-align: center;"><u>LOGICIAN</u></p> <p style="text-align: center;">gathers facts measures precisely understands technical side considers financial aspects problem-solves logically analyses issues argues rationally</p>	<p style="text-align: center;"><i>CEREBRAL RIGHT</i></p> <p style="text-align: center;"><u>VISIONARY</u></p> <p style="text-align: center;">reads signs of coming change sees the "big" picture recognizes ambiguity tolerates ambiguity recognizes new possibilities bends established policies intuitive problem-solving communicates through analogy</p>
<p style="text-align: center;"><i>LIMBIC LEFT</i></p> <p style="text-align: center;"><u>ORGANIZER/IMPLEMENTER</u></p> <p style="text-align: center;">handles problems practically maintains standards provides stable leadership develops detailed plans implements projects on time meticulous financial records finds overlooked flaws</p>	<p style="text-align: center;"><i>LIMBIC RIGHT</i></p> <p style="text-align: center;"><u>COLLABORATOR</u></p> <p style="text-align: center;">anticipates how others feel recognizes personal problems considers values persuades and teaches integrates conciliates engenders enthusiasm</p>

In this schema, the organizer/implementer favors his limbic left brain. This type of individual approaches problems practically, maintains standards, provides stable leadership, develops detailed plans, implements projects on time, keeps meticulous financial records, and finds overlooked flaws. The visionary is in the opposite quadrant and favors the cerebral right brain. This type of individual reads signs of coming change, sees the "big" picture, tolerates ambiguity, recognizes new possibilities, bends established policies, problem solves in intuitive ways, and communicates through analogy. Both the collaborator and the visionary are right brain thinkers and favor intuition. The limbic, however, is more intuitive about feelings while the cerebral is more intuitive about solutions.

In large organizations, it is likely that there will be both organizer/implementers as well as visionaries. Which should be in charge? How do they communicate with each other? To illustrate the importance of different cognitive preferences, consider how each of these four different individuals might handle money, or in Navy terminology--"OPTAR." The logicians would find different ways of allocating it to various competing alternatives--probably designing complex allocation algorithms. Implementers would want to control it--accounting being its own reward. Collaborators would want to use money to help others and would probably get into trouble with the bookkeepers. Visionaries would find new ways to get more OPTAR and want to spend all of it to establish

the precedent. Visionaries are apt to get frustrated if implementers are an impediment to more creative use of OPTAR. Implementers are likely to be equally frustrated with the visionary who steps, or even lives, "out of the box."

Imagine an organizer/implementer in a position of leadership with subordinate visionaries (or a group including visionaries) or vice versa. The organizer/implementer would probably have extreme difficulty in getting the best out of a visionary--yet the organizer often hires a visionary consultant. Similarly the visionary might be an excellent leader at the top of an organization but might not do well down in the line where deadlines matter. This may be the exact type of problem we face if we cultivate "visionary" cerebral right brain "NT" general and flag officers who must direct the limbic left brain "ESTJ" colonels.

Preferred cognitive patterns are derived by the use of the Herrmann Brain Dominance Instrument (HBDI), developed by Ned Herrmann of the Ned Herrmann Group, Lake Lure, North Carolina. This instrument has been used more than 500,000 times for a variety of private business and government organizations. The HBDI correlates well with the Meyers-Briggs Type Indicator (MBTI) and might prove useful in identifying individuals and teams that have various types of preferred cognitive preferences.

For example, Thinking correlates well with the cerebral preference as does Feeling with the limbic. Many thinkers prefer left brain skills but they may be equally strong in untapped right brain activities. Generally thinkers tend to avoid the limbic right. Similarly, many feelers with strong left brain preferences will avoid the right cerebral. Intuitive individuals generally correlate well with right brain preferences, specifically cerebral right, as do Sensing with the left brain. Many sensors will also consciously avoid the right cerebral. Judging correlates well with the limbic left and Perceiving with the cerebral right. Many judgers tend to avoid right hemisphere processing. Hence the frustrations described above between the organizer/implementer (judger) and the visionary (perceiver) are more easily understood by marrying up HBDI and MBTI test results. Yet it is exactly that type of problem that must be addressed by leaders who employ visionaries or who act in a visionary or intuitive manner in combat.

The HBDI focuses on preferred modes of knowing or learning, whereas the MBTI analyzes the preferred ways of behaving. Although an individual's MBTI results would be expected to change over time, the HBDI profile is usually static unless the subject has experienced a significant life-changing event or has participated in personal development programs designed to stretch in a specific area with changes in the limbic right quadrant being most easily achieved. The MBTI is a psychological

construct, while the HBDI is based upon a physiological construct. Therefore, each represents a different perspective.⁸⁰

To date, the HBDI has not been accepted by the appropriate academic and medical disciplines. This may be due, in part, to its development outside mainstream psychological or neurophysiological research. Herrmann's theory replaces two dimensions found in cognitive complexity literature: abstract-concrete and analytic-integrative. Thus Herrmann's four quadrants could be more properly renamed: concrete-analytic (logician), concrete-integrative (organizer-implementer), abstract-integrative (collaborator), and abstract-integrative (visionary).⁸¹ For most individuals, such terms are too complex, but the heuristic approach suggested by Herrmann has value in the world of non-specialists as a self-measurement tool to promote introspection as a part of personal growth.

Self-improvements Based Upon Cognitive Preferences

All organizations attempt to improve output--some of this will be done by leadership. Should organizations only hire individuals with the same cognitive preferences--thus minimizing the need for cross-cognitive communications? The answer is no--organizations need all types of individuals (not everyone should be a cerebral right brain thinker). One approach for organizational improvement is for individuals to strengthen weak areas or to improve cooperative skills to accommodate others with different cognitive preferences. To do this, individuals must first be aware of their own areas of strength and weakness--a byproduct of personal growth training and education and associated tests and instruments such as the MBTI or HBDI.

An alternative approach to improving the quality of work by an organization is to concentrate more on the organization than the individual. Ideally, an organization should attempt to improve both the individual and the organization itself--but austere fiscal environments often force other choices.

Instead of working on personal growth, organizations often focus on team-building to improve the quality of work. Teams generally have leaders. Team building skills are different than individual skills and were noted to be of value in the Persian Gulf War study. Effective team building can change organizational behavior, but, to increase effectiveness, teams should be aware of the strengths and weaknesses of their members. Teams consist of individuals who each have different strengths in the four cognitive quadrants. Analytic tools can assist in team building by identifying particular skills and providing the opportunity for improvement.

Effective combat units are formed prior to battle. These units are the result of sound individual and unit training and good team building. Individual training can only take the organization so far. Tactical combat units are teams that must be created and refined. The creation of these combat teams requires both the skills of the manager and the skills of good leaders.⁸²

Whether an organization builds teams, allows individuals to enhance their own personal skills, or both, one of the major challenges is for individuals to communicate among vastly different cognitive preferences. The vast majority of military officers are of the "ESTJ" persuasion. Doctrine centers, however, can afford, and probably should have, a group of more visionary staff members if doctrine has a role in sharing its vision, and thus acting as a "learning organization," with the less-visionary elements of the military.

On a more personal level, the "ESTJ" colonel must be able to get the desired results from the "INFP" visionary that he has hired as a consultant. Communicating across quadrants within an organization, or from the position of a visionary "learning organization," is difficult and requires special skills.⁸³ Leadership styles vary within each cognitive preference--thus demanding consideration of cognitive preferences when developing leadership doctrine. It is also apparent that team leaders should be carefully selected by cognitive preferences when assembling a team with a varied makeup. Existing instruments such as the MBTI or HBDI could be used to help build teams, however, the HBDI appears to have more utility in this area than the MBTI.

Reviewing the left and right brain type of thinkers, it should be obvious that the "maneuver" warfare specialist probably favors his cerebral right rather than the limbic left. Such individuals often think outside of constrained norms and bend established policies. Despite the attraction of cerebral right thinkers for "maneuver" warfare, is it in the best interests of any armed force, or society, to allow its military to be dominated by such unconstrained thinkers? Is there a way to segregate such individuals and draw upon them when required? The answers to such important questions beg additional research--if only to ascertain if a "maneuverist" can be identified as having a discrete cognitive pattern.

A recent, and controversial, U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences sponsored-study concludes that, under high stress situations which call for rapid and decisive decisions, such as combat, more intelligent tactical-level leaders are liable to find their intelligence detrimental to superior performance.⁸⁴ The desire to gather information and weigh alternatives (cognitive preference) runs counter to the

need for intuition, based upon experience, in stressful situations.

Assessment

Recognition of the **importance of cognitive preferences on organizational behavior, and leadership, is an area of major challenge to the U.S. Navy.** Although there may not be many opportunities to select and recruit specific cognitive types for entry-level officer positions, such knowledge is very important for the organization as it socializes the new officer, retains him/her, and grooms the individual for upward mobility. The key to using such knowledge is to first obtain data on individuals and then correlate the information with a system of personal growth within the organization.

SUMMARY

The existing scientific literature does not necessarily support the inherent differences between combat and non-combat leadership or different forms of combat, although some arguments have been made that combat leadership is in fact different. Opinions exist on all sides of this issue--but little existing evidence supports the apparent uniqueness of combat leadership. Based upon the behavior of the U.S. Navy, I believe the Navy also does not accept these inherent differences. Thus, the remainder of this report will be based on the assumption that, although the combat environment is different, leadership in any combat environment requires essentially the same skills, but with a different mix of application and a different time frame for decision-making. Conversely, there is compelling evidence that, from a cultural perspective, **the U.S. Navy would be ill-served by admitting that there were no real differences in combat leadership versus non-combat leadership.**

Both the existing literature and the observed behavior of the U.S. Navy strongly support the assumption that there are **clear and distinct differences in the job of the leader based upon rank.** From a review of the literature, it is clear that the U.S. Army has a far greater appreciation of the importance of these differences and they have an extremely sophisticated leadership development program for officers that continues through the general officer ranks. This report will therefore assume that leadership tasks, and therefore leadership requirements, vary with rank.

There is little evidence to support any inherent differences in leadership requirements between the maritime environment and non-maritime. Aviation leadership may have some similarities to combat leadership on the ground--in both cases the senior leadership must place itself at risk. On the other hand, the literature supports the conclusion that leadership requirements

for a specific maritime organization, e.g., the U.S. Navy, may be different than for others, e.g., the U.S. Army. There are specific behaviors associated with the organization that one intends to operate within. This report will assume that **important influences within the specific organization are significant** and must be taken into consideration if one intends to study leadership.

This report finds overwhelming evidence to support the conclusion that the cultural context of leadership transcends the specific organization and includes different cognitive preferences, national identity, and gender. These cultural impacts on leadership are often overlooked in leadership studies and can have a significant influence on leadership. This report will assume that the **cultural and cognitive influences are significant**.

The cultural context of leadership is so important that many military personnel believe combat leadership requires certain special skills. For this reason, and because the military is the only combat-oriented organization, it may be necessary to identify combat leadership as a discreet item for special consideration, training, and education.

Furthermore, it appears from the concepts of "maneuver" warfare (which has already been adopted as doctrine by the U.S. Navy) that the Navy will be incapable of fully exploiting the depths of "maneuver" warfare without a cadre of officers who are combat leaders. To develop such leaders, the Navy will need to emphasize the combat aspects of leadership, so that the context of risk-taking associated with "maneuver" are studied and explained in the context of combat, rather than the bureaucratic environment.

The attributes of good leaders are probably additive, i.e., the good combat leader probably displays a series of interrelated traits rather than just one or two.⁸⁵ The military needs risk-takers, but this trait alone does not predict good combat leadership. There may be a set of core traits that are needed, but as of yet there is no consensus on what these would be. The literature suggests that coolness under stress, cognitive complexity, and team building are three.

NOTES

1. Two respected flag/general officers agreed with that assessment at the U.S. Naval Academy conference. Yet one junior reserve officer disagreed.

2. In Gary A. Yukl and David D. Van Fleet, "Cross-situational, Multinational Research on Military Leadership Effectiveness," *Organizational Behavior and Human Performance*, 30, 1982, p. 100-102, the authors conclude that at least four aspects of leadership (performance emphasis, inspiration, role clarification, and criticism-discipline) appear to be unaffected by whether the leader is in a combat or non-combat situation. They also state that in combat, planning and problem solving appear to be more important than in non-combat situations (p. 103). Careful reading of this article reveals that some of the "combat" situations were actually simulated and the authors themselves caution the reader that the research results are merely exploratory and not conclusive (p. 104).
3. Major Thomas L. Lentz, USAF, "Combat Leadership: 56th Fighter Group, 1943-1944," unpublished student report 86-1525, Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air Command and Staff College, April 1986.
4. Major General Perry M. Smith, USAF (Ret.), *Taking Charge: A Practical Guide for Leaders*, Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1986, p. 57.
5. Lieutenant Colonel Robert Mabus, USAF, "Combat Leadership: Does it Require Different Traits and Skills Than Managerial or Peacetime Leadership?" unpublished research report 90-0205043, Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air War College, 1989, AD No. A217-500.
6. There is no universally acceptable set of definitions that would make clear the distinction between leaders and managers.
7. Lieutenant Colonel Robert P. Hansen, USAF, "Combat Leadership: A Historical Analysis of Traits, Definition, and How it Differs From Peacetime Leadership," unpublished research report 90-0205110, Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air War College, May 1989, AD No. A217-872.
8. Lieutenant Colonel Donald H. Watts, Jr., USA, "Combat Versus Noncombat Leadership," unpublished research report 90-0205095, Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air War College, April 1989, AD No. A217-531.
9. Lieutenant Colonel James M. Fisher, USA, "Combat Leadership," unpublished research report 91-12129, Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air War College, May 1990, AD No. A241-101.
10. Lieutenant Colonel David J. Semon, USAF, "Combat Leadership: Trouble in the Nineties?" unpublished research report 92-10791, Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air War College, April 1990, AD No. A249-515.

11. Captain Charles T. Barco, USAF, "Valuing Leadership in an Era of Prophets, Politicians, and Pugilists," *Airpower Journal*, 8, no. 3 (Fall 1994): 4-13.

12. Major Jerry D. Morelock, USA, "Senior Leadership--The Crucial Element of Combat Power: A Leadership Analysis of Selected World War II Commanders, European Theater, 1944-45," unpublished thesis, Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Command & General Staff College, May 1984, AD No. A149-421.

13. Colonel Bennet S. Jones, USA, "Leadership Competency for Combat: Pork Barrel or Pork Chop Hill," unpublished research report 86-821099, Washington, DC: Industrial College of the Armed Forces, March 1986.

14. I am indebted to Lieutenant General Walter Ulmer, U.S. Army (Ret.) for this point (contained in correspondence with the author of March 8, 1995).

15. Lieutenant Colonel K.E. Hamburger, USA, study director, "Leadership in Combat: An [sic] Historical Appraisal," copy of an undated summary of report conducted by the History Department, U.S. Military Academy, obtained from the U.S. Army Armor School, Fort Knox, KY, AD No. A203-571 [entered into the Defense Technical Information Center in 1989].

16. At least one of these officers was from the U.S. Navy.

17. Peter W. Dorfman, et al., "Leadership Within the 'Discontinuous Hierarchy' Structure of the Military: Are Effective Leadership Behaviors Similar Within and Across Command Structures?" *Impact of Leadership*, Kenneth E. Clark, Miriam B. Clark, and David P. Campbell, eds., Greensboro, NC: Center for Creative Leadership, 1992, p. 400.

18. Lieutenant Colonel Kenneth R. Knight, USA, "Similarities/Differences in Combat/Peacetime Leadership," unpublished individual study project 92-12851, Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, April 1992, AD No. A249-933.

19. Major Arthur J. Athens, USMC, "Unravelling the Mystery of Battlefield Coup d'oeil," unpublished monograph, Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command & General Staff College, February 1993.

20. Headquarters, Department of the Army, *Leadership and Command at Senior Levels*, F[ield] M[annual] 22-103, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 21 June 1987.

21. Suggested in a letter to the author from Dr. T. Owen Jacobs, Industrial College of the Armed Forces, February 14, 1995.

22. General Carl E. Mundy, Jr., Commandant of the Marine Corps, *Leading Marines*, FMFM [Fleet Marine Force Manual] 1-0, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, signed 3 January 1995, p. 48.

23. I am indebted to Lieutenant General Walter Ulmer, U.S. Army (Ret.) for this point (contained in correspondence with the author of March 8, 1995).

24. I am indebted to Lieutenant General Walter Ulmer, U.S. Army (Ret.) for this point (contained in correspondence with the author of March 8, 1995). Similar claims were made about military art following the "revolution in military affairs" created by the nuclear weapon and long-range delivery systems.

25. Admiral E.W. Eberle, USN, Chief of Naval Operations, *War Instructions: United States Navy, 1924*, F.T.P. 43, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1924, signed May 19, 1924.

26. Admiral W.H. Standley, U.S. Navy, Chief of Naval Operations, *War Instructions: United States Navy, 1934*, F.T.P. 143, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1942 [reprint], signed March 28, 1934.

27. Admiral E[rnest]. J. King, Commander in Chief, United States Fleet and Chief of Naval Operations, *War Instructions: United States Navy, 1944*, F.T.P. 143(A), Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1 November 1944.

28. Karl von Clausewitz, *On War*, O.J. Matthijs Jolles, trans., New York, NY: The Modern Library, 1943, p. 45.

29. Michael Howard, *Men Against Fire: The Doctrine of the Offensive in 1914*, "Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age", Peter Paret, ed., Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986, p. 520; and Michael Howard, "Men Against Fire," *International Security*, vol. 9, no. 1 (Summer 1984): 57. See also: Gideon Y. Akavia, *Decisive Victory and Correct Doctrine: Cults in French Military Thought Before 1914*, Stanford, CA: Center for International Security and Arms Control, Stanford University, November 1993, p. 43-63.

30. James J. Tritten, "Navy and Military Doctrine in France," NDC Technical Report 3-00-005, Norfolk, VA: Naval Doctrine Command, October 1994, p. 26-27.

31. Peter Padfield, *Armada: A Celebration of the Four Hundredth Anniversary of the Defeat of the Spanish Armada, 1588-1988*, Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1988, p. 47-48.

32. David C. Evans and Mark R. Peattie, *Kaigun [Navy]: Strategy, Tactics and Technology in the Imperial Japanese Navy, 1887-1941*, December 1994 draft book manuscript, epilogue.

33. Gideon Y. Akavia, *Decisive Victory and Correct Doctrine: Cults in French Military Thought Before 1914*, Stanford, CA: Center for International Security and Arms Control, Stanford University, November 1993, p. 1-6, 65-69.

34. Norman Dixon, *On the Psychology of Military Incompetence*, New York, NY: Basic Books, Inc., 1976, p. 212 (discussion of problems of a defensive mind-set).

35. T. Owen Jacobs and Elliott Jaques, "Military Executive Leadership," *Measures of Leadership*, Kenneth E. Clark and Miriam B. Clark, eds., West Orange, NJ: Leadership Library of America, Inc., for the Center for Creative Leadership, 1990, p. 281-295.

36. The closest parallel would be the Navy Personnel Research and Development Center (NPRDC) in San Diego, CA. The Air Force Parallel is the Armstrong Laboratories located at Brooks Air Force Base, San Antonio, TX. All three organizations conduct research in career development, classification and selection, manpower, training, surveys, and turnover. The Army Research Institute has taken the lead on leadership research and is the executive agent for such research within the Department of Defense.

37. Carl Gustav Jung, "Psychological Types," in *The Collected Works of C.G. Jung*, vol. 6, R.F.C. Hull, ed., H.G. Baynes, trans., Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1971 [original German language version published in 1921]. For a popular version of this test, see David Keirsey and Marilyn Bates, *Please Understand Me: Character & Temperament Types*, Del Mar, CA: Prometheus Nemesis Book Co., 1984. The Keirsey-Bates Temperament Sorter is routinely used by the Navy Leadership Instructor School to help instructors understand their own personal preferences so that they can perform instructional duties better.

38. Mary H. McCaulley, "The Myers-Briggs Type Indicator and Leadership," and Herbert F. Barber, "Some Personality Characteristics of Senior Military Officers," *Measures of Leadership*, Kenneth E. Clark & Miriam B. Clark, eds., West Orange, NJ: Leadership Library of America, Inc., for the Center for Creative Leadership, 1990, p. 404, 405, 408, 443-444. See also, Lieutenant Colonel Simon F.J. Hollington, Royal Marines, "Leadership and Leadership Development--Do we suffer from 'not invented here' Syndrome (NIHS)?" *The Naval Review*, 82, no. 3, July 1994, p. 233; and *The British Army Review*, no. 108, December 1994, p. 53-54.

39. Dean C. Allard, "Nimitz and Spruance: A Naval Style of Command," *Military Leadership and Command: The John Biggs Cincinnati Lectures, 1988*, Henry S. Bausum, ed., Lexington, VA: The VMI [Virginia Military Institute] Foundation, Inc., 1989, p. 110-111.
40. Walter Ulmer, Jr., "Leadership in the 1990s," briefing slides, Greensboro, NC: Center for Creative Leadership (CCL), undated but provided in March 1994.
41. Patricia Harris and Ken Lucas, CAE-Link Corporation, "Executive Leadership: Requisite Skills and Developmental Processes for Three- and Four-Star Assignments," technical report, Alexandria, VA: U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences, March 1991; T. Owen Jacobs, presentation at the February 1991 Strategic Leadership Conference, contained in *Strategic Leadership Conference: Proceedings*, Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College and the U.S. Army Research Institute, April 1993, p. 185-205; Joan Markessini, CAE-LTSD, "Executive Leadership in a Changing World Order: Requisite Cognitive Skills--A Taxonomy of Cognitive Capabilities for Executives," research product, Alexandria, VA: U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences, November 16, 1990; Elliott Jaques, Stephen Clement, Carlos Rigby, and T.O. Jacobs, "Senior Leadership Performance: Requirements at the Executive Level," technical report 1420, Alexandria, VA: U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences, January 1986.
42. T. Owen Jacobs and Elliott Jaques, "Military Executive Leadership," *Measures of Leadership*, Kenneth E. Clark and Miriam B. Clark, eds., West Orange, NJ: Leadership Library of America, Inc., for the Center for Creative Leadership, 1990, p. 292-294.
43. Kenneth W. Lucas and Joan Markessini, "Senior Leadership in a Changing World Order: Requisite Skills for U.S. Army One- and Two-Star Assignments," technical report 976, Alexandria, VA: U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences, April 1993; Gillian P. Stamp, "Longitudinal Research into Methods of Assessing Managerial Potential," technical report 819, Alexandria, VA: U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences, October 1988.
44. Susaan Straus, "Thinking Styles and Organizational Effectiveness," *European Business Report*, October/November 1992, p. 44+ (offprint).
45. Jane Henry, "MBTI [Meyers-Briggs Type Indicator] and KAI [Kirton Adaption-Innovation Inventory] Bias on Creativity Courses," and Sylvester Taylor, "The Relationship Between the Kirton Adaption-Innovation Inventory and the MBTI Creativity Index," *Discovering Creativity: Proceedings of the 1992*

International Creativity & Innovation Networking Conference, Stanley S. Gryskiewicz, ed., Greensboro, NC: Center for Creative Leadership, 1993, p. 147-150, and 201-205.

46. U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command [TRADOC], *Force XXI Operations: A Concept for the Evolution of Full-Dimensional Operations for the Strategic Army of the Early Twenty-First Century*, TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5, Fort Monroe, VA: TRADOC, 1 August 1994 [with 8 September 1994 errata], p. 3-4.

47. Indeed, the Meyers-Briggs Type Indicator (MBTI) test has some inherent problems that should cause one to regard any research based upon them with skepticism. For example, the MBTI measures "normal" behavior and not inherent behavior. In addition, anyone or anything that sits in front of the computer screen and can push buttons will generate data--a person with a blindfold can take the test.

48. I am indebted to Lieutenant General Walter Ulmer, U.S. Army (Ret.) for this point (contained in correspondence with the author of March 8, 1995).

49. Karl von Clausewitz, *On War*, O.J. Matthijs Jolles, trans., New York, NY: The Modern Library, 1943, p. 81.

50. Quoted by Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan, USN, *The Influence of Sea Power Upon the French Revolution and Empire, 1793-1812*, Vol. II, New York, NY: Greenwood Press, Publishers, 1968 reprint [original version published in 1892 by Little, Brown, and Co.], p. 130.

51. Daniel J. Hughes, ed., [Field Marshal Helmuth Graf von] *Moltke on the Art of War: Selected Writings*, Harry Bell and Daniel J. Hughes, trans., Novato CA: Presidio Press, 1993, p. 263.

52. Gary A. Yukl and David D. Van Fleet, "Cross-situational, Multinational Research on Military Leadership Effectiveness," *Organizational Behavior and Human Performance*, 30, 1982, p. 105. Yukl and Van Fleet imply that leadership differences between U.S. Air Force officers and ground combat officers matter. However, their research did not focus on this issue and they merely offered the statement as an unproved assumption.

53. General Carl E. Mundy, Jr., Commandant of the Marine Corps, *Leading Marines*, FMFM [Fleet Marine Force Manual] 1-0, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, signed 3 January 1995, p. 7-8, 19, 22-23, 31-32.

54. Department of the Army, *Leadership and Command on the Battlefield: Operations JUST CAUSE and DESERT STORM*, TRADOC

Pamphlet 525-100-1, Fort Monroe, VA: U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command [TRADOC], 1992, p. 13, 17, 41.

55. The experience of the business world in comparable areas is that the perception of technical expertise is important when in leadership positions. For example, when computers were first introduced, business leaders with the appropriate technical expertise appeared to be more successful in convincing employees as to the value of the new systems. I am indebted for this observation to Dr. Robert Morrison, Navy Personnel Research and Development Center (in a telephone conversation of April 7, 1995).

56. The problem of sleep and fatigue in extended Army operations has resulted in a doctrinal publication which strongly recommends not trying to stay awake for long periods of time. See: Headquarters, Department of the Army, *Soldier Performance in Continuous Operations*, F[ield] M[annual] 22-9, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 12 December 1991.

57. This also happened to a deploying Army battalion. I am indebted to Lieutenant General Walter Ulmer, U.S. Army (Ret.) for this point (contained in correspondence with the author of March 8, 1995).

58. Eric Larrabee, *Commander in Chief: Franklin Delano Roosevelt, His Lieutenants, and Their War*, New York, NY: Harper & Row, Pubs., 1987, p. 195.

59. Peter M. Senge, *The Fifth Discipline: The Art and Practice of the Learning Organization*, New York, NY: Doubleday, 1990, p. 3. See also Paul Bracken, "The Military After Next," *The Washington Quarterly*, 16, no. 4 (Autumn 1993): 171, for a discussion of the need for "organizational learning;" and Peter M. Senge, et al., *The Fifth Discipline Fieldbook: Strategies and Tools for Building a Learning Organization*, New York, NY: Doubleday, July 1994, p. 50-52.

60. Peter M. Senge, *The Fifth Discipline: The Art and Practice of the Learning Organization*, New York, NY: Doubleday, 1990, p. 339-360; Peter M. Senge, et al., *The Fifth Discipline Fieldbook: Strategies and Tools for Building a Learning Organization*, New York, NY: Doubleday, July 1994, p. 451-453.

61. Robert B. Bathurst, *Intelligence and the Mirror: On Creating an Enemy*, London, UK: Sage Publications for the International Peace Research Institute (PRIO), Oslo, Norway, 1993, p. 48, 50.

62. In the opinion of some scholars, the international cultural differences between managers is measurable. See Clark L. Wilson, et al., "The Impact of Personality, Gender, and International Location on Multilevel Management Ratings," *Impact of Leadership*,

Kenneth E. Clark, Miriam B. Clark, and David P. Campbell, eds., Greensboro, NC: Center for Creative Leadership, 1992, p. 357.

63. Robert B. Bathurst, *Intelligence and the Mirror: On Creating an Enemy*, London, UK: Sage Publications for the International Peace Research Institute (PRIO), Oslo, Norway, 1993.

64. Fred E. Fielder, "Leadership Performance in Complex Organizations," Seattle, WA: Department of Psychology, University of Washington, September 1976, AD No. A0309788; Fred E. Fielder, "Leadership Experience and Leadership Training: Some New Answers to an Old Problem," Seattle, WA: Department of Psychology, University of Washington, April 1972, AD No. 756698.

65. Anne Noggle, *A Dance With Death: Soviet Airwomen in World War II*, College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press, 1994.

66. Ralph Peters, "The New Warrior Class," *Parameters*, 24, no. 2 (Summer 1994): 16-26.

67. Interview with Brigadier General Howard T. Prince II, U.S. Army (Ret.), Professor and Dean of the Jepson School of Leadership Studies, University of Richmond, Richmond, VA, February 8, 1995.

68. Joan Markessini, studies in preparation for the U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences, cited in Kenneth W. Lucas and Joan Markessini, "Senior Leadership in a Changing World Order: Requisite Skills for U.S. Army One- and Two-Star Assignments," technical report 976, Alexandria, VA: U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences, April 1993, p. 2.

69. I am indebted to Lieutenant General Walter Ulmer, U.S. Army (Ret.) for this point (contained in correspondence with the author of March 8, 1995).

70. Barry R. Posen, *The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany Between the World Wars*, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1984, p. 105-140, 220-244; Lieutenant Colonel Robert Allan Doughty, *The Seeds of Disaster: The Development of French Army Doctrine, 1919-1939*, Hamden, CT: Archon Books, 1985; his subsequent *The Breaking Point: Sedan and the Fall of France, 1940*, Hamden CT: Archon Books, 1990, p. 19-32, 321-332; and his chapter, "The French Armed Forces, 1918-40," *Military Effectiveness, Volume II: The Interwar Period*, Allan R. Millett and Williamson Murray, eds., Boston, MA: Unwin Hyman, for the Merhson Center, Ohio State University, 1988, p. 39-69; Lieutenant General Philip D. Shutler, USMC (Ret.), "Thinking About Warfare," *Marine Corps Gazette*, 71, no. 11 (November 1987): 22-23; and Eliot A. Cohen and John Gooch, *Military Misfortunes: The Anatomy*

of Failure in War, New York, NY: The Free Press, 1990, p. 197-230.

71. General William DePuy, U.S. Army (Ret.), "Generals Balck and von Mellenthin on Tactics: Implications for NATO Military Doctrine," The BDM Corporation technical report BDM/W-81-077-TR, Alexandria, VA: Defense Nuclear Agency, 19 December 1990, p. 21.

72. Commander Gerard D. Roncolato, USN, "Chance Dominates in War," U.S. Naval Institute *Proceedings*, 121, no. 2 (February 1995): 37.

73. Early H. Potter and Robert R. Albright II, "Predicting Performance During the Apprenticeship," *Measures of Leadership*, Kenneth E. Clark and Miriam B. Clark, eds., West Orange, NJ: Leadership Library of America, Inc., for the Center for Creative Leadership, 1990, p. 466. Potter and Albright cite David S. Campbell, "The Psychological Test Profiles of Brigadier Generals: Warmongers or Decisive Warriors," paper presented at the annual convention of the American Psychological Association, New York, NY, August 30, 1987.

74. Lieutenant Thomas B. Grassey, USNR, "Outcomes, Essences, and Individuals," U.S. Naval Institute *Proceedings*, 102, no. 7 (July 1976): 72-75.

75. Sally P. Springer and Georg Deutsch, *Left Brain, Right Brain*, 3rd. ed., New York, NY: W.H. Freeman & Co., 1989, p. 284-287. The authors note, however, that despite the popular acceptance of such notions, there are no scientifically proven ways to measure hemisphericity (p. 293-294).

76. Jacquelyn Wonder and Priscilla Donovan, *Whole-Brain Thinking: Working from Both Sides of the Brain to Achieve Peak Job Performance*, New York, NY: William Morrow and Co., Inc., 1984. Wonder and Donovan correlate their Brain Performance Indicator (BPI) test to the Performance Prediction Results (PPR) tests developed by Drs. David Merrill and Roger Reid. BPI scores of 1-3 correlate to the PPR grouping "Analytical." The BPI score of 3-5 correlates to "Driver" and 5-7 to "Amiable." The BPI score of 7-9 correlates to "Expressive" (p. 163).

77. McBer & Company, *LSI--Learning-Style Inventory: Self-Scoring Inventory and Interpretation Booklet*, Boston, MA: McBer & Company, Training Resources Group, 1985.

78. Ned Herrmann, *The Creative Brain*, Lake Lure, NC: The Ned Herrmann Group, 1988; and additional materials developed by Herrmann.

79. Susaan Straus, "Thinking Styles and Organizational Effectiveness," *European Business Report*, October/November 1992, p. 44+ (offprint).

80. Letter to the author from Dorothy Roché, Brain Tools, The Ned Herrmann Group, February 22, 1995.

81. Suggested in a letter to the author from Dr. T. Owen Jacobs, Industrial College of the Armed Forces, February 14, 1995.

82. I am indebted to Lieutenant General Walter Ulmer, U.S. Army (Ret.) for this point (contained in correspondence with the author of March 8, 1995).

83. Such difficulties have been addressed by Michael J. Kirton, "Adaptors and Innovators: Problem-solvers in Organizations," *Readings in Innovation*, Stanley S. Gyskiewicz and David A. Hills, eds., Greensboro, NC: Center for Creative Leadership, 1992, p. 45-67 [reprinted from *Innovation: A Cross-disciplinary Perspective*, Kjell Grønhaug and Geir Kaufmann, Norwegian University Press, 1988].

84. Fred E. Fielder, *Leadership Experience and Leadership Performance*, Alexandria, VA: U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences, 1994, p. 59-63. This finding is controversial and needs to be assessed against other literature which does not support this view. Also, Fielder's subjects were at the lower end of the tactical-level of warfare. One should not extrapolate his findings to the operational or strategic-levels. Under conditions of stress caused by a boss, non-innovative tasks, and an organizational climate which did not allow for much decision discretion, Fielder's findings become less surprising. On the other hand, supporting this conclusion is a related study on the complexity of information processing by national political leaders operating under the severe stress associated with the 1990-1991 Persian Gulf crisis and war. See: Michael D. Wallace, Peter Suedfeld, and Kimberley Thachuk, "Political Rhetoric of Leaders Under Stress in the Gulf Crisis," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 37, no. 1 (March 1993): 101-103. Wallace, Suedfeld, and Thachuk find that under stress, leaders exhibit less complex information processing. Similar patterns had been noticed by Suedfeld in his prior study of General Robert E. Lee. See: Peter Suedfeld, R.S. Corteen, and C. McCormick, "The Role of Integrative Complexity in Military Leadership: Robert E. Lee and His Opponents," *Journal of Applied Social Psychology*, 16, no. 6 (1986): 498-507. Karl von Clausewitz noted the same: "...the most distinguished generals have never risen from the very learned, or really erudite, class of officers, but have been mostly men who, from the circumstances of their position, could not have attained any great amount of knowledge." Karl von Clausewitz, *On War*, O.J. Matthijs Jolles, trans., New York, NY: The Modern Library, 1943, p. 80. In the U.S. armed forces of the future, it is unlikely

that our senior leaders will include many who will not have attained a great amount of knowledge.

85. Suggested in a letter to the author from Dr. T. Owen Jacobs, Industrial College of the Armed Forces, February 14, 1995.

CHAPTER 4

THE SPECIAL CASE OF "CHARISMATIC" LEADERSHIP

Don't confuse charisma with a loud voice.

--Harvey Mackay¹

Another myth about leadership, and especially combat leadership, is that of the need for a "charismatic" leader. This term "charisma" has been so much abused--to imply anyone that has an air, flamboyance, style, or popular appeal--that we must therefore go back to the original literature discussion of "charisma" to see how the term was originally used and then how it might apply to leadership in general and then specifically to combat leadership.

FORMAL THEORIES OF "CHARISMA"

The first serious study of "charisma" was completed by a German sociologist, Max Weber in 1924.² Weber took the concept from the Greek, which was used in the literature of early Christianity to refer to "the gift of grace." "Charisma" was thought to be the basis of religious communities and military comradeship. Weber argued that societies passed through a sequence of three types of legitimate authority: "charismatic," rational/legal, and traditional. Authority refers to the regime that rules a particular society or group. Leadership can exist in each of these three different categories of authority.

Whereas rational/legal and traditional authority are generally supported by bureaucracies and organizations operating within "normal" bound, religious communities and military comradeship based upon "charisma" are very different. "Charismatic" authority involves a special two-way relationship between followers and the leader in accordance with different and non-traditional patterns "revealed" by the leader. "Charismatic" authority is derived from the capacity of an individual leader to arouse and maintain beliefs in himself or herself as the only source of legitimacy--not from the office or status of the leader. Anything less than this is "charismatic-like", but not true "charisma."

Following his lost battle at the "Bloody Angle" at Spotsylvania Court House, Virginia, during the U.S. Civil War (1864), General Robert E. Lee lamented what might become of his country. An aide interrupted, "General, for the last two years, these men have had no country; you are their country, and what they have fought for."³ This is charisma--affectations are not.

"Charismatic" leadership, in its purest sense, involves hero worship which transcends mere idolatry. Followers must receive and respond to the influence of the "charismatic" leader in ways very different than they would to rational/legal or traditional leaders. This relationship has been described as one in which the leader is an actor on a stage--unaware that his performance is being seen. The dialogue on the stage is between the leader and himself--and the leader has total faith in this inner dialogue. The follower is a spectator of this actor that has lost all separation between himself and the leader. The follower's intellect and emotion are no longer distinct.⁴

There are four major differences between "charismatic" leaders and traditional or rational/legal leaders.⁵ First, believers attribute **divine or supernatural** qualities commonly associated within that culture to the "charismatic" leader. Second, statements and ideas of the "charismatic" leader are **accepted unconditionally** by the believer simply because the leader has made the statement or advanced the idea--ideas do not need to be first tested for "truth."

Third, the followers **comply simply because they have been given a command** by the leader--no other reason is necessary and the task need not be evaluated first. Fourth, **followers respond emotionally to the leader and, by extension, to his vision or doctrine**, in a manner close to religious worship--devotion, awe, reverence, and blind faith. Therefore "charismatic" leadership is a very special subtype of leadership involving personal qualities and interpersonal relationships between the leader and the follower that are not found in the general population of leaders.

There have been very few pure "charismatic" leaders--those for which there is universal agreement of the presence of "charisma." Those suggested include:⁶ Moses, King David, Jesus Christ, Attila the Hun, Mohammed, Joan of Arc, Peter the Great, Napoleon Bonaparte, the Mahdi of the Sudan, Prince Diponegoro of Java, Benito Mussolini, Adolph Hitler, Franklin Delano Roosevelt, Mohandas Ghandi, Fidel Castro, Sukarno, and Ayatollah Ruholla Khomeini. Another group of leaders are those who have successfully mastered "charisma" and ideological leadership--such as Mao Tse-tung. Indeed, there is a close tie between "charismatic" leaders--who have a message--and ideology. Some of these leaders are combat warriors, but the bulk of them are not.

Many other leaders have often been described as "charismatic," but either fail the purity test with unbiased scholarly investigation or can only be termed probable or "charismatic-like". This group includes: Kemal Atatürk, Vladimir Lenin, Josef Stalin, Winston Churchill, Juan Perón, Sékou Touré, Jawaharlal Nehru, Ramon Magsaysay, Charles de Gaulle, Gamal Nassar, John F. Kennedy, Kwame Nkrumah, and U Nu. Complicating

the problem of determining who was really "charismatic" is the subjective quality of the term, a strong desire on the part of many political leaders to claim such status for themselves, and the written support of those claims by official or popular histories. Some of these leaders were prominent during wartime and others were not--implying that "charismatic" studies should not separate out combat as a discrete area.

Studies of "charisma" have focused on religious and political leaders that **have arisen from** societies in **crises** when the trust and legitimacy of major institutions overwhelm the current rulers, ideology, and institutions. However, not all "charismatic" leaders have evolved from crises. "Charismatic" leaders have generally, but not always, been **agents of change**. When a challenger succeeds in changing the existing order, he often claims support of the populace in order to effect that change--and in doing so, suggests that his authority is "charismatic."

Due, in part, to numerous attempts by political leaders to describe themselves as, or to even make themselves more, "charismatic," academic literature often includes discussions of whether "charisma" is a genetic trait or a cultivated one? In general, sociologists tend to favor the view that "charismatic" leadership is situationally-based--the leader emerges from a crisis and would have otherwise not appeared. Political scientists have reviewed these crises without finding a direct cause and effect relationship. Psychologists examine the critical inter-personal relationships between leader and follower or correlate personality traits with biographical experiences. Organizational theorists have explored the role that the "charismatic" leader plays within an organization. Historians, and certainly others, use the term imprecisely--to anyone with a flair for leadership or unusual behaviors in a leadership context.

Yet the fundamental determinate of a "charismatic" leader is the perception of "charisma" and responses of followers--regardless of whether the relationship was artificially created by manipulative leaders. It would appear that, as long as the leader can establish this relationship, "charisma" exists. When looking for evidence of a "charismatic" leader, **we must focus on the responses of followers--not the behaviors of the leader**. Thus, when considering the issue of the context of combat leadership, "charismatic" leadership theory strongly supports the idea that historically-based combat leadership studies are fatally flawed if they describe only the actions or personality traits of leaders. But how do we study the followers of long-dead "charismatic" leaders in the absence of data?

The psychological approach to studying the followers of "charismatic" leaders emphasizes the needy follower attempting to

resolve inner conflicts between who they are and who they want to become. These followers substitute the "charismatic" leader for their own ideal. A social psychologist and organizational theorist approach emphasizes the attraction that followers have for the identity or abilities of the "charismatic" leader. Here, the follower is described as being in awe of the leader's vision, communications skills, and ability to motivate and empower subordinates.

If the **crux of "charismatic" leadership is this special relationship with followers**, then "charismatic" leaders can be created--thus explaining the efforts made by such leaders as Richard Nixon to become "charismatic" through image building in the media. Recent research has demonstrated that "charismatic" behaviors can be successfully taught and followers can demonstrate higher task performance and greater degree of satisfaction in a work environment.⁷ However, a minority of other scholars disagree and emphasize that charisma is the result of extremely complex interactions between individuals and their environment--hence charisma cannot be artificially created or trained.⁸

If "charismatic" leadership is primarily a result of perceptions in the minds of followers, then **what makes a "charismatic" leader in one society or situation may not work elsewhere.**⁹ Thus, although Adolf Hitler was "charismatic" in 1930s and 1940s Germany, his appeal was not shared by Americans who preferred their own "charismatic" leader--Franklin Delano Roosevelt. This further implies that there is not one single "charismatic" personality type. This conclusion further reinforces the importance of the cultural context of combat and other types of leadership and the associated criticism of historical research which focuses on the behavior and actions of individual leaders.

Although the "charismatic" leader is primarily relational, such leaders generally display specific personality characteristics: traits and behaviors that can be described--similar to attempts to describe successful leaders and successful combat leaders.¹⁰ However, such descriptions only deal with the leader and, in "charismatic" leadership, it is the relationship with the follower that is the most important element. This relationship includes an emotional, spiritual, or otherwise not rational feeling that the follower has for the leader.

"Charismatic" leaders have been described as having: extremely high levels of self-confidence, an ability to dominate and a need to influence, a strong conviction in the moral righteousness of their beliefs. Some researchers have attempted to trace the roots of "charismatic" personalities to early childhood bonds with parents who favored them--thus giving them

the self-confidence to be creative and more self-reliant, or parents who died--causing a compensation for the loss.¹¹

"Charismatic" leaders have also been described as demonstrating the following behaviors: good goal articulation, role modeling, personal image building, demonstrations of confidence, motive arousal behaviors, compassion, and dynamic, resourceful, and responsive **competence that rebels against authority and tradition** in the name of a group that the leader respects and values. Such individuals have exceptional expressive behavior and skills--including nonverbal cues, insight, self-determination, and perhaps freedom from internal conflict.¹² "Charismatic" leaders may have the ability to articulate a **vision** and to communicate high expectations which enhance the self-esteem of followers.

Such personality traits and behaviors are suggestive of cerebral right brain thinking (the visionary) and perhaps that of the limbic right brain (the collaborator). "Charismatic" preferences are not those associated with the "ESTJ" pattern on the Meyers-Briggs Type Indicator test. There has not yet been an all-encompassing research study that fully categorizes the personality traits and behaviors associated with all "charismatic" leaders, in part, because there are many examples of "charismatic" leaders who have exhibited exceedingly wicked behavior as well as those who have used their "charisma" for good. Thus, there probably **cannot be one all-purpose "charismatic" leadership personality profile.**

A standard "charismatic" leadership profile has been attempted for at least one sub-set of leaders--U.S. presidents.¹³ Researchers have correlated standard personality traits and behaviors with the performance of these selected leaders. These studies characterize between five and seven presidents as "charismatic," but the use of the term does not coincide with its usage by previous more traditional scholars in the field of leadership. In addition, presidential studies suffer methodological flaws. It is doubtful whether many U.S. presidents have been able to exercise the influence and power over the population, Congress, and courts to the degree that was described by early researchers attempting to define the term "charisma."

Max Weber noted that the world had more or less come to grips with replacement of rational/legal and traditional authority, such as a U.S. president, but "charismatic" authority required a different form of transition to a new leader. For example, the "charismatic" leader often "reveals" the manner in which a new leader was to be selected--and such means would naturally not be subject to question. Such "revealed" means include: revelation by oracles, designation by the original leader, selection by the followers, heredity, or via some ritual.

"Charismatic" American presidents are selected by more legal and traditional means, although one could certainly agree that running for office is a "ritual" that could follow being designated by an incumbent or after having been revealed by a national party convention. "Charismatic" military leaders are also generally replaced by traditional means, although it is not inconceivable that a "charismatic" military leader would not have made a major bureaucratic input to the formal selection of his replacement.

Due to the problems associated with the lack of standardization in the term "charisma," some scholars have suggested that a new term be applied in a leadership context, one which implies "charisma" but includes a great deal more. This new term is "transformational" leadership.

"TRANSFORMATIONAL" LEADERSHIP: A BETTER IDEA

"Charismatic" leadership was discussed at the 1987 leadership conference held at the U.S. Naval Academy. The one paper which used this term was delivered by Bernard M. Bass, a well-recognized scholar whose research in the area of leadership has been sponsored by the Office of Naval Research.¹⁴ Bass argued at the conference that most studies of leadership involved styles in which leaders reward subordinates for services rendered-- "transactional" leadership. He stated that in reality, a new type of leader should be studied and this model applied for training and educating leaders--including military leaders.

The new model for leadership is that of the "transformational" leader--first articulated by James MacGregor Burns in his pioneering and Pulitzer Prize-winning 1978 book *Leadership*.¹⁵ The "transformational" leader also articulates a reasonable **vision** of the future that can be shared and understood by subordinates but then **empowers the group to act**. Inspired by the "charismatic-like" "transformational" leader, followers accomplish more because they have a clearer vision of what needs to be done and then exert extra effort. H. Ross Perot would be a good example of a "transformational" leader who did not attain the degree of following necessary to be called "charismatic."

The Transformational Leader,¹⁶ a business school book, was published in 1986 and further developed many of Burns's ideas. The authors used numerous business case studies to illuminate concepts of "transformational" leadership including the central concept of right brain visioning. In the second edition of the book, the authors added a list of characteristics of "transformational" leaders which included: (1) an understanding that they were agents of change; (2) courage; (3) belief in people; (4) value-driven; (5) life long learners; (6) the ability to deal with complexity, ambiguity, and uncertainty; and, (7)

vision with an ability to translate that dream so that others could share in the process of change.

Bass argues that "attaining charisma in the eyes of one's subordinates is central to the transformational leadership process." Charisma provides the followers with a vision, a sense of mission which they can respect. The follower then trusts and has faith in the leader and his focus of effort. Bass' concludes that organizations increase the payoff when leaders articulate a shared vision of the future in a manner that arouses confidence and commitment. Peter Senge concurs with the linkage between charisma and shared vision, noting also that shared vision is one of the cornerstones for the "learning organization."¹⁷

"Transformational" leaders thrive in an atmosphere of innovation and creativity and are more likely to emerge in times of stress and disorganization--a parallel to the debated emergence of pure "charismatic" leaders.¹⁸ As with "charismatic" leaders, "transformational" leadership behaviors appear to be more associated with right brain thinking and appear to be associated with the **"NP" pattern on the Meyers-Briggs Type Indicator test.**¹⁹

Bass uses three military combat leaders as examples of "transformational" leadership: Napoleon Bonaparte, Ernst Rommel, and George S. Patton. Each of these officers was willing to accept calculated risks and each transformed the military organization they commanded. Bass implies that combat leadership is not unique and that it has lessons that are relevant to other disciplines. The selection of Patton as an example should remind us that "transformational" leaders have the same problems with a "dark side" as do "charismatic leaders.

Presented at the U.S. Naval Academy, Bass based his research results on survey studies in which hundreds of business, government, academic leaders, and senior U.S. Army officers were evaluated by subordinates. Bass conducted another study of U.S. Navy officers which likewise made use of **assessments by peers and subordinates.**²⁰ Other researchers have used the "transformational" leadership paradigm to look at U.S. Navy officers with results identical to Bass.²¹ In addition, a recent article in *Airpower Journal* states that the U.S. Air Force is incorrectly moving away from "transformational" leadership back to "transactional" leadership which will inhibit the ability of leaders to develop *coup d'oeil*.²²

"Transformational" leaders display more concern for individuals within the organization than pure "charismatic" leaders. They stimulate subordinates intellectually by enabling them to look at problems in a new way and by stressing problem-solving. Providing a means to attain goals--empowering--appears

to be crucial to the concept of "transformational" leadership. Recent research has investigated why so many business leaders believe they are empowering subordinates but fail to realize that they are not.²³ One scholar has recognized that, in some cases, the pure "charismatic" leader does not empower his followers at all.²⁴

Other researchers have attempted to ascertain the significance of the differences between "charismatic" and "transformational" leadership. Some researchers have concluded that the differences are not worth discussing--the terms are identical.²⁵ Others have identified significant differences which are outside the scope of this research report. Suffice it to say, the "transformational" leader can actually be less "charismatic" because he diverts the attention of followers with empowerment.

Bass urged the military to recognize that **"transformational" leadership can be increased through training and education**--it was not entirely a genetic trait. Instead, he believed the genetic component of the latent "transformational" leader can be awakened by training and education.²⁶ He further stated that the organization can support the development of such leaders with appropriate recruitment, selection, and promotion. It is not important to note that not all scholars agree that "transformational" leadership behaviors can be taught.²⁷ Bass and the others who have studied "transformational" leadership represent a different group of scholars who have examined leadership from the perspective of business. Their results that are of interest to the U.S. Navy.

BUSINESS SCHOOL STUDIES

In the mid-1980s, a new dimension was added to "charismatic" leadership. This was due to the perceived need for more effective leadership which could revitalize North American industry in the face of a changed and competitive business environment. Concurrent with this perceived need was the appearance of non-standard corporate leaders who were able to inspire and motivate on a grand scale, distancing their approach to business from the likes of the former "robber barons." These men included Lee Iacocca of Chrysler, Steven Jobs of Apple Computer, and others who are studied in business schools in order to understand their personality, behavior, and role in industry. By emphasizing the leader, and not the follower, the business approach to "charisma" differs from that of other scholars. It also appears that the business school approach grants "charismatic" status to individuals who are less "charismatic" than those in the world of political science.

A series of books and studies has appeared recently, written for business schools and business leaders.²⁸ Like previous studies of combat leadership, these books on "charismatic" leadership are

primarily based upon biographical data and speeches, with a recognition of the problems associated with such materials. These books do not accept the use of the term "charisma" by other academics and tend to ascribe this trait to anyone who masters change and is perceived as revolutionary. Indeed, they question whether the evolutionary leader can be "charismatic."

Despite these flaws, there is value at looking at the business school model of "charisma." One of the most important findings in such literature is that **"charismatic" leaders are not cost-free**. This directly supports analyses of combat leaders such as Admiral Lord Horatio Nelson and Generals George S. Patton and Douglas MacArthur. These "charismatic" combat leaders all exhibited behaviors that increased the cost of leadership.

"Charismatic" or "charismatic-like" business leaders potentially have a parallel **"dark side"**²⁹ that can cause major problems for their businesses. These leaders may not have the correct vision of the future or may be blinded by pure ambition. Vision is based upon insight--"charisma" may not be. The "charismatic" may lose contact with followers as he becomes corrupted to selfish ends and loses the feedback necessary to adjust goals in different circumstances.³⁰

"Charismatic" or "charismatic-like" business leaders are often guilty of projecting personal needs and beliefs onto constituents. They may be out of synch with the marketplace and they may be unwilling to recognize flaws. "Charismatic" leaders have also been known to misuse their communications abilities to manipulate groups and organizations--the personal power to control others being a strong draw. They are often impulsive, autocratic, inattentive to details, and their management styles foster alienation and rivalries. Additionally, there is the problem of succession of the "charismatic" business leader.

In short, the business school approach has revealed some of the flaws of "charismatic" leaders and how organizations can deal with these flaws. Many of these negative sides can be mitigated with strong staffs and with good socialization and training of potential leaders. In some cases, businesses are simply willing to pay the price of the "charismatic" or "charismatic-like" leader. Simply put, the "charismatic" business leader may require a management plan to handle him.

Yet when supported by a good staff, "charismatic" or "charismatic-like" business leaders offer a keen sense of strategic opportunity, perhaps similar to *coup d'oeil/blick*, and are willing to take the risks necessary to achieve objectives. Business "charismatic-like" leadership also appears to involve the concept of **empowering** subordinates--the same term used in discussions of "transformational" leadership. Since the

"hardcore," "charismatic" leader probably does not care much about empowerment, this reinforces the conclusion that the use of the term "charisma" by the business world bears special attention.

Vision and empowerment appear to be the cornerstones of business "charismatic" leadership. Strategic **vision**, in the business sense, is a result of an incremental process resulting from past experiences, creative insights, opportunism, and serendipity. Leaders with vision tend to have a broad exposure to many aspects of their business early in their career and an intuitive sense of what is needed based upon this broad exposure. They also have had exposure to **innovative** ideas and have had the opportunity to experiment so that they do not fear creativity.

Serendipity may play a large part in the creation of a business "charismatic-like" leader. Many leaders find that the market, technology, or resources are beyond their control--despite their accurate vision and desire to shape events. However, when an able leader perceives an opportunity and has the ability to seize it, he may then be credited with having intuition and "charisma." Business literature attempts to demystify **intuition** by describing it as the ability to synthesize diverse information, weed out the irrelevant, and conceptualize what remains into a coherent picture. Is this not *coup d'oeil/blick*?

"Charismatic" or "charismatic-like" leaders in business **thrive in an innovative and creative environment**--even if they themselves do not intentionally create the environment. They accept uncertainty, unconventional approaches, and individual expression. Because of these attributes, "charismatic-like" leaders are potential sources for enormous transformation of organizations and can play a crucial role in the creation of new organizations.

Rather than specifically developing "charismatic" business leaders, scholars have recommended that business simply enhance the general leadership skills of all managers, and to then deal with the "charismatic" leader if one emerges. **One way to develop leaders with vision may be to recruit and retain non-technical managers and leaders.** Research studies tend to show that innovation and imagination decrease as students become more proficient in technical fields, while those enrolled in the arts tend to increase their imaginative skills.³¹ Similar debates have taken place in the military over the need for technical versus non-technical education.³² However, since many military endeavors and businesses require technical skills, we may be forced to "retrain" the technically-proficient leader instead.

Similarly, organizational vision can be enhanced by selection, promotion, and training. Non-threatening brainstorming sessions offer a mechanism to stimulate vision. One type of training recommended involves enhancing self-awareness. This leads to more effective personal behavior--such as "active listening."³³ **The most sure way to kill creativity is to place creative individuals in an organization that demands uncreative ways of thinking and has no reward structure for initiative.** Organizations need to find, reward, and retain individuals with stronger-than-average conceptual and creative skills.

One group of researchers believes that there is sufficient knowledge concerning leadership personalities to warrant the development of testing materials and selection procedures for the identification of "charismatic" leadership potential.³⁴ However, these same scholars admit that the assignment of a "charismatic" leader to a routine situation requiring reliable performance could be dysfunctional. Individuals with a strong passion for their work are often more motivated and have the most potential to become visionaries. Organizations should provide opportunities for experimentation in leadership styles and foster decentralization as much as possible.

To foster "transformational" leadership, organizations should reward managers who develop empowerment practices. This is a large culture change for some organizations, and must be sponsored from above and supported from below, or change is impossible. If the U.S. military is interested in empowering junior rank leaders to execute "maneuver" warfare doctrine, the need for "transformational" leadership and empowerment in the military appears to have been established.

MILITARY "CHARISMA"?

Studies have been conducted on both military and combat leaders, but none of these attempted to link the theoretical work in "charisma" to specific situations in which military "charismatic" leaders operated. On the other hand, two researchers have looked at four separate military samples of "inspirational" leadership and concluded that it correlates positively to high levels of follower motivation.³⁵

Another study found that Army combat officers were more likely to have demonstrated qualities of "transformational" leadership, including "charisma," than officers assigned to combat service support.³⁶ If we focus on individuals and the psychological approach to leadership, this might imply that officers assigned to combat units have developed, or naturally possessed, more "charismatic" behaviors. Alternatively, the followers in combat service support might simply be the type of individuals who do not see "charismatic" leaders. Perhaps, the

context of combat service support is less dependent on the inspirational motivator than the combat environment.³⁷ If the environment is examined separately, perhaps we would find more crises and life-and-death emergency situations in combat, hence "charismatic" leaders are born there out of necessity.

If visions of the future and new messages are revealed by a "charismatic" leader, then by definition they must be accepted without question by followers. It stands to reason that any doctrine or new paradigm developed by a "charismatic" leader flows from the top-down and perhaps without the participation of the followers--the "charismatic" leader being able to ascertain the needs of followers and deliver the message that they want to hear. Also, the vision, message, and doctrine of a "charismatic" leader have generally, but not always, developed from a climate of crisis, potential followers in distress, and a leader willing to challenge the existing order with a new idea.

Doctrinal development can, but has not always facilitated revolutionary change within the military. However, such processes and behavior do not describe the military in general and the military doctrinal development process in the United States. It may, however, more accurately describe the role played by visionary military leaders attempting to introduce new technologies or ideas into the bureaucracy from a position within the organization. Doctrine has often changed with the introduction of new technologies. Admirals William Moffett and Hyman Rickover, USN, represent another type of **military "charismatic" personality that can emerge from and exist within an organization and effect major change.**

Early "charismatic" leadership theory cast the role of the leader as an outsider until historical evidence was developed showing that revolutionary forces can exist within organizations.³⁸ Although Admiral Rickover denied the need for "charismatic" leaders and claimed he had the "charisma" of a chipmunk,³⁹ he did, in fact, have a special relationship with his followers and the ability to arouse and maintain beliefs with his own authority as the only source of legitimacy. One could conclude that the relationship was, indeed, "charismatic." This means that, if we are to look for "charismatic" leadership in the military, we can and must also look at non-combat examples.

Although most of the academic research into "charisma" involves other than combat leaders, the literature does make reference to some specific military combat leaders and techniques. For example, most of the literature recognizes the "charismatic" leadership of Alexander the Great, Julius Caesar, Napoleon Bonaparte, and General George S. Patton. These highly successful combat leaders used more than their leadership

abilities--each was a superb master of the technical skills required in the art of war.

The German Army has been interested in "charisma," noting that:

"A great general is able to substitute his own personality in the eyes of his soldiers for their home country... In the long years of war the soldier finds a second home in the camp; and as a substitute for patriotism he has his *esprit de corps* and his enthusiastic loyalty for his great leader."

--Major General Hugo von Freytag-Loringhoven⁴⁰

Von Freytag-Loringhoven also noted that the tendency to extreme centralization under a "charismatic" leader has a detrimental effect on the development of subordinates.

Just as in the world of politics, there is a tendency for successful combat leaders to have been described as "charismatic" by their public affairs officers. There is no serious scholarly research to support the wide claims for "charisma" attributed to many combat leaders. Clearly, this area would be debated if military historians used social science techniques prior to labeling individuals as "charismatic."

The need for the general leader to motivate and arouse followers is a technique that is well understood in the military and one that business school psychological studies have attempted to generalize. Military, and especially combat leaders, understand well the use of **symbols of authority** and images of the enemy to arouse the emotions necessary to support effective combat performance.⁴¹ For example, Julius Caesar fought one of his greatest victories at Alesia wearing a bright red cloak so that his men would be inspired by his presence. At this particular battle, Caesar won the field against Arvernian Vercingetorix who reportedly had five times as many warriors as did Rome.⁴² Legend has it that the "charisma" of Caesar made up the difference.

Similarly, when Admiral Nelson died at Trafalgar, heroic paintings often depict that he had been standing in full dress uniform, with medals and sword, on the quarterdeck of *HMS Victory* so that his presence would inspire his men.⁴³ Individuality in dress was audacious behavior in front of the enemy and was perceived as such by both sides. General George Patton's use of the flag, his uniform, etc., was orchestrated to inspire confidence and result in unquestioned loyalty and compliance. The pearl-handled revolvers were audacious to the bulk of his troops committed to uniformity in dress.

Individuality in dress is by itself not indicative of "charisma," but such symbols are often used, and can be used, by military commanders who desire to advertise their audacity to their own forces and those of the enemy. They are similar to the use of radio call-signs and specially marked aircraft in naval aviation as symbols of combat prowess.

In some navies, under modern combat conditions at sea, uniforms with inspirational symbols have been replaced by individual protection gear which has no rank insignia or even names. During the Falklands War, the British Navy learned that the black names or ranks on white flash protection equipment resulted in flash burns. Official policy is now to avoid any ranks or names. Recent U.S. naval aircraft have been painted with duller paints for aircraft self-protection. A result, however, of this effort is that it now less obvious which aircraft contains the flight leader. This obviously presents a problem for the leader--being unable to identify himself to subordinates with other than verbal cues. The U.S. Army has been investigating this issue as well since it believes that the leader does need to be identified visually to his/her subordinates.⁴⁴

When attempting to lead a cohesive team, the arousal of affiliative motives--by symbols, etc.--is extremely important for overall task accomplishment. Such type of behavior and symbology can be taught and utilized by other organizations and individuals than the military. Clearly, Adolf Hitler was a master of manipulation using motivational techniques and symbols. But is "charismatic" leadership only about the manipulation of symbols and presence? Does a "charismatic" combat leader actually have to be there at the forward line of troops? In ground combat and in aviation, the tactical-level combat leader often is at the forward line of troops or leading the combat flight into battle.

One of the world's earliest documented cases of a "charismatic" combat leader is Alexander the Great. Alexander occupies a unique position, like that of Nelson, being a tactician, a strategist, and a leader who demonstrated great courage in combat. His self-confidence, inexhaustible strength, and genius are legend. Yet a detailed analysis of battles fought by Alexander reveals an interesting pattern. Alexander's job, like that of Nelson, focused more on preparing his warriors for the battle than combat itself. Alexander's role in actual battle was direction and assessment--not fighting at the front line of troops. The combat leader therefore needs to be both the builder of forces and the operator. This sounds remarkably like vision, communication, and empowerment--terms used in "charismatic" or "transformational" leadership theory. Alexander was thought of as being supernatural. His warriors complied with his orders without question. They also had an emotional bond with him.

Unfortunately, the lack of data prevents us from having more of an understanding of the inter-personal dynamics involved.

Alexander's role on the actual day of a battle was to select the time and place of the attack. That being done, the local cavalry, infantry, and supporting forces commanders took over to complete the actual tactical actions.⁴⁵ As a "charismatic" leader, Alexander provided the **vision of the battlespace** and his orders were accepted without question--he did not have to lead every individual engagement.

The parallel to the role played by Nelson at Trafalgar (1805) is remarkable--Nelson's death during the battle in no way diminished the competency with which his captains and their crews fought and attained victory. They shared Nelson's sense of vision and had been empowered with the tools necessary to accomplish the mission. Nelson's legend is clearly that of a supernatural leader and his subordinates had an emotional bond with him. Whereas Nelson did issue orders that were accepted unconditionally by his captains, we must remember the importance of the pre-battle meetings with his officers which facilitated the sharing of the vision and the building of consensus.

In the case of more recent examples of "charismatic" military and combat leaders, we have the opportunity to learn more about the inter-personal dynamics involved and to de-mystify the process of "charisma." Just as there was a myth that Nelson never followed or used doctrine, careful scholarship reveals patterns of consensus building that also built "charisma." For example, if we look at the more accurate records of the life of General George Patton, we learn that he was not particularly visionary, but he had excellent staff officers who provided that component.

General Douglas MacArthur was a classic "charismatic" leader. When MacArthur was the commander of forces in the Southwest Pacific during World War II, his subordinate component commanders spoke of their forces as "MacArthur's forces" rather than those of their own Service--i.e., they totally subordinated their Service position and own desire for glory to that of serving a "charismatic" combat leader.⁴⁶ But, like the "charismatic" leader in the business world, is he the type of officer that political and military seniors routinely prefer in a leadership position? On the other hand, can a military deliberately avoid the development of future MacArthurs and still retain their warrior ethos?

Despite our official "Europe first" policy during World War II, the U.S. essentially devoted about half of its overall war effort to the Pacific. Some historians have claimed that the government deviated from its stated policy due to the

"charismatic" personality of General MacArthur.⁴⁷ The American public saw MacArthur as the one who would lead the attack on Japan to avenge its war dead and the atrocities being committed by the enemy in the field.

Once MacArthur left the Philippines, his area of responsibility, he lost the authority to act as a warfare commander. Yet he did exactly that. Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, USN, Commander of the U.S. Pacific Command, acquiesced to MacArthur's self-proclaimed role as the "czar" for the Southwest Pacific because the only other serious choices for MacArthur would be service in Europe, Washington, or to run for President; and it would ensure that Admiral Ernest J. King, USN, and General George C. Marshall would pay attention to the Pacific!⁴⁸ Therefore, the "charismatic" personality of MacArthur forced the Navy, the Joint Chiefs, and the government to make major strategic-level decisions that they otherwise might not have. MacArthur is an excellent example of military "charismatic" personalities that have proven difficult to handle and yet had to be "handled."

One noted military historian, Martin van Creveld, has noted that some famous "charismatic" practitioners of wars had a personal "dark side." For example, Julius Caesar was known as "the bald fornicator" and Napoleon cheated at cards. Van Creveld further concludes that even military genius itself is an insufficient quality to ensure victory in combat.⁴⁹ What is not clear is whether the "charismatic" leader will automatically bring a "dark side" with him/her to command?

Historians tell us that "charismatic" combat leaders even existed in the U.S. Navy. Admiral Farragut's combat exploits during the U.S. Civil War became legend in his own lifetime. Although Farragut had a relatively undistinguished career in peacetime, when thrust into combat, he demonstrated vision and the ability to exploit it. Does Farragut meet the "charismatic" criteria as defined by Weber and other scholars? Of his success there is no doubt--but was he perceived by followers as being divine or supernatural? Were his ideas and orders accepted unquestioningly? Did his followers have an emotional bond to the leader? Unfortunately, we probably do not have the necessary raw data to research and answer this question.

Reviewing the cases of successful navy combat leaders during World War II leads to some additional interesting observations. Admiral Raymond A. Spruance, USN, was one of the most well-known and successful navy combat leaders of the Pacific war. Spruance was the key leader at the Battle of Midway (June 1942) and led the thrust through the Central Pacific culminating in the Battle of the Philippine Sea (June 1944). The most accurate biography of Admiral Spruance is titled: *The Quiet Warrior* which documents

Spruance as an extremely successful warrior, but also as a private person, unconcerned with image, oblivious to how he would be portrayed in history.⁵⁰ Spruance was not a "charismatic" leader.

Another interesting case is that of Vice Admiral Willis A. "Ching" Lee, USN.⁵¹ In charge of the fast battleships during most major engagements and battles in the Pacific theater of World War II, Lee was an extremely effective combat leader. He was an innovative thinker during the war--settling how to actually use radar in combat. Admiral Lee was by no means a "charismatic," or even aggressive, warrior--he has been described as a scientist in uniform. His area of expertise before the war was tactics, especially the use of gunnery against aircraft. Lee's expertise was well-recognized; after the Battle of Leyte Gulf he was ordered to return home and work on defenses against *kamikaze* attacks. His organization eventually grew into the Operational Test and Evaluation Force (OPTEVFOR). "Ching" Lee was a first-class warrior but not a "charismatic" leader.

Of course, there were other more "charismatic-like" leaders in the Pacific theater. Unfortunately, Admiral William F. Halsey, USN, is remembered most for falling into a Japanese trap at the Battle of Leyte Gulf (October 1944). Halsey could not resist an opportunity to go after the Japanese aircraft carriers, an action that has placed a blemish on what would have otherwise been an outstanding war record. Simply put, the Japanese knew that Halsey was determined to sink the Japanese fleet, and not "make the mistake" of Admiral Spruance who "let the Japanese get away" at the Battle of the Philippine Sea. Halsey's preoccupation with the decisive battle and fighting on the offensive almost cost the U.S. the invasion force which was left defended in the center only by the Taffy Group (of which *USS Johnston* was a part).

Spruance was quiet, deep thinking, always in control, and concerned with capabilities of the enemy. Spruance had a sense of vision. Halsey was loud, impetuous, flamboyant, but he personally lacked vision. Like Patton, Halsey benefited from good staff officers who supplied his vision. Halsey was concerned with the probabilities of what the enemy would do.⁵² Halsey was clearly more "charismatic" than Spruance, but was Halsey a truly "charismatic" leader or merely loud, impetuous, and flamboyant? Did Halsey's men consider him supernatural or did they fear him? Did they accept his ideas and orders because of his persona and not because he wore a uniform with stars? Who was the better combat leader--Halsey or Spruance? Which model would be chosen to replicate today?

The concept of a "charismatic" military leader is one that is decidedly affected by the social cultural context. Japan, for example, has a tradition of deemphasizing the importance of

individual leaders. Hence although the brilliant victory of Admiral Tōgō Heihachirō at Tsushima (May 1905) led to his elevation to the status of a national hero by some biographers, officers in the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) did not regard their admiral as anything special. Indeed, there were puns of Tōgō made at the time by fleet officers: "*Tōgō baka ne*" ("Tōgō's an idiot, isn't he?"). Admiral Yamamoto Isoroku, IJN, did achieve the status of a true "charismatic" leader in the fleet, but this was a very notable exception to the rule.⁵³

Even more interesting points can be made by considering non-navy examples of "charismatic" combat leadership. The U.S. Army studied the significance of combat leadership in the tactical sphere during World War II.⁵⁴ In this study, the authors compared the effectiveness of twenty-four representative divisions of the European theater--twelve German, five British, and seven American. Using comparative techniques, they rated these divisions in order of battlefield effectiveness--selecting the top rated ten divisions for further in-depth analysis. Nine of the **top ten divisions** were German,⁵⁵ with the only non-German division being the 88th Infantry Division of the U.S. Army. The 88th Infantry Division was **commanded by a non-descript and definitely non-"charismatic" group of leaders** and the division itself had been formed "from scratch" when the mobilization began. The success of the 88th Division has been generally attributed to good training and leaders who were with the group from the start and who had a vision of what a good division would look like before it went into combat.⁵⁶

The essential element found in each of these top rated divisions was the overall superior quality of the division's top leadership. These top-rated leaders showed:⁵⁷ (1) a great capacity for independent action; (2) a determination to adhere to the mission (that is a moral obligation to act at all times in the spirit of the assigned mission); (3) avoidance of a fixed pattern of action; (4) the ability to make clear and unambiguous decisions; (5) the ability to establish a definite point of main effort; and, (6) a constant concern for the welfare of their troops and to preserve combat efficiency.⁵⁸ These are all good principles of leadership--not evidence of "charisma"--although some of the German general officers might have been perceived as "charismatic" by their troops.⁵⁹

Vision and insight appear to be an indispensable part of both "charismatic" and good leadership. Vision and insight are good indicators of the ability for greater conceptual complexity. One retired U.S. Army general officer has attempted to articulate this concept of vision for the combat officer. He says that meeting the challenges of operational and tactical combat requires both insight and the ability to master execution. Insight comes from a willing openness to a variety of stimuli,

from intellectual curiosity (although intellect itself does not guarantee insight), from observation and reflection, from continuous evaluation and testing, from conversations and discussions, from review of assumptions, from listening to the views of outsiders, from a study of history, and from the indispensable ingredient of humility. Obstacles to insight are many: one's own propaganda, accepting the conventional wisdom, superficial thinking, blindness to reality, self-satisfaction, complacency, and arrogance.⁶⁰

"Charismatic" combat leadership may require additional study in the future. If U.S. involvement in operations other than war (OOTW) becomes more prevalent, it is possible that the U.S. armed forces will engage more non-traditional types of forces than traditional armies. If the enemy is more likely to be a terrorist, guerrilla, bandit, or robber, then it is likely that his leadership will be on "charismatic" lines and not institutional ones.⁶¹ If this is the case, we will need to understand the nature of "charismatic" leadership as an element of future intelligence requirements.

ASSESSMENT/SUMMARY

"Charisma" is a much abused term that means different things to different people. Theories of "charisma", however, state that the presence of "charisma" is determined by the follower and not by the leader. If "charisma" is not seen by followers, then it isn't there--no matter how hard a leader tries. This finding further reinforces the vital importance of leader-follower relationships in any study of leadership--relationships generally overlooked in historical accounts and probably important for all forms of leadership!

Most discussions of "charisma" are cursed with a lack of standardization--everyone thinks they can recognize it when they see it but no one agrees on the definition. In this report, "charismatic" leadership has been defined as an inter-personal relationship in which the follower believes the leader has extraordinary or even supernatural status, accepts ideas and orders of the leader without question merely because they were issued by the leader (not his office), and there is an emotional bond, approaching the irrational, between follower and leader (not one mandated by law).

Perhaps "charismatic" leadership is not an all-inclusive definition, i.e., individuals may have "charisma" as well as more traditional rational/legal leadership traits. Surely much more research is warranted if "charismatic" leadership is a type of leadership that is desired.

Although there is not total consensus on this issue, most "charismatic" leaders appear to emerge from crises--thus implying that they are major agents of change. This finding reinforces the vital necessity of understanding the context of leadership--again often overlooked in many studies of leadership in which the object of investigation is the individual leader.

A "charismatic" relationship existed between Adolf Hitler and members of the *Wehrmacht* and *SS*. It seems that further basic research is warranted into the importance of this "charismatic" relationship with Adolf Hitler to the self-confidence of *Wehrmacht* and *SS* officers who were able to exercise confidence and competence associated with *auftragstaktik*. For junior officers to have success at the tactical-level, was it necessary that they have a shared vision with a "charismatic" leader?

Although individual "charismatic" leadership behaviors can be learned, **the value of a truly "charismatic" leader to an organization is mixed.** Recent scholarly research has emphasized the need for "transformational" leaders who are somewhat less than fully "charismatic," but able to empower followers to execute a vision. There appears to be some degree--and this is growing--of acceptance within certain parts of the business world for such "transformational" leaders and efforts are made to groom and retain them. A key to "transformational" leadership may be that, not only do the followers trust the leader, but the leader trusts his subordinates as well.

The record on "charismatic" combat leaders is likewise mixed. There are clear examples of "charismatic" combat leaders in history, but their actual contributions to combat have been somewhat inflated with the passage of time. Often these "charismatic" combat leaders have caused great problems for the governments which they serve. There are more examples of officers which simply were good leaders that served their country well in time of war--none of whom can reasonably be construed as "charismatic."

A review of the literature concerning "charismatic" leadership shows that such leaders are not necessary in combat or even non-combat situations. If anything, the evidence shows that **"charismatic" leaders are often more problem than they are worth.** Although "charisma" can, to some degree, be artificially created and taught, it is probably not worth a major effort. Improvements to leadership can probably be better attained by organizations attempting to upgrade the overall population of potential leaders rather than trying to specifically cultivate this trait of "charisma" across the board. Individuals who desire to cultivate a "charismatic" leader image must understand that they cannot demonstrate a "charismatic" image to followers--it is only "charisma" if their followers perceive it as such.

The more that individuals are taught and encouraged to take risks and to challenge the existing orthodoxy, the less susceptible they will be to "charismatic" leaders. Said another way, the more that we develop doctrine (knowledge of how to do their job) and good leadership skills in subordinates, the less they will need a "charismatic" leader to tell them what to do.

The study of "charisma" makes it apparent that **leadership at the most senior levels requires "transformational" behavior and loyalty which can be cultivated.** To cultivate such behavior from a group of former colonels/captains who were primarily left brain thinkers and enjoyed their "ESTJ" status, organizations must take positive action in the form of selection, promotion, and training to empower individuals to grow. "Charismatic-like" behaviors and symbols can and should be used to enhance leadership skills, but true "charisma" is probably not required.

NOTES

1. Jonathon Lazear, *Meditations For Men Who Do Too Much*, New York, NY: A Fireside/Parkside Meditation Book, Simon & Schuster, 1992, for August 25.
2. Max Weber, *The Theory of Social and Economic Organization*, A.M. Henderson, trans., Talcott Parsons, ed., London, UK: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1947 [originally published in German in 1924], especially p. 106, 265, 328, 364-366. A German church historian used this term earlier in the context of religious transformations. See Rudolf Sohm, *Kirchenrecht*, 2 vols., Leipzig: Dunker & Humblot, 1892.
3. James L. Stokesbury, "Leadership as an Art," *Military Leadership: In Pursuit of Excellence*, 2nd. ed., Robert L. Taylor and William E. Rosenback, eds., Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1992, p. 12.
4. Abraham Zaleznik and Manfred F.R. Kets de Vries, *Power and the Corporate Mind*, Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin, 1975, p. 246-247.
5. Ann Ruth Willner, *The Spellbinders: Charismatic Political Leadership*, New York, NY: Yale University Press, 1984, p. 5-8, 19.
6. James MacGregor Burns, *Leadership*, New York, NY: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1978, p. 241-254; and Ann Ruth Willner, *The Spellbinders: Charismatic Political Leadership*, New York, NY: Yale University Press, 1984.
7. See, for example, the fascinating report of an experiment to teach charismatic behaviors to leaders with a measurable rise in worker productivity not evidenced in a control group. Jane M. Howell and Peter J. Frost, "A Laboratory Study of Charismatic

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9. Ann Ruth Willner, *The Spellbinders: Charismatic Political Leadership*, New York, NY: Yale University Press, 1984, p. 14-15.

10. Robert J. House, "A 1976 Theory of Charismatic Leadership," *Leadership: The Cutting Edge--A Symposium* held at Southern Illinois University, Carbondale, October 27-28, 1976, James G. Hunt and Lars L. Larson, eds., Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois University Press, 1977, p. 193-194, 205-207; and James MacGregor Burns, *Leadership*, New York, NY: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1978, p. 244.

11. Abraham Zaleznik and Manfred F.R. Kets de Vries, *Power and the Corporate Mind*, Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin, 1975, p. 242-243; and Bernard M. Bass, *Leadership and Performance Beyond Expectations*, New York, NY: The Free Press, 1985, p. 170.

12. Bernard M. Bass, "Evolving Perspectives on Charismatic Leadership," *Charismatic Leadership: The Elusive Factor in Organizational Effectiveness*, Jay A. Conger and Rabindra N. Kanungo, and Associates, San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass Publishers, 1989. The conclusions chapter to this book takes issue with the assertion that "charismatic" leaders are less free from internal conflict than anyone else. See Jay A. Conger and Rabindra N. Kanungo, "Conclusion: Patterns and Trends in Studying Charismatic Leadership," *Charismatic Leadership: The Elusive Factor in Organizational Effectiveness*, Jay A. Conger and Rabindra N. Kanungo, and Associates, San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass Publishers, 1989, p. 328.

13. Dean Keith Simonton, "Presidential Style: Personality, Biography, and Performance," *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 55, no. 6, 1988, p. 928-936; and Robert J. House,

James Woycke, and Eugene M. Fodor, "Charismatic and Noncharismatic Leaders: Differences in Behavior and Effectiveness," *Charismatic Leadership: The Elusive Factor in Organizational Effectiveness*, Jay A. Conger and Rabindra N. Kanungo, and Associates, San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass Publishers, 1989, p. 105-116.

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31. R. Altemeyer, "Education in the Arts and Sciences: Divergent Paths," unpublished doctoral dissertation, Carnegie Institute of Technology, 1966.

32. Captain Paul R. Schratz, USN (Ret.), "Where Will the Warriors Come From? U.S. Naval Institute *Proceedings*, 115, no. 6 (June 1989): 62-69.

33. Marshall Saskin, "The Visionary Leader," *Charismatic Leadership: The Elusive Factor in Organizational Effectiveness*, Jay A. Conger and Rabindra N. Kanungo, and Associates, San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass Publishers, 1989, p. 153.

34. Robert J. House, James Woycke, and Eugene M. Fodor, "Charismatic and Noncharismatic Leaders: Differences in Behavior and Effectiveness," *Charismatic Leadership: The Elusive Factor in Organizational Effectiveness*, Jay A. Conger and Rabindra N. Kanungo, and Associates, San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass Publishers, 1989, p. 117. This conclusion was endorsed by the primary authors of this book. See Jay A. Conger and Rabindra N. Kanungo, "Training Charismatic Leadership: A Risky and Critical Task," *Charismatic Leadership: The Elusive Factor in Organizational Effectiveness*, Jay A. Conger and Rabindra N. Kanungo, and Associates, San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass Publishers, 1989, p. 309-323.

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42. For an alternative view of the battle strength of Arvernian Vercingetorix, see Hans Delbrück, *History of the Art of War, Volume I: Warfare in Antiquity*, Walter J. Renfro, Jr., trans., Lincoln, NE and London, UK: University of Nebraska Press, 1985 [original German version published in 1920], p. 495-507.

43. Although this is the conventional view of Admiral Lord Horatio Nelson's appearance at Trafalgar, and certainly how he is depicted on canvas, he appeared on the quarterdeck that day without his sword and in an old undress coat with a minimum of gold braid and only replicas of his military orders--not the actual medals themselves. See David Walter, *Nelson*, New York, NY: Dial Press, 1978, p. 495. Even this account, however, acknowledges that the Nelson was clearly visible as an admiral and that this was of some concern to his subordinates. The author of this study verified the coat worn by Nelson at Trafalgar by looking at it on display at the Royal Maritime Museum, Greenwich, England. It was in fact an undress coat and not a full dress.

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45. Hans Delbrück, *History of the Art of War, Volume I: Warfare in Antiquity*, Walter J. Renfro, Jr., trans., Lincoln, NE and London, UK: University of Nebraska Press, 1985 [original German version published in 1920], p. 231-232.

46. Dr. Herman Wolk, "General [George C.] Kenney in the Southwest Pacific Theater," presented at the World War II in the Pacific Conference, Alexandria, VA, August 10, 1994. The context, according to Wolk, is that these forces were not "forced" to view themselves as "MacArthur's forces" nor did they adopt this view out of fear.

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48. Professor Robert Love, "The Pacific War and the U.S. Navy," presented at the World War II in the Pacific Conference, Alexandria, VA, August 12, 1994.
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50. Thomas B. Buell, *The Quiet Warrior: A Biography of Admiral Raymond A. Spruance*, Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1987.
51. Interview with Paul Stillwell, U.S. Naval Institute, Annapolis, MD, February 17, 1994, based upon materials being developed for a biography of Admiral Lee. Lee died before dictating an oral history.
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53. David C. Evans and Mark R. Peattie, *Kaigun [Navy]: Strategy, Tactics and Technology in the Imperial Japanese Navy, 1887-1941*, August 1994 draft book manuscript, chapter 3; and interview with Professor David C. Evans, Department of History, University of Richmond, Richmond, VA, 8 February 1995.
54. Gay Hammerman and Richard G. Sheridan, "The 88th Infantry Division in World War II: Factors Responsible for Its Excellence," Fairfax, VA, 1982.
55. Thus reinforcing the point that models of success at the tactical-level of warfare do not necessarily result in success in campaigns or war.
56. Suggested in a letter to the author from Dr. T. Owen Jacobs, Industrial College of the Armed Forces, February 14, 1995.
57. Lieutenant General John H. Cushman, USA (Ret.), "Challenge and Response at the Operational Levels, 1914-45," *Military Effectiveness*, Volume III: The Second World War, Allan R. Millett and Williamson Murray, eds., Boston, MA: Allen & Unwin for the Merston Center, The Ohio State University, 1988. p. 326-330.
58. On this last point, see also: Generaloberst Franz Halder, et al., *Analysis of U.S. Army Field Service Regulations*, Historical Division, United States Army, Europe, 1953, p. 7.
59. For an interesting study of Wehrmacht general officers, see: Correlli Barnett, ed., *Hitler's General's*, New York, NY: Grove Weidenfeld, 1989.
60. Lieutenant General John H. Cushman, USA (Ret.), "Challenge and Response at the Operational Levels, 1914-45," *Military Effectiveness*, Volume III: The Second World War, Allan R. Millett

and Williamson Murray, eds., Boston, MA: Allen & Unwin for the
Mershon Center, The Ohio State University, 1988, p. 324, 334.

61. Martin van Creveld, *The Transformation of War*, New York, NY:
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CHAPTER 5

PROBLEMS OF AN ERA OF LONG PEACE

"In a long period of peace, the mental and moral qualities which are all-important in war are often relegated to the background."

--Major General Hugo von Freytag-Loringhoven¹

Recent research has examined leadership styles in the Royal Navy during the era between Admiral Lord Horatio Nelson's victory at Trafalgar (October 1805) and the World War I Battle of Jutland (May-June 1916).² Andrew Gordon, a British scholar, has concluded that, during this era of long peace (no world wars), the attitudes of the Royal Navy officer corps reflected the major changes in Victorian society. Men who fought to win under Nelson were replaced by those who played sports games fairly and according to the rules. For these officers, winning was not as important as was "playing the game" and doing the right thing. The warrior class had disappeared because society had changed and ultimately an officer corps will reflect the society from which it is drawn.

The societal change resulted in changed professional values. True warriors, such as David Beatty, who distinguished themselves in minor combat during the long peace, were not upwardly mobile in the Royal Navy of the Victorian era. Beatty was at Jutland only by chance and not in a position of major command. Thus, by influencing the promotion patterns of the Royal Navy, the societal changes of the Victorian-era predicted the behavior of the Grand Fleet at Jutland and thus the outcome of the battle.³

The myth that militaries are composed of incompetent leaders who tend to perpetuate themselves is supported by Norman Dixon's 1976 book, *On the Psychology of Military Incompetence*.⁴ Dixon justifies this stereotype using the British Army as the case study. This myth holds that, during peacetime--especially periods of long peace (periods absent formal war), the military will tend to promote only those officers who exhibit good bureaucratic skills and that these officers will need to be disposed of immediately upon the outbreak of war. Indeed, there is anecdotal evidence demonstrating that, at the beginning of many wars, some officers have had to be "fired" in order to make way for the aggressive warriors that proved to be needed.

Complicating this issue for the U.S. military is the shift in paradigms for combat. Rather than periods of long peace temporarily interrupted by global conventional wars of considerable length, the U.S. is entering an era in which long peace will be interrupted by short and regional contingencies.

According to this new paradigm, combat will be of such short duration that the senior officers which fate has placed in combat command may be all we get. The nation will not have the opportunity to see senior officers in action for a sufficient length of time that political leaders are willing to "fire" them. Additionally, politicians will be less willing to "fire" too many senior military leaders who "fail" in regional contingencies, because doing so would undermine their own agendas favoring non-military activities rather than combat preparations (and obviously because they had originally approved their promotions and assignments). Hence, we will be more than ever required to use the leaders who have demonstrated their leadership skills and been promoted in a non-combat environment.

Although we are currently construed to be in an ear of "peace," the international security environment is not "peaceful." Combat still takes place. Warriors are still sent into harm's way. The context of these combat actions, however, is different. In the current international security environment, the military will more likely be used in what is now termed operations other than war (OOTW). OOTW may include long periods of crises in which not commencing combat, despite extreme pressure, will be an important criteria for success. The recently-published principles that guide U.S. Army OOTW do not, for example, include the principles of "offensive" or "mass" but do include "restraint" and "legitimacy."⁵

Can a warrior culture exist in a military where importance is placed on the ability to support such non-combat OOTW activities as arms control, support to domestic civil authorities, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, nation assistance, and support to counterdrug operations? Should we have one group of military officers capable of OOTW and another whose specialty is combat and who are allowed to hone their combat skills by taking risks in peacetime exercises, allowed to fail, and are not penalized for doing so in the promotion system?

As medium-power navies are increasingly tasked by their governments to respond to OOTW, will they begin to develop officers whose self-identity strays from that of the warrior? Today, the self-identity of most navies is still tied to combat. However, as navies focus increasingly on OOTW, the less likely they will be successful at combat endeavors at the higher end of the warfighting spectrum. Indeed, as younger navy officers in some medium-power navies, who identify more with constabulary and other OOTW tasks, advance into leadership positions, they will probably embrace these non-combat roles, thus changing their Service culture. Today the self-identity of the U.S. Coast Guard is more akin to the policeman than the combat warrior.

In the current era of long peace, the U.S. simply does not have the capability to fight at the major regional contingency (MRC)-level of warfare without multinational forces. The U.S. may also elect to include multinational forces for lesser regional contingencies (LRCs). We therefore count on the support of multinational navy forces. Will those officers share the same combat ethos that the U.S. intends to maintain in its own officer corps?

CAN WARRIORS BE PROMOTED DURING PEACETIME?

In periods of peace, leaders are not allowed to make mistakes without being fired, resulting in a risk-averse officer corps which is exactly the opposite type of officer that is needed in war. On the other hand, Generals Douglas MacArthur and George Patton, U.S. Army and Admiral William F. Halsey, USN, were promoted to the ranks of general and flag officer during the peacetime military associated with the long inter-War years. At least one scholar has looked at the years between World Wars I and II and concluded that the U.S. Navy had a better prepared officer corps than is generally acknowledged.⁶

Implicit in this issue of peacetime promotions is whether one believes that there is a difference in the leadership skills required of officers in peacetime and wartime. As was shown by the evidence regarding this fundamental question, it appears that the U.S. armed forces, and the U.S. Navy in particular, do not appear to view combat leadership as a special task unrelated to general leadership. The U.S. Army research into leadership skills required by rank would further reinforce that view. Although one could clearly distinguish between the skills required of the junior officer in combat compared to his civilian industry equivalent, the differences are more difficult to see at the general officer level. Indeed, **the U.S. Army makes no distinction in the development of leaders for combat--the overall leadership pool is enhanced and from this pool will come the combat leaders when required.** This Army view is reflected in leadership doctrine which accepts the lack of distinction between combat leadership skills and those developed during peacetime non-combat.

Despite some rather interesting cases where excellent combat officers failed to select for promotion in peacetime, one can hardly refute the evidence of two such glaring examples as MacArthur and Patton. Even if U.S. Army examples have no relevance to U.S. Navy promotion patterns, the promotion of Halsey and other combat flag officers during peacetime refutes the myth that all warriors are doomed to being overlooked by promotion boards in peacetime--especially periods of long peace.

The fitness report and promotion system is the current method of identifying upwardly mobile military leaders. If combat

leaders who have survived this process fail when placed before the stresses of higher leadership--and combat--then it would appear that the system is not working. Indeed, prior to World War II, the U.S. Army recognized that their fitness report and promotion system was an inadequate tool to identify the future leaders that were required in the coming war.

Hence, **General George C. Marshall**, U.S. Army, and his senior "trainer", Lieutenant General Lesley J. McNair, U.S. Army, developed an off-line system of personally watching the performance of officers during a series of training maneuvers, the Louisiana Maneuvers, that were held prior to the war. At these maneuvers, Marshall reportedly kept a "**black book**" on which the real value of the individual was noted.⁷ Marshall used the information in his "black book" as the source of a series of key assignments for up and coming officers. With those assignments came higher rank. Of course, the U.S. Army was considerably smaller at this time and had a strong **mentoring** program.⁸

If we assume that the current fitness report system is equally incapable of identifying the combat leaders that we need for the future, then we should consider a similar off-line system to identify warriors today and return to mentoring. As with the case of the pre-war Louisiana Maneuvers, simulations and exercises are the most logical place where such off-line evaluations can take place. The evaluators might logically be retired flag and general officers who have excelled while on active duty and have retained their interest in combat leadership.

Unfortunately, when writing evaluations on prospective leaders, senior officers have only their own perspective to offer. Scholarly research has demonstrated that a better source of leadership evaluation is peer review and that an even better source is a subordinate review. A full 360° review is probably a useful tool, but it should not be the only vehicle used to assess future leaders. A review by senior officers outside the normal evaluation and promotion system also has merit. Senior officers would be better able to assess the conceptual ability and potential of the leader being evaluated than either peers or subordinates. Naturally, the existence of such an off-line system could place a great deal of stress on the existing bureaucracy, especially if it became well-known to the officer corps. Indeed, it is unlikely that such a system could exist without the officers eventually finding out about it.

There are many merits to a mentoring program such as the U.S. Army endeavor before World War II. Only a few years ago, mentoring junior officers by more senior officers was routine in the U.S. Navy. Mentoring of the most junior officers by senior enlisted personnel remains the normal way to "break in" new

officers. Mentoring helps build Service and unit *esprit de corps* and culture. It also helps subordinates to develop "...the ability to take appropriate action on their own initiative in support of the commander's intent."⁹ This desire to support a commander may be enhanced by loyalty if that senior has mentored the subordinate. Mentoring need not end at any particular rank.

In an era of a long peace, some have argued that promotion competition is based largely upon non-combat criteria. In this climate, the officers who can best articulate their thoughts may be more likely to be promoted. This implies that those officers with higher intelligence may be more successful in being promoted.

Assessment

Due to the problems inherent with the long peace, the military will have to find alternative methods of both enhancing the combat skills of their leaders who must operate during most of their career in a non-combat environment. The military must also quickly identify leaders who have exhibited the special skills desired of combat officers. In both of these areas, doctrine can play a central role.

In a long peace, the single most difficult task will be to pick and develop good leaders. General Marshall used his infamous "black book." President Franklin Delano Roosevelt was personally involved with the selection of U.S. Navy officers for higher command.¹⁰ The U.S. Army believes in mentoring and personal development. Whatever system is used, we must find ways to both identify leaders and to assist them by providing the most favorable context possible in which to exercise command.

ROLE OF DOCTRINE

Introducing formal centralized written doctrine into the U.S. Navy is a major innovation. It is an innovation resulting from the vision of the senior leadership of the U.S. Navy. Research into innovation in the military suggests that increasing the longevity of military innovation depends more upon non-combat skills than warfighting skills. Obviously, the non-combat innovator must have more than an appreciation of warfighting, but in the end, doctrine is simply paper that must be created, sold, and revised.

How to "sell" the lessons from combat experience will depend on the organizational culture and the specific individual to be "sold." Army officers have a culture that includes reading and journaling, but this culture is less prevalent in the Navy. Neither approach is right or wrong--the appropriate tools should be selected for the appropriate audience. The Herrmann Brain

Dominance Instrument (HBDI) can be used to assess individual and organizational preferences for learning. If a group is predisposed toward logical cognitive patterns, perhaps they will respond best when presented with wargame "evidence" that suggests certain types of behavior. The visionary might better respond to a free-wheeling seminar style brainstorming discussion with other experts where battlefield concepts are debated.

In an era of long peace, there will not be sufficient opportunities to observe and learn from combat. If we assume that there are no significant differences in the leadership skills required between combat and non-combat situations, then there is no difficulty in training leaders. However, if we assume that these situations are so different that one has to experience it to learn how to lead in it, then we must provide experiences as close to the real thing as possible. For example, after the two atomic bombs dropped on Japan at the end of World War II, there was never another a situation to observe and learn from nuclear warfighting. Yet politicians were able to surmise how to lead, including end, a nuclear war. The military had no problem in creating doctrine for the fighting of nuclear war. Many methodologies were used, but the ones that were the most directly applicable to leadership were simulations, war games, and exercises.

In an era of long peace, the U.S. Navy will have to rely upon simulations, war games, and exercises as the tools to build simulated combat experience. Through simulations, war games, and exercises under simulated combat stress, the leader is far more likely to develop the necessary experience upon which he must draw when actually in combat as well as the requisite trust in his intuition. *Coup d'oeil/blick* is developed by constant exposure to the combat situation and generally not by reading books. However, doctrinal books can improve the simulations, war games, and exercises by providing the experience of officers who have actually been in combat.

Navies must create a system through which they can extract the leadership lessons learned from combat leaders so that innovation in formal leadership doctrine will follow. Perhaps those lessons need to be learned in simulations, games, and exercises rather than actual combat--they can be. Complete doctrinal development and revision need the participation of both warriors and bureaucrats.

Decision-making under stress has been shown to be more effective when based upon intuition and experience.¹¹ The U.S. Navy's 1944 *War Instructions* recognized this when it stated that:

"The military virtues necessary for success are made instinctive by training."

--War Instructions: United States Navy, 1944¹²

Constant exposure to doctrine, and derivative simulations, wargames, and exercises can all contribute to a climate where the combat leader will intuitively, or instinctively, respond in a manner described by armies as *coup d'oeil/blick*. However, the special stresses of combat might exacerbate the weaknesses of character that non-combat stress does not.¹³

Navies need both combat doctrine on how to fight and leadership doctrine on how to lead. Combat leadership doctrine, like all military doctrine, cannot be prescriptive--it should be suggestive; a baseline from which the individual leader departs as he builds his own leadership style. How to lead is an important element in carrying out the vision of how to fight.

Assessment

In combat leadership, doctrine provides guidance on how the job is to be done. The leader implements doctrine and knows when to deviate from it. The doctrine commands extract the lessons of combat and distill them into doctrine. These roles must be understood by the military and the doctrine organizations that support the military.

LEADERSHIP AS AN INTEGRAL ELEMENT OF COMBAT POWER

In *Operations*, FM [Field Manual] 100-5, the U.S. Army has developed an interesting approach to leadership as an integral element of combat power.¹⁴ The Army has stated that maneuver, firepower, protection, and **leadership** comprise the four primary elements of combat power--the ability to fight.

According to FM 100-5, the fundamental role of the leader is to know how to employ maneuver, firepower, and protection. The leader must study doctrine, theory, history, and the biographies of military leaders to help him in his task. The leader must use his personal influence and competence to have a positive bearing on the outcome of battle. He must also use the superior moral qualities of his soldiers and himself to provide the decisive edge when opposing forces are equal, or nearly equal.

FM 100-5 also addresses the psychological dimensions of combat.¹⁵ The Army does not claim that combat is a unique environment, only that combat is likely to induce more effect on the soldier's mind than on his body. The combat leader must understand these stresses of combat--part of the fog of war--and help the soldier deal with them. With effective training, unit cohesion, and leadership, each member of the unit can step

forward and give direction toward mission accomplishment. Decision-making and combat stress are subjects of interest to a series of research projects sponsored by the U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences.¹⁶

Another Army doctrinal publication, *Military Leadership*, FM 22-100, provides basic doctrinal guidance for company grade officers and below.¹⁷ FM 22-100 develops in much greater detail the general guidance provided to leaders in FM 100-5. *Military Leadership* states that there are levels of leadership, there is value in studying the historical lessons of military combat leadership and that **the first principle of leadership is to "know yourself and seek self-improvement."** The publication does not cite any inherent differences in combat leadership situations other than stress.

To parallel the efforts of these two publications the U.S. Navy should add a combat leadership section in each of the second generation of the capstone-level Naval Doctrine Publications (NDPs) and to develop a keystone-level Naval Warfare Publication (NWP) which specifically addresses combat leadership. Including combat leadership in each capstone NDP ensures, that when combat is discussed, leadership is automatically included. Inclusion in the capstone series should also preclude the treatment of combat leadership as a discrete field which only needs to be mastered by "others."

If leadership is acknowledged as a fundamental element of combat power, it would automatically be assessed during combat simulations, wargames, and exercises. Modern technological capabilities exist which can capture leadership styles and allow critique of this area as well as combat decisions in the exercise debrief. We can assess leadership skills--there is no reason not to do so.

Assessment

By including leadership as an integral part of combat power, the U.S. Army automatically includes a discussion of leadership in any discussion of combat. The advantage of this approach is that any combat doctrinal development must also address leadership. Thus, the Army is constantly developing doctrine for combat leadership as it develops doctrine for any combat actions.

The U.S. Army approaches combat leadership by developing leaders in peacetime that are prepared for war. The Army is concerned with developing combat leaders from a pool of talent who have had their primary experience in the non-combat environment. **The combat leader must come from this pool when required.** However, the only true test of this assumption will be actual combat.

The Army approach includes a discrete doctrinal publication on leadership and subordinate publications on leadership techniques and procedures.¹⁸ Thus, the Army approach is that they consider leadership both an integral part of combat as well as a discreet skill that can be learned.

THE ROLE OF THE LEADER IN SHAPING COMBAT TECHNOLOGY

In an era of long peace, the leader articulates the vision of the future battlespace. That **vision can serve to develop forward-looking doctrine in support of programmatics which will ultimately affect combat.** If "visionary" leaders have useful "charismatic" or "transformational" leadership qualities which are useful in articulating their vision, so much the better. If teaching our senior officers such behaviors will help "sell" military programs, then it should be a priority for leadership training and education.

We are currently witnessing this visionary combat leadership role in this country. To improve programming, Admiral William A. Owens, USN, is supporting the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff's input to programmatics. This new system will utilize the existing four-star joint officers, all war-fighting Commanders-in-Chief (CinCs) and Service Deputy Chiefs of Staff to allow them to determine military programmatic objectives.¹⁹ From the non-staff driven consensus of joint combat commanders, Admiral Owens intends to provide the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with the vision of programmatic requirements that transcend the traditional Service stovepipe approach.²⁰ Admiral Owens is attempting to put together such a process and has enlisted the support of the analytic community to do so. If the military is truly going to fight wars from a joint perspective, then it will need the vision of the joint war fighter to identify technological and doctrinal needs for the future. To date, this has not been successfully done in the U.S., and it will take some time to see if Admiral Owens' efforts will fare better than the traditional approach to programming.

The visionary leader can communicate his vision through programmatic doctrine or doctrine-like publications. Once a general idea of the future is created, someone needs to supplement that vision with details. For example, when President Ronald Reagan gave a basic outline for the ballistic missile defense of the continental United States, he left the details to be filled in by the bureaucracy. Those details should also include how to fight under the new conditions--doctrine.

The U.S. Army has institutionalized this process with the publication of a pamphlet which provides the vision of the future battlespace.²¹ This pamphlet is used to generate discussion/external debate over what that future vision should

look like. This occurs before the senior leadership of the Army has established its formal position on the subject in the fiscal world of programming. If Admiral Owens is going to be successful in his efforts to support the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, he will need to have a similar document. Clearly, the U.S. Army senior leadership has accepted the uncertainties of such a process and recognized the need for external reviews of future visionary papers. This is more clearly right brain than left brain thinking.

Non-combat leaders have made other important changes that ultimately affected combat. Admiral Hyman Rickover, USN (Ret.), a "charismatic" leader in a non-combat environment, was willing to challenge the entire U.S. Navy and made profound changes affecting the future of combat. Are there other cases of "charismatic" leaders who enhanced future combat capabilities? Due to the lack of studies focusing on the "charismatic" relationship, it is probably necessary to focus on major changes in which military innovators successfully introduced new ideas or technologies.

In the 1920s and 1930s, the U.S. Navy changed its operational art from decisive battle centered around the battleship to the ability to direct interaction with the enemy battle fleet and affecting the shore with the aircraft carrier.²² This change was permitted by the technological development of the radial aircraft engine and a vision of the new battlespace. This vision was provided by a group of heretical officers who believed in the predominate role of naval aviation.²³ When the main battle fleet was sunk on December 7, 1941, the U.S. Navy was able to quickly respond to the war requirements with a new Pacific Fleet centered around the aircraft carrier and its main striking arm--the airplane.

Similarly, Major Earl H. Ellis, USMC, developed excellent visionary ideas for expeditionary amphibious operations in support of War Plan Orange. Unfortunately, these good ideas languished on the shelf until the intervention of a Commandant of the Marine Corps who was willing to retire senior officers unable to make the paradigm shift. The full development of modern amphibious warfare also depended upon one additional Marine Corps officer who witnessed the use of new technologies by Japan and had the bureaucratic skills to overcome the obstacles in developing modern landing craft and ships for the U.S. Fleet.²⁴

Central to the concept of a paradigm shift is both the idea and its messenger--the senior officer with the vision to permit its development. **This senior leader must both share the vision and exercise the leadership necessary to ensure the junior visionaries are protected and the new idea flourishes.** Lieutenant Commander Henry C. Mustin, USN, was the first American to

understand that the striking power of aircraft at sea could equal that of the battleship. Both Mustin and Ellis needed senior general and flag officers within the established organization to protect their new ideas and allow them to grow.²⁵ Both officers found their protectors. Rear Admiral William Moffett, USN, was the champion of naval aviation, and General John Russell, USMC, supported Ellis and his amphibious concepts for the Marine Corps.

Changes to military doctrine, new combat paradigms, and recognition of "revolutions in military affairs" will always be somewhat difficult due to the inherent personality types attracted to senior government and military service.²⁶ The average army colonel or navy captain is, by his very nature, less perceptual than judgmental. Thus, he or she is less likely to respond well to innovation which threatens the established order and structure. Yet innovation in military doctrine and paradigms is needed if we are to avoid the negative lessons of history. Therefore, the psychological traits of senior military officers are at least as important as their tactical and combat experience and their education and training. We need senior officers who understand the need to create a climate which nourishes innovation.

The difficulties that beset changing paradigms/doctrine, recognizing "revolutions in military affairs," and the critical role of individual leaders with vision can best be studied with detailed and fully-developed case studies which provide specific lessons learned. For example, Stephen Rosen's *Winning the Next War: Innovation and the Modern Military* is an excellent book written about change in military organizations.²⁷ This book examines a number of cases which provide the military doctrine supervisor with a quick overview of the problems inherent in change across the spectrum of conflict.

To delve into the heart of change, single book-length case studies must also be consulted. An in-depth analysis of one organization and its attempt to come to grips with a new technology can be seen in Harold R. Winton's, *To Change an Army: General Sir John Burnett-Stuart and British Armored Doctrine, 1927-1938*.²⁸ Study of such in-depth cases provides the impetus to accept recommendations such as: **support at the top, a mechanism for the building of consensus, and an organizational climate that accepts rational analysis as the basis for doctrine and force structure.** The leader facilitates change and must protect innovative individuals who think outside of their "boxes."

Assessment

Rickover, Mustin, and Ellis were all successful agents of major change within the military. All were insiders of the system. Perhaps Admiral Rickover was even a "charismatic" leader

(in the original sense of that word), but it is not obvious that any of the others were "charismatic."²⁹ Although the individual with the new idea is important, others may facilitate the change. These officers who introduced new ideas and technologies probably favored right brain thinking.

SUMMARY

The myth that "combat" officers cannot get promoted during periods of long peace is not substantiated by available anecdotal evidence. While solid research into this issue is not apparent, with access to promotion records at the Bureau of Naval Personnel, further investigation could be fruitful.

What does appear to be valid, however, is that, in periods of long peace, combat organizations such as the U.S. Navy need to find **alternative methods of enhancing the combat skills of leaders and develop a reliable method of identifying combat warriors.**

Doctrine can play a major role in helping the military prepare for war in an era of long peace. Doctrine documents, in writing, how to fight and defines the norm from which combat leaders may deviate. Doctrine commands and centers have a great responsibility to ensure they capture the essence of how to fight, but will increasingly be forced to turn to simulations, games, and exercises as the source of some of this information. **Making leadership an integral part of the elements of combat power** forces a consideration of combat leadership issues as any new doctrine is developed for any combat action. There is also a *prima facie* case for the need for discrete leadership doctrine as well.

Finally, the military needs to reward behaviors normally associated with right brain tendencies. Non-traditional officers in leadership positions are necessary to nurture innovation and protect innovative officers. Officers with new ideas will challenge existing doctrine and suggest new technological innovations. Innovators need a home and military doctrine has an important role to play.

If senior officers accept the view that a corps of innovators are needed within the military, they need to support the creation of conditions which will allow such individuals to serve. Currently, most innovators opt out of the "up or out" promotion system, leaving the Service at a relatively early stage. This system is satisfactory only if the military selectively details these innovators into key positions prior to their Service departure. Other possibilities include: re-hiring these individuals as consultants, placing them into the civil service, or to creating a separate track for officers which the

military wishes to retain, but are no longer promotion competitive. All of these are possible, but, for innovators to have credibility with the various combat arms, they probably should be in uniform.

NOTES

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2. Andrew Gordon, *Conflict of Style: Jutland and British Naval Command*, draft manuscript circa November 1994, chapter 10.

3. Andrew Gordon, *Conflict of Style: Jutland and British Naval Command*, draft manuscript circa November 1994, chapters 16 and 18.

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5. Headquarters, Department of the Army, *Operations*, F[ield] M[anual] 100-5, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 14 June 1993, p. 13-3 to 13-4.

6. David Alan Rosenberg, "Officer Development in the Interwar Navy: Arleigh Burke--The Making of a Naval Professional, 1919-1940," *Pacific Historical Review*, 44, no. 4 (November 1975): 524.

7. Eric Larrabee, *Commander in Chief: Franklin Delano Roosevelt, His Lieutenants, and Their War*, New York, NY: Harper & Row, Pubs., 1987, p. 101-102; and Christopher R. Gabel, *The U.S. Army GHQ [General Headquarters] Maneuvers of 1941*, Washington, DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 25 February 1991, p. 187.

8. General Edward C. Meyer, USA (Ret.) presentation at the February 1991 Strategic Leadership Conference, contained in *Strategic Leadership Conference: Proceedings*, Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College and the U.S. Army Research Institute, April 1993, p. 154.

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10. Eric Larrabee, *Commander in Chief: Franklin Delano Roosevelt, His Lieutenants, and Their War*, New York, NY: Harper & Row, Pubs., 1987, p. 5, 24, 623, 643-644.

11. Fred E. Fielder, *Leadership Experience and Leadership Performance*, Alexandria, VA: U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences, 1994, p. 59-63.
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13. I am indebted to Lieutenant General Walter Ulmer, U.S. Army (Ret.) for this point (contained in correspondence with the author of March 13, 1995).
14. Headquarters, Department of the Army, *Operations*, F[ield] M[annual] 100-5, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 14 June 1993, p. 2-10 to 2-12.
15. Headquarters, Department of the Army, *Operations*, F[ield] M[annual] 100-5, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 14 June 1993, p. 14-1 to 14-2.
16. Fred E. Fielder, *Leadership Experience and Leadership Performance*, Alexandria, VA: U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences, 1994.
17. Headquarters, Department of the Army, *Military Leadership*, F[ield] M[annual] 22-100, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, July 1990.
18. Headquarters, Department of the Army, *Leadership and Command at Senior Levels*, F[ield] M[annual] 22-103, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 21 June 1987; Headquarters, Department of the Army, *Soldier Team Development*, FM 22-102, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2 March 1987; Headquarters, Department of the Army, *Leadership Counseling*, FM 22-101, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 3 June 1985; Headquarters, Department of the Army, *Soldier Performance in Continuous Operations*, FM 22-9, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 12 December 1991; and Headquarters, Department of the Army, *Leaders' Manual for Combat Stress Control*, FM 22-51, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 29 September 1994.
19. John Boatman, "The Jane's Interview," [with Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral William A. Owens, USN], *Jane's Defence Weekly*, July 23, 1994, p. 32; and address by Admiral William A. Owens, USN, to the Military Operations Research Society JROC [Joint Requirements Oversight Council] Process Workshop Arlington, VA, October 17, 1994. At this address, Admiral Owens urged the participants to "dream" about the future battlespace and to explore new concepts and without the constraints of programmatic requirements.

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22. For additional information, see: James J. Tritten, "Introduction of Aircraft Carriers into the Royal Navy: Lessons for the Development of Naval Doctrine," *The Naval Review*, 82, no. 3 (July 1994): 260-267; and Norman Friedman, Thomas C. Hone, and Mark D. Mandeles, "The Introduction of Carrier Aviation into the U.S. Navy and the Royal Navy: Military-Technical Revolutions, Organizations, and the Problem of Decision," draft report prepared for the Director, Net Assessment, Office of the Secretary of Defense, May 12, 1994.

23. Commander Charles M. Melhorn, USN (Ret.), *Two-Block Fox: The Rise of the Aircraft Carrier, 1911-1929*, Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1974.

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25. Stephen Peter Rosen, *Winning the Next War: Innovation and the Modern Military*, Ithaca, NY and London, UK: Cornell University Press, 1991, p. 70, 82-85. See also similar conclusions following experimentation with innovation in the U.S. Air Force: Dale W. Clauson, "Innovation in the U.S. Military," *Discovering Creativity: Proceedings of the 1992 International Creativity & Innovation Networking Conference*, Stanley S. Gryskiewicz, ed., Greensboro, NC: Center for Creative Leadership, 1993, p. 217-219.
26. Mary H. McCaulley, "The Myers-Briggs Type Indicator and Leadership," *Measures of Leadership*, Kenneth E. Clark & Miriam B. Clark, eds., West Orange, NJ: Leadership Library of America, Inc., for the Center for Creative Leadership, 1990, p. 404, 405, 408.
27. Stephen Peter Rosen, *Winning the Next War: Innovation and the Modern Military*, Ithaca, NY and London, UK: Cornell University Press, 1991.
28. Harold R. Winton, *To Change an Army: General Sir John Burnett-Stuart and British Armored Doctrine, 1927-1938*, Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1988. Another good example is James S. Corum, *The Roots of Blitzkrieg: Hans von Seeckt and German Military Reform*, Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1992.
29. Visionary officers may even have shy or introverted personalities. See Clark G. Reynolds, *Admiral John H. Towers: The Struggle for Naval Air Supremacy*, Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1991.

CHAPTER 6

NAVY COMBAT LEADERSHIP TRAINING & EDUCATION

"'An Army,' it is said, 'is as brave as its privates and as good as its generals.' But in a navy, the admirals determine the bravery as well as the merit of the whole force...The connection between a fleet and its leader is so immediate and intimate that the spirit of the commander tends to be suffused throughout all the personnel of the force."

--Bernard Brodie¹

The U.S. Army model for the development of combat leadership focuses primarily on improving the peacetime pool of leaders from which combat leaders will be found when needed. Hence, leaders developed during peacetime must be able to lead during combat. To facilitate this, Army doctrine is a combination of giving leaders experience via assignments, assessments via selection, and training and education.²

The military is well acquainted with experience as a part of the officer's leadership development. For example, duty as an aide gives junior officers an opportunity to work with seniors--thus providing them with the opportunity to develop mental mapping skills (Businesses also recognize the need for a broader range of experiences for leaders and managers being groomed for upward mobility). It is not clear how joint assignments influence the development of leaders who must later function within their parent Services and be promoted within a "stovepipe" that favors combat arm advocacy over joint integration. How this will impact on the development of combat leaders is also uncertain.

Selection following assessment is an area of constant debate within both the military and the civilian world. Selection in the military is more simplistic than in the corporate environment. In business, it is possible that an external candidate will be selected for leadership of an organization--in the military, leaders are only selected from within. However, with the *entree* of jointness in the U.S. armed forces, the combat leader can be selected from another Service.

Improvements to joint combat capability by training and education include far more than just leadership development. Congress has mandated a prescribed course of Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) for all Services. Others have recommended additional teaching in history and theory of military art--beyond that envisaged in the core JPME--recommending that the intellectual preparation for war be used as a major criteria for promotion.³

TRAINING IN AN ERA OF LONG PEACE

Traditionally, the basic paradigm for navy leadership training and education has been "getting the job done and taking care of your personnel." Doctrine plays an extremely important role in helping the leader get the job done and specific leadership doctrine can also help with taking care of personnel. Leadership **skills are based upon knowledge and are honed by experience.** Leadership skills are reasonably easy to teach and easily learned. "Charismatic-like" skills can also be taught. If added to senior officer leadership development programs, they might enhance the communications abilities of these officers and reinforce the symbology necessary to build a sense of Service culture.

Generally combat units are created before battles. Combat units are both a collection of individuals, each individually trained, and a group of individuals trained together as a team. When groups of individuals share a task, a leader is normally placed in charge. An example of Navy combat team training is the team training of flag staffs at the Tactical Training Groups Atlantic and Pacific. This parallels the Army Battle Command Training Program (BCTP) efforts. Where appropriate, combat leadership training should be included in this Navy team training. If navy leadership training and education is integrated with navy combat training and education, skilled navy combat leaders will be developed. These combat leaders will know both how to fight--doctrine--and also know when the conditions which were assumed to be in place when doctrine was written are so different that deviation is not only authorized but required.

With the possibilities of a long peace, training, education, simulations, war games, and exercises become even more important. These techniques allow doctrine commands and combat leaders in the fleet and field the opportunity to test new concepts prior to adopting them formally as doctrine. In addition, training, education, simulations, war games, and exercises permit the teaching of combat leadership skills to the untried warrior. However, we remember German Field Marshal Helmuth Graf von Moltke's [The Elder] observation that decisions made in peacetime maneuvers are not made under the heavy pressures of real war.⁴

During simulations, exercises, and war games, senior military leadership observes commanders in simulated combat conditions--thus allowing them to make judgements about the future suitability in actual combat. Should these judgements be made available to selection boards or should an off-line system be developed to track good combat leaders?

While the military needs to assess untried leaders in simulations, war games, and exercises, there is a demonstrated propensity to take higher risks during a game than in actual combat.⁵ Indeed, if officers knew their upward mobility depended upon certain actions in games and exercises, performance in games would change. Is the off-line system the better choice?

A recent assessment of U.S. Navy battles fought during the American Revolution (1775-1783), the quasi-War with France (1798-1801), the Barbary Wars (1801-1805), the War of 1812, the interwar period, and the American Civil War (1861-1865), included an assessment of the value of leadership and teamwork to the outcome of battle.⁶ From a study of thirty-eight single ship battles, there was a strong correlation between success and demonstrated good leadership and teamwork. The data from this study further suggests that personnel losses suffered at sea were extremely high even when ship losses themselves were only slight. These results document the need to ensure that, in an era of long peace where combat losses of any kind are not to be tolerated, the U.S. Navy needs to do all that it can to improve combat potential by improvements to combat leadership skills.

IMPROVEMENTS TO TRAINING TECHNIQUES

Specific training about combat leadership generally uses positive case studies to reinforce correct behavior. There are some excellent raw materials which can be used for supporting cases in the classroom, but there is generally no requirement to use Navy-specific cases when teaching in most courses. In many cases, instructors may be using non-navy combat examples since the materials are more current, in color, available, or have "always" been used. An analysis of the actions taken off Samar Island by Commander Ernest E. Evans, USN, of *USS Johnston*, would be a beneficial addition.

Why U.S. Navy leadership textbooks do not use more positive examples of U.S. Navy combat leaders is difficult to understand. Where raw materials are lacking, there is nothing stopping the Navy from developing them. At a minimum, a research project should be commissioned to develop multiple case studies for inclusion in Navy leadership doctrine publications. These doctrinal publications would become the core materials used at the various Navy leadership education and training courses. Inspirational examples need to be crafted to appeal to every ethnic group in the Navy and for both sexes.

Positive examples and enhancement of self-esteem are widely understood techniques to improve student performance in the classroom. Indeed, the "Pygmalion effect" was used on instructors in Israeli Army. Instructors were told that a portion of their trainees had more command potential than others. Although it was

not true, the instructors believed that it, was true, and their performance changed. As a result, trainees grades and attitudes also improved.⁷ This technique is also used at the Naval Postgraduate School where faculty members are told that the Navy has sent them the best and the brightest.

In recent Navy-wide training about sexual harassment, the Navy used negative cases, some of which were difficult to clearly judge. The difficult cases were included to stimulate discussion by participants. Quite frankly, combat leadership training and education also need the negative and difficult cases to stimulate more in-depth classroom discussion. The case of Captain William Bligh, RN of *HMS Bounty*, could prove an excellent case in point--deeper investigation reveals that Bligh might not have been the blackguard that he is often portrayed.⁸ The major problem in developing good case studies of poor leadership is the non-existence of peers' and subordinates' records.

Although current leadership programs make use of films, there is a technique that also appears to be extremely powerful--**oral learning**. Instead of visual learning, oral learning is the more appropriate method if the messages can be communicated in the first person. For example, one can read the memoirs of General George Patton, or one can listen to those memoirs on audio tape. The benefit of tapes force the listener to create the images of what is being said--active participation--rather than more passively watching a film.

Further research is needed on the value of listening to these memoirs and accounts of combat experiences (generally oral history is the province of cultural anthropology⁹). The difference between listening and reading can be seen in the parallel between a ground instructor teaching flying lessons and the now too-prevalent programmed text. Another parallel is that, despite all of the written doctrine on job performance when a new employee or member of a command checks onboard, generally someone sits that individual down and tells them in words "how it is really done." Future combat leaders need to know "how it is really done," which they cannot learn exclusively from books.

Leadership training and education must also include individual **mentoring** of juniors by seniors. Indeed, a former Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army has said that:

"There is no leadership program without mentoring."
--General Edward C. Meyer¹⁰

Mentoring recognizes that leadership is developed not only from doctrinal books and classroom work, but is the responsibility of each and every individual in the chain of command. Mentoring also

has the benefit of refreshing and refining the skills of the mentor!¹¹

Sources of stress cannot be totally eliminated from the workplace, and we are certainly not able to eliminate it from combat, thus, any leadership training experience should include methods for individuals to better **deal with stress**.¹² Training efforts must also include making individuals comfortable with intuition and experience when in stressful situations. The military must teach its more intelligent, more conceptually abstract, and more innovative officers that they may not be able to "think" their way through all problems.

Officers assigned to leadership instructional positions should review academic literature on leadership. A relatively new journal, *The Journal of Leadership Studies*, includes focus on leadership teaching methods. In one of its first issues, a faculty member from the Jepson School of Leadership Studies, at the University of Richmond, wrote that leadership instruction is enhanced when the instructor is perceived to also be a leader.¹³

PERSONAL GROWTH

If leadership is an integral part of combat potential, then improvements to leadership will improve combat potential. A theory for developing leadership competencies could include addressing skills, self-concepts, and personality traits. Leadership skills are regularly taught. Self-concepts can be measured and analyzed, while self-worth can be enhanced through training and education. Basic personality traits, such as those measured on the Meyers-Briggs Type Indicator (MBTI) test and the Herrmann Brain Dominance Instrument (HBDI), are also malleable to some extent, as evidenced by shifting test results of U.S. Army officers through the senior general officer ranks. Individuals can be trained to become more comfortable with skills they have yet to fully exploit (such as intuition) or they can increase their understanding of their basic cognitive preferences.

The armed forces are not seeking any one particular MBTI or HBDI "type"--in reality there are leadership and non-leadership roles for all "types." What is clear, however, is that staff officers will retain predominance in extreme areas while general officers will gravitate toward a more balanced position. The desirable pattern for general officers is toward the center of the MBTI scales with perhaps some tendency toward "NT"--but above all a balance. On the HBDI, the desired pattern for a chief executive officer of a corporation is equal strengths in all four quadrants. However, before one can develop such leaders, they must get comfortable with "who they are"¹⁴--personal growth.

Before discussing self-concept and personality trait improvements, we must recognize that **the overall Navy leadership paradigm of getting the job done and taking care of your personnel is inadequate.** Under this paradigm, who is responsible for the development of the individual? The U.S. Army, in *The Army FM [Field Manual]-1*¹⁵ and in *Leadership Counseling, FM 22-101*,¹⁶ has recognized **the responsibility and the role of the organization to ensure that individuals are allowed the opportunities to grow and develop as individuals.** The organization must create and monitor an environment that allows individuals to grow. It is the responsibility of senior leadership to do this.

Lao Tzu's *Tao Te Ching* (which may predate Sun Tzu by a few hundred years) teaches us that:

"Knowing others is intelligence;
knowing yourself is true wisdom.
Mastering others is strength;
mastering yourself is true power."¹⁷

"When the Master governs, the people
are hardly aware that he exists.
Next best is a leader who is loved
Next, one who is feared.
The worst is one who is despised."¹⁸

--Lao Tzu

In the 20th Century psychology recognized the role the unconscious plays on conscious behavior, including leadership, self-consciousness, and personality traits. To address improvements to behavior, self-consciousness, and personality traits, it is necessary to look beyond the conscious mind. This conclusion has not been lost on the business community. A recent book for business leaders, *The New Paradigm in Business: Emerging Strategies for Leadership and Organizational Change*, addressed how to deal with new requirements for leaders when so many of the requirements are not from the conscious mind.

"One view of the paradigm that seems to be emerging is that consciousness is causal, that the inner experiences of individuals, including intuition, emotions, creativity, and spirit, are vastly more important than the world of the senses alone. In fact, even the messages we get from our senses about reality are ultimately affected by our inner consciousness."

--Michael Ray and Alan Rinzler¹⁹

According to this book, current business practices are inconsistent with a long-term more global view which credits sacrifice of short term profit in favor of long term interests.²⁰

The authors discuss the need to develop a new group of business leaders less warlike, aggressive, and competitive--the "old" business paradigm--and more creative, compassionate, community-oriented, with a recognition of the greater good--the "new" business paradigm. These "new" leaders can be developed by concentrating on organizational and situational improvements and by fostering the personal growth of the individual.

Studies of "learning organizations" also highlight the importance of self-consciousness (understanding what matters most to themselves) before mastery of the business world.²¹ Peter Senge feels that the search for personal mastery is one of the essential cornerstones of the "learning organization." Individuals who have come to grips with the natural tension between "who they are" and their vision of "what they want" expand their abilities to create the results they desire. Is this tension reconciled by constant adjustments toward the desired end state? From a quest to seek resolution, and for continued individual self-improvement, comes the essence of the "learning organization."

In a "learning organization," "learning" is not about acquiring more information--it is about expanding the ability to create desired end states. According to Senge, people with a high level of personal mastery live in a continual "learning" mode. They have an ability to focus on ultimate desires and to not be sidetracked with secondary goals. Seminars about how organizations can become "learning organizations" are available in the private sector and are tailored for individual clients. For example, Performance Resources offers a two-day seminar that assists in creating the conditions which will mold an existing organization into a "learning organization."²²

The best leadership instructional practices in the civilian sector employ a variety of methods to train and educate leaders and managers. These range from formal (and expensive) seminar-style learning experiences to self-help tapes and books. *Learning to Lead*,²³ a newly published leadership development book is typical. It attempts to teach core competencies of the self, to provide assistance with the concept of vision, and to help the student learn about **empowering**. **The first step in this process is an internal focus to know yourself.** Without being confident in who you are as an individual, you cannot take the next step of knowing how to assess the potential in others and the degree to which others can be developed to execute a shared dream?

According to *Learning to Lead*, other important elements of leadership include the environment, goals, styles, openness to new information, being a risk taker, accepting mistakes, and **vision**. These traits seem remarkably similar to those developed for combat leadership.

Consider the following discussion from a book of meditations:

"The true leader is always led."

--Carl Gustav Jung

"I suggest that the most charismatic, the most vibrant, open thinker, is led by his heart. He doesn't trust the intellectual process. Not entirely. Sometimes not at all. The true leader is a listener. He listens to those whom he leads, he notices who they are, he looks for cues in the themes of his people, he's aware of nuance. He is no tyrant. He doesn't find his self-esteem intermeshed with those who report to him. He is spiritual."

--Jonathon Lazear²⁴

Researchers at the Center for Creative Leadership have been instrumental in developing in-depth knowledge of what makes the ambitious executive "tick" and how to influence those individuals to be less "lopsided" in their balancing of work and other activities. Businesses want to retain the "expansive" character of the senior executive--one who attempts to gain mastery over his or her environment--yet are frustrated by high turnover and "burnout." Self-awareness, support, introspection and analysis, and reinforcement are some of the tools available to overcome excessive inherited or acquired expansiveness.²⁵

With knowledge of personal shortcomings, individuals can choose to build new strengths by either finding situations where learning new things is essential or by finding ways to get help and support while learning new things. Another choice is to anticipate situations by seeking advice, using the expertise of others, spending more time learning, or asking "dumb" questions. A third alternative to handling personal shortcomings is to compensate by avoiding certain situations, delegating to others, staffing to cover weaknesses, or by changing the situation. A final way to address shortcomings is to change through intensive counseling and coaching, personal change efforts, or even by a minimal change just sufficient to get by.²⁶

In a non-combat context, personal growth is an effort to improve the personal skills, self-concept, and personality traits of the individual so that he has the opportunity to become a better leader. Personal growth focuses specific attention on vision, communication of vision, consistency, self-knowledge, and empowerment.²⁷ Part of the problem with the concept of personal growth is that a hierarchical system is a serious block to personal development programs.²⁸ Being more specific, limbic left brain thinkers might have difficulty understanding the need for such training--implying the need for more visionary leaders to implement the change.

Personal Growth in the U.S. Army

The U.S. Army, an extremely hierarchical organization, has recognized the need for personal growth, in the proper context. The Army has changed its leadership paradigm development from getting the job done and taking care of the men to also include the concept of personal growth. In addition to the formal military leadership doctrine, training, and education, the Army has a systematic program for the personal development of leaders. One Army leadership training goal is to produce future leaders who are intuitive, agile-minded, and innovative, and who can operate in ambiguous, uncertain, and complex environments.²⁹ Fulfilling this leadership paradigm does not occur without help.

When an Army officer is selected for general officer rank, s/he is enrolled in the Leadership Development Program at the Center for Creative Leadership (CCL) in Greensboro, North Carolina.³⁰ This program is designed "to give middle-level to upper-level managers an opportunity to stimulate their personal and professional growth, while increasing their organizational effectiveness."³¹ The Leadership Development Program was not designed specifically for the Army officers; participants come from all walks of life. The Leadership Development Program (LDP) develops participants' leadership styles and effectiveness and assists participants in setting goals. LDP is an intensive six-day program combining lectures, group exercises, and a variety of assessments.³²

While in the LDP, the newly selected general officer is guided through a **360° review of his leadership abilities--assessments from seniors, peers, and subordinates** (research has shown that subordinates see motivational leader behaviors most clearly³³). From this review of performance, the officer is then exposed to traits which more senior officers are expected to display. Subordinates' reviews are an extremely touchy issue in any hierarchical organization--thus, when the newly-selected brigadier receives his or her 360° review, it is done in private, with individual counselors. The Army is not given access to the data developed for individual assessments.

The senior civilian members of the LDP class are probably having this 360° assessment for the first time in their lives. However, this may not be the first such assessment for some of the Army officers. In August 1993, the U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences developed a "Strategic Leader Development Inventory" (SLDI) for use by Army War College students.³⁴ It was designed to help upwardly mobile officers understand themselves so that they can self-direct their personal growth more precisely and effectively.

The SLDI was developed using materials gathered by the U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences in its research on leadership behaviors and traits for general officers. It measures such factors as conceptual flexibility, complex understanding, and empowering as positive traits. After completing the SLDI, the student is provided with a list of traits that are desirable and those proven necessary if s/he expects to become a general officer.

Officers from all services selected to the Industrial College of the Armed Forces (ICAF) and the National War College in Washington, DC are also given an opportunity for personal development. Officers are given a series of personal development batteries, including the Meyers-Briggs Type Indicator. A new test is being designed at ICAF--based upon the SLDI model used at the Army War College. ICAF officers also receive counseling on personal development.

Personal Growth in the U.S. Navy

Recent research at the U.S. Naval Academy demonstrates the value of subordinate feedback to positively change leadership performance by seniors.³⁵ Leaders who have a better self-concept should be able to use all available skills and personality traits to do a better job in combat. Put another way, one military scholar has noted that:

"...when we rank the big-league tactical commanders of history, [Admiral William F.] Halsey trails [Admiral Raymond A.] Spruance, who fought with both heart and head."

--Captain Wayne P. Hughes, Jr.³⁶

Does the U.S. Navy, another hierarchical organization, recognize the need for personal growth as a means to improve job performance (as is already the case in business and the U.S. Army)? The answer is a qualified yes; **a Navy personal growth program** has existed for almost a quarter of a century and is available for officers who are interested in becoming better leaders.

The Chaplains Religious Enrichment Development Operation (CREDO) was founded in San Diego, California in November 1970 and operates in numerous locations throughout the U.S. Navy. It offers a program of personal growth, leading to increased self-actualization (be all that you can be) and the exploration of personal and spiritual (not religious) values. Additional goals of CREDO are to reinforce the basic Navy core values of honor, courage, and commitment. Support for the additional core values of honesty, concern for others, the building of community,

personal responsibility, and spiritual formation is currently underway.

CREDO represents an effort to expand the activities of the Navy Chaplain Corps beyond the traditional chapel and shipboard ministry. The CREDO program includes a series of expanded retreat opportunities on a variety of topics. Central to participation in CREDO is the Personal Growth Retreat (PGR).

A CREDO PGR is centered about a seventy-two hour growth-oriented group experience in which Navy core values are reinforced through individual participation. CREDO PGRs seek to provide an experience in which aspects of an individuals' feelings and behavior become more apparent to one's own self and to others. Major objectives are to establish participants' identity, increase self-esteem, to be more accepting of themselves and others, and to achieve positive emotional, intellectual, and spiritual growth. The CREDO PGR encourages leadership from within the group and encourages application of the lessons learned at the workshop with future life experiences.

According to one doctoral dissertation, the results of the first five years of the program included statistically significant change in eight of the twelve categories of self-actualization represented by the measurement of the Personal Orientation Inventory.³⁷ Another dissertation also found that significant results were attained in areas of desired growth in the dimensions of intra- and interpersonal attitudes, values, and behavior.³⁸ By 1980, another dissertation had concluded that enough studies about CREDO had been done--it works.³⁹

The CREDO PGR works because it focuses on personal growth in a non-threatening environment. Individuals are allowed to explore their inner problems in a supportive "family" atmosphere that casts no judgement on their issues. Feelings are respected more than thinking. Empathy develops with the experience. If approached with an open mind, the weekend is enough to break down the barriers of the most inflexible "ESTJ."

During the first five years, 627 officers attended CREDO workshops (out of a total of 2971 participants). Officers still go; at Norfolk, Virginia, 63 out of 433 participants were officers in the first 6 months of fiscal year 1994.⁴⁰ Other participants include enlisted personnel, retirees, and dependents--no last names and ranks are used during the PGR experience. Despite its overall success, CREDO has been attempted at the entry-level with poor results.⁴¹

Although the CREDO program would be of immense value to any officer seeking personal growth, many officers are reluctant to attend either because the program is administered by the Navy

Chaplain Corps or because it is associated with "problem" sailors who are sent to the Chaplains to be "fixed." Another common, but false, image that frightens many officers is the "touchy-feely" aspect or the use of the terms "unconditional acceptance" or "unconditional love." For those willing to "surrender" themselves to the CREDO process, there is an ample opportunity for both personal growth and exposure to issues facing the rest of the Navy "family."

If senior officers accepted the value of the CREDO PGR experience as a part of leadership development, there would be obvious problems. If the Navy mandated attendance, the result would be failure. Anonymity must be maintained, or individuals will merely attend and "mark time." The only solution may be to advocate in leadership doctrine that everyone should attend a CREDO PGR sometime before being in command. Those who participate will benefit and spread the word. Those who do not can remain comfortable in their lack of willingness to explore themselves and improve their own leadership potential--this group will eventually leave active service.

The PREVENT program also addresses personal growth, but as an aside to other issues being considered. PREVENT is a part of the Navy's response to drug and alcohol abuse and has been in existence since the mid-1970s. It uses an anthropological model--which starts with observed behavior--and then works on changing the participant's state of mind.⁴² This program works on the premise that changes in behavior may change attitudes.

From time-to-time, the Navy has used personal growth techniques as an integral part of other programs of professional instruction for officers. For example, the Navy has sent Supply Corps and other staff officers to a series of senior management and management development programs at Duke University.⁴³ Such programs routinely introduce concepts such as individual psychological profiles (of a variety of types), personal growth, and other aspects of human behavior that relate to leadership.

The Navy Leadership Instructor School uses the Keirsey-Bates Temperament Sorter, a parallel the Meyers-Briggs Type Indicator (MBTI), to establish behavior preference types. However, students should take this test at each stage of their leadership training to enable a discussion of how test results change over time. This could easily be incorporated into the leadership training continuum and would promote personal growth.

The Navy Leadership Instructor School also uses the Learning-Style Inventory (LSI) to document preferred styles of learning.⁴⁴ Instructional materials include three strategies for improving learning and problem-solving skills. The first strategy is to develop supportive relationships by relying on others to

compensate for areas of weakness and by trying to learn from the behavior of others who exhibit different preferences. This is a valuable area for instruction in team-building.

The second strategy for improvement is for the individual to match learning preferences to life situations. Job changes are frequent in the Navy and a possible way to handle personal dissatisfaction with the work environment, although not necessarily the preferred solution. A third strategy is to become a flexible learner by working on areas of weakness. The difficulty of this approach, of course, is that it must currently be done without the support of the Navy.

With minor modifications, the Navy Leadership Instructor School could add additional self-improvement concepts that have been developed in the business school sector. Such additions would be outside the current school mission, but could be added once the Navy accepts the need for personal growth. The Navy leadership continuum is one of the few opportunities to continually address leadership issues with the same group of officers as they progress upward in their career.

The U.S. Navy has recently developed a revised leadership course for all prospective commanding and executive officers--the senior most element in the leadership continuum. At present, the course has an ethics and professional/personal development unit and a unit on combat/crisis management.⁴⁵ A proposed unit on self-assessment was not developed.

The ethics and professional/personal development units have four lessons concerned primarily with ethics, traditions and customs. The combat/crisis management unit has one lesson on combat leadership. The opportunity exists to make significant modifications to the prospective commanding officers' course. As currently envisaged, the self-assessment unit would be concerned with personal health risks.

The model for anything associated, even remotely, with mental health in the Navy focuses on ruling out psychiatric disorders for individuals selected for certain programs. Mental health issues are also present in the form of promotion, protection, and prevention in traditional areas of stress management, suicide prevention, and substance abuse prevention. Expanding the area of mental health to both organizational responsibilities and individually-driven elements of "mental readiness" for combat will require both supporting research and a changed paradigm. Perhaps one of the best ways to demonstrate the value of such issues would be to cite case studies of aviation officers who were Prisoners of War in Vietnam.⁴⁶

CAN INTUITION BE LEARNED?

The value of intuition to the navy commander has long been recognized. Bernard Brodie, one of America's most well-respected scholars, "cut his teeth" studying navies before he moved on to nuclear theorizing. In his classic *A Guide to Naval Strategy*, Brodie states:

"...the great commander must of course have a profound insight into all the ramifications of strategic principle...he must above all be able to see intuitively through the ever-prevalent 'fog of war'..."
--Bernard Brodie⁴⁷

Can intuition be learned? Is intuition only associated with the female gender or with psychics or "touchy-feely" individuals? Perhaps we should stop referring to "intuition"--a loaded word--and use instead *coup d'oeil* or the Teutonic *fingerspitzengefühl* or *blick*.⁴⁸ *Coup d'oeil* is the term in current use by the U.S. Marine Corps. If it were possible to develop *coup d'oeil* in combat leaders, there would be a high degree of pay-off for the military. Regardless of what "intuition" is called, the concept has been investigated by militaries and most warriors would have to confess that "intuition" guides their preparation of fitness reports.

With the development of the Mitsubishi Zero and the adoption of three-aircraft sections, highly skilled and trained naval aviators of the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) were able to achieve remarkable pre-war gunnery runs. Owing to the lack of good radio equipment, the officer fighter pilots began to develop non-verbal and non-mechanical *ishin denshin* through which they claimed they could communicate (or at least know what the other would do) during violent combat maneuvers. This "sixth sense" appeared after months of intense practice and training. The IJN even experimented with expanding *ishin denshin* communication to nine-man divisions and eighteen-man squadrons.⁴⁹ How far removed is such thinking from the training of the U.S. Marine Corps silent drill team?

In Western terminology, we refer to *ishin denshin* by another name--intuition. The IJN developed *ishin denshin* in its fighter pilots and used this skill to lead men into battle at the tactical-level of warfare. Was it a learned skill or some genetic superiority and perhaps applicable only to the imperial culture? Is there a relationship between intuition on the battlefield and doctrine and training?

The successes of the Taffy Group off Samar Island in October 1944 resulted, in part, from the doctrinal knowledge of the officers in command--specifically, that the role of the smaller

ship was to protect the bigger ships and all the ships were to protect the landing force. Without direct guidance, commanding officers such as Commander Ernest E. Evans, USN, of *USS Johnston*, intuitively knew what to do--much as the IJN fighter pilots needed no communications equipment to fight successfully as a unit. Combat leadership at Leyte Gulf included a healthy dose of intuition that was shaped by years of doctrinal study and battle fleet exercises. Intuition can be cultivated.

It was this type of intuitive or instinctual behavior that the U.S. Navy's 1944 *War Instructions* addressed in its opening chapter on "The Human Element in Naval Strength." According to this combat doctrine:

"The human element is a combination of instincts plus intelligence."

--*War Instructions: United States Navy, 1944*⁵⁰

Intuition is a trait that is cultivated in sports--team members intuitively know what each other will do, due to extensive training, familiarity, and a shared sense of how to go about the job (doctrine). The value of intuition has been fully accepted by the U.S. Army, as evidenced by the doctrine contained in FM 100-5 and other official training and education booklets.⁵¹ The U.S. Marine Corps appears to be investigating an "intuitive" approach to command and control.⁵² Major General Paul Van Riper, USMC, Assistant Chief of Staff for Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence (C⁴I) at Headquarters Marine Corps, described a new concept for field commanders that would enhance *coup d'oeil* by continued exposure to combat situations in war games, simulations, exercises, and studies of past battles.

The value of *coup d'oeil* has been well understood by the German Army.⁵³ Similarly, the former Soviet armed forces appeared to also understand that intuition was the product of training and experience.

"Intuition is close to quickness of thought, and it is nothing more than an unique mental activity reduced to the limit in time. Intuition is possible only as a result of profound knowledge and enormous personal experience."

--Colonel M.I. Galkin⁵⁴

This strongly suggests that, as individuals gain familiarity with their doctrine and capabilities, they will develop the intuitive ability to react in battle (*coup d'oeil/blick*).

Successful commanders who have mastered intuition, or *coup d'oeil/blick*, include: Alexander the Great, Hannibal, Frederick

the Great, Napoleon Bonaparte, the Duke of Wellington, General Ulysses S. Grant, Adolf Hitler, Winston Churchill, Field Marshal Ernst Rommel, and General Douglas MacArthur. Many, but not all, of these have also been termed "charismatic" leaders. The reputation of Rommel, and his standing as a "charismatic" leader, was enhanced by his powers of intuition on the battlefield--as perceived not only by his followers but of equal importance by the British Eighth Army!

A recent article by a British Army Brigadier⁵⁵ strongly recommends the development of intuitive skills for operational-level commanders. According to this author, the first step in developing intuitive skills is self-awareness through one of the various self-assessment instruments such as the Meyers-Briggs Type Indicator (MBTI), which specifically measures intuitive behavior. The second step is removing impediments to the intuitive process. A series of practice exercises are prescribed as a third step. Creating an atmosphere in which intuition is encouraged is the fourth step. Finally, intuition needs to be practiced daily.

I believe the recent interest in the development of "maneuver" warfare doctrine can be correlated with the need for more intuitive decision-making. The benefits of increased intuition include speed in decision-making, the ability to visualize the battlefield in a spatial manner, and originality and the ability to gain surprise. However, intuitive decision-making should complement, not replace, the traditional analytic approach. The impediments to taking these recommendations seriously will be the pervasive attitudes in the military toward taking risks and making mistakes.

The importance of integrating intuition with reason has also been recognized by recent business school studies which focus on "learning organizations."⁵⁶ Peter Senge argues that individuals of most value to a "learning organization" are those who have achieved a high level of personal mastery. Individuals who have a firm foundation of "who they are" also are those who are most likely to integrate their left and right brains. Senge quotes Albert Einstein saying that Einstein never discovered anything with his rational mind.

ASSESSMENT/SUMMARY

Navy combat leadership should be a discrete category of doctrine, training, and education. Because it is an integral part of combat power combat, leadership should be embedded in combat development. One risk of making separate leadership training curricula is that some will conclude they do not need it. For example, flag officers in the U.S. Navy have no leadership⁵⁷ training program while general officers in the U.S. Army have

several programs, including a mentoring program. Another risk is that professional competencies may take precedence over leadership skills--an issue associated with more technical parts of any organization.

Leadership programs in the Navy that use non-Navy and non-combat examples may be technically correct, but send the wrong message to the officer corps. The U.S. Navy is about combat. **At every level of officer training, the subject of combat leadership should and must be addressed.**

There is considerable value in including personal growth in the current navy leadership paradigm of getting the job done and taking care of personnel. Every organization--including the U.S. Navy--has a responsibility to allow its potential leaders to acquire the tools necessary to become better leaders. Current and planned leadership programs do not address these needs and could benefit from more innovative techniques to train and educate future leaders.

NOTES

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CHAPTER 7

FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, & RECOMMENDATIONS

"Historically, good men with poor ships are better than poor men with good ships;...which our own age, with its rage for the last new thing in material improvement, has largely dropped out of memory."

--Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan¹

FINDINGS

This report is about navy combat leadership. The **lack of existing scholarly research** into this subject is the first and most obvious finding. While there are many historical materials which can be used for such research, none of these is without major methodological problems. These methodological problems are significant and can fundamentally distort leadership research into reaching incorrect findings.

The complexity of leadership research requires more than a historical approach--**interdisciplinary research is required**. The discipline of psychology brings with it the rigor associated with scholarship on behaviors, skills, and personality traits. Both the business and political science approaches bring with them the added dimensions of the context in which leadership is exercised. All three disciplines have value for research in leadership, although there may be others.

Of particular note is the lack of rigor associated with student research at war colleges and in graduate school. At best, this material should only be used to assist serious scholars with data (such as individual case studies) and sources for more comprehensive efforts. Simply put, the scholarship required for a serious look at combat leadership requires an interdisciplinary approach by academic experts and senior military officers in an academic environment. This type of research could be undertaken at our Navy academic organizations (the U.S. Naval Academy, the Naval Postgraduate School, and the Naval War College), but cross-disciplinary research by academic institutions is often problematic unless under the direction of an external organization.

There are organizations within the U.S. Navy and within the Department of Defense (DoD) where serious efforts to investigate **navy combat leadership could be undertaken**. The Navy Personnel Research and Development Center (NPRDC) and the Naval Air Warfare Center, Training Systems Division, have the existing staff and the ability to contract with external resources to perform research into navy combat leadership. The U.S. Army Research

Institute (ARI) for the Behavioral and Social Sciences has apparently been given the charter within DoD to act as the executive agent for all DoD leadership research. As of yet, neither NPRDC nor ARI are performing research into combat leadership and ARI is not performing any research into navy leadership.

There are also external organizations which have the capabilities to perform research about leadership--although none of these has heretofore focused on navy combat leadership issues. Such organizations include, but are not limited to: the Center for Creative Leadership (CCL) in Greensboro, NC; the Center for Naval Analyses (CNA) in Alexandria, VA; and the Personnel Decision Research Institute (PDRI) in Minneapolis, MN.

There are only three (known) previous studies into navy combat leadership and one U.S. Navy-sponsored conference where navy combat leadership was addressed. The state of existing navy combat leadership research is such that U.S. Navy courses and textbooks often use non-navy examples and case studies. Despite this clear void in knowledge, navy leadership--including navy combat leadership--continues to be taught today and efforts are being made to improve navy leadership training in the absence of raw materials. Another, related finding is that there are no known studies of navy combat "charismatic" leadership, although many navy combat officers have been called "charismatic."

Attempts to learn the behaviors, skills, and personality traits associated with successful leadership in any context appear to emphasize some of the same behaviors, skills, and personality traits associated with successful navy combat leaders. Most important of these appears to be **vision**. Technical competence is important, but **successful leadership is associated with mostly non-technical abilities**. Unfortunately, technical competency is also required--making it difficult to prioritize training and education. Clearly, both must be addressed in a balanced fashion.

Based upon the existing evidence and practices by the U.S. Navy, **it appears that the Navy does not believe that there are any fundamental differences between combat leadership and leadership in a non-combat environment or in leadership between different forms of combat.** The existing literature on this subject is extremely fragile--primarily student theses--and the subject demands more rigor. However, in the existing literature, the case has not yet been made that combat leadership is so fundamentally different that it would take a special type of individual to be in such positions.

Existing evidence strongly supports the finding that the requirements for leadership and the behaviors, skills, and personality traits associated with leadership **vary significantly**

by rank or level of responsibility. Certain characteristics, such as integrity and courage, are equally essential at all levels. Simply put, what makes an excellent colonel does not guarantee an excellent general officer. The U.S. Navy appears to have accepted this view of leadership.

The behavior of the U.S. Navy strongly suggests that it does **not view leadership in the maritime environment as being particularly different** than in any other warfare environment. I do not necessarily agree with this finding. Similarly, although the Navy appears to not consider the requirements for leadership in the U.S. Navy to be particularly "unique," if the leadership styles associated with other organizations (such as the U.S. Marine Corps) were attempted in the U.S. Navy, they would not necessarily work.

The U.S. Navy position on the subject of **"learning organizations"** is unclear. This, despite the fact that military forces which have successfully adapted **"maneuver" warfare** fit the "learning organization" mold. "Learning organizations" require individuals who exhibit visionary tendencies associated with cerebral right brain thinking. Such individuals are found in military organizations, but are often not upwardly mobile. "Learning organizations" need to find alternative means of retaining the expertise of visionaries.

From the available evidence, it appears that the U.S. Navy **does not take seriously how cultural differences impact on leadership**. This explains why Navy textbooks and case studies often refer to foreign leadership examples. There is a compelling case that, in fact, the cultural context of leadership matters in very significant ways. Perhaps the most important cultural context is, of course, combat.

Findings on the **value of "charismatic" leadership are somewhat mixed**. Although there are excellent examples of "charismatic" individuals inspiring their men to greatness, there are more examples of good leaders learning to improve. "Charismatic" leaders also bring with them a whole host of excess "baggage" which can sometimes be troublesome. On the other hand, there is value in "charismatic-like" behavior which can and should be taught and is a legitimate component of "transformational" leadership. With regard to pure "charismatic" leadership, it is only "charismatic" when judged to be so by the followers--not when some individual declares him/herself to be "charismatic" or starts to exhibit behaviors normally associated with "charisma."

There have been no substantive studies of **officer promotions during periods of long peace**. Indeed, there is only anecdotal evidence supporting the fear that warriors may not get promoted and equally persuasive cases where they have been promoted.

Nevertheless, the current method of promotion, selection, and retention has little correlation with combat leadership potential.

Doctrine plays an important role in capturing the combat leadership successes of previous wars and situations simulating war. The successful combat leader must know his doctrine, but also know when to deviate from it. This is more cerebral right brain thinking than that of the limbic left brain.

The U.S. Army has internalized **leadership** into its basic **components of combat power**,² requiring a continual discussion of combat leadership. The Army also has **separate doctrine** on leadership, thus ensuring that the subject is constantly addressed--both in isolation as well as when combat action doctrine is created.

There also appears to be strong evidence that the military can benefit from some number of **right brain thinkers** who will challenge existing doctrine and technology with ideas that might lead to an overall improvement in combat power. Such individuals often languish in a hierarchical organization and visionary leaders need to find them a home.

Navy combat leadership is currently not a discreet category of study. Nor has navy leadership training accepted the value of personal growth. Each of these has the capability of improving combat potential in the fleet, although in very different ways.

CONCLUSIONS

"The problem all military organizations--primitive or sophisticated--have in common is that they must find ways to insure that soldiers will act against the most fundamental law of human nature, the instinct for survival. The men must aggressively dance with death if they are to succeed in war. In order to get them reliably to do so, nations must devise rituals, myths and legends which elicit the desired behavior since men cannot be taught to face death purely through reason. Facing violent death is a problem for the spirit, not the mind. Its data come from the gut, not the head."

--Robert B. Bathurst³

There is only one logical conclusion to be reached about the state of navy combat leadership research--**the U.S. Navy does not believe that combat is a discreet activity in which leadership skills or requirements are different.** If the Navy thought otherwise, it would have commissioned studies and developed the materials necessary to teach combat leadership as a discreet activity.

The methodological problems associated with source materials used to study navy combat leadership are extreme. One cannot go out and read a few good biographies--these do not address the issues of leadership necessary to develop navy combat leaders for the future. Future research into navy combat leadership must shatter the paradigm of primarily historical research. Leadership studies need the added disciplines of psychology, business schools, and political science.

Basic research into navy combat leadership is warranted and long overdue. Without proper research, leadership programs and course materials will continue to be developed making use of materials inappropriate to the U.S. Navy or its development of future combat leaders.

Basic leadership research into navy combat leadership can be most effectively performed by a multi-disciplinary academic team supplemented by active or recently-retired senior navy officers in an academic environment. This type of research is probably not performed best by defense contractors who have no experience with academic-type research. It is also not performed best by the pure academic community (without external supervision), since research will require the participation of a variety of individuals from many different locations and disciplines. Due to the magnitude of the effort envisaged, the least desirable approach would be to use only internal in-house assets.

By their very nature, researchers are change agents. It would be very difficult, but not impossible, for active officers to act as change agents--hence a serious project should be assisted by active duty officers but run by civilians whose future does not depend upon research results. An in-house team with academic/academic-style contractor support is probably the best compromise.

Although we can continue to attempt to discover the behaviors, skills, and personality traits associated with good navy combat leaders, if we utilize only the behavioral approach, such research will be fatally flawed. Good research into leadership must also address the relationship between leader and followers as well as the situational context in which leadership is exercised.

If leadership requirements, behaviors, skills, and personality traits vary with rank, then the U.S. Navy needs a more robust program for the upward development of leaders through the flag officer-level. **Leadership development by rank does not happen by serendipity.** The Navy should examine closely the model employed by the U.S. Army to enhance the overall pool of leaders who will constitute the combat leader when necessary.

Since complexity increases in most organizations at higher level positions, it stands to reason that most leaders in lower positions are more comfortable with the relative certainty at this level. If we desire to introduce the ability to deal with uncertainty at the lowest unit levels of a military organization, this will take considerable effort on the part of that military. In fact, in such situations, the organization may actually function less well, unless there is a parallel investment in leadership development.⁴

The U.S. Navy should probably reassess its position that there is no real difference between leadership styles based upon the specific organization. Naval aviators and sea-air-land (SEAL) officers must routinely place themselves individually at risk to be effective leaders--suggesting that their situation is similar to that of ground officers from other services. Such behaviors are not necessarily required of many other navy officers.

If the U.S. Navy is going to successfully adopt "maneuver" warfare, it needs to investigate the concept of the "learning organization" and design a model for developing and retaining visionary individuals. These individuals who favor their cerebral right brain should be detailed to both positions of leadership and commands which prepare doctrine. If "maneuver" warfare is to include actions taken at the lowest levels of combat leadership, then some parts of the Navy may actually have to recruit individuals who are already pre-disposed toward behaviors identified with "maneuver" warfare. How such individuals will be retained in a "risk-averse" military is problematic.

There is some degree of consensus that the traditional assessment systems--fitness reports--are unable to identify and promote officers with good combat leadership skills. When bureaucratic systems are "broken," there are always "work-arounds." If a new "black book" system is needed to identify future warriors, one should be created. Can a new system do any worse than the current one?

Although the U.S. Navy does not seriously consider the cultural context of leadership, it appears that these differences do matter. Therefore, **the U.S. Navy should develop case studies of U.S. Navy combat leaders for use in textbooks and doctrinal manuals,** and discontinue the reliance on foreign examples. Extending this conclusion, one could also surmise that, even without actual differences between combat and non-combat leadership behaviors, skills, and traits, the strategic culture of the armed forces would suffer if all of its leadership examples were of non-combat heroes. Furthermore, it appears obvious that **the U.S. Navy should explore the full dimensions of combat leadership if it is serious about adopting "maneuver" warfare.** Indeed, how can the U.S. Navy seriously investigate this

concept without a parallel investigation of the associated leadership requirements?

Although true "charismatic" leadership is not required for navy combat, "charismatic-like" behaviors can assist in the building of *esprit de corps* and otherwise preparing a unit for combat. **The "transformational" leader may be able to offer more to any organization than can his more pure "charismatic" cousin.** The key is that the "transformational" leader empowers his subordinates to carry out the vision. However, the traditional "transactional" leadership also has a place in the armed forces.

Rather than attempting to single out combat leaders for promotion, there is probably more to gain with the overall improvement of leadership development in the U.S. Navy. An overall improved pool will provide the future combat leaders when they are required. An off-line system will be needed to track potentially good combat leaders so that they can quickly be found when needed. The U.S. Navy does not require officers who are cast in the model of Admiral Lord Horatio Nelson.⁵ Nor should it prepare its doctrine from the perspective that every officer will be a Nelson. **The Navy would be better served with a pool of officers with less native genius and "charisma" and more solid training and education.**

Doctrine has an important role to play in the preparation of combat leaders for the future. **Leaders need to know both when to follow and when to deviate from doctrine.** At present, there is a void which can be filled by the Naval Doctrine command in this area. **The Navy should incorporate leadership within the elements of combat power making the Naval Doctrine Command the logical place to address combat leadership in the Navy.**

A variety of types of individuals are of value to the Navy. Although the limbic left brain thinker has traditionally been promoted through the rank of Captain, under "maneuver" warfare, the cerebral right brain thinker may have more value. Making a transition from one group to the other will not happen without deliberate action on the part of visionary flag officers.

The current U.S. Navy leadership training and education program could benefit by emphasizing Navy examples of combat leadership. **The addition of personal growth** into the overall leadership program, and specifically the prospective commanding officer course, could also produce a high yield. If the personal growth concept simply cannot fit into the curriculum, then the Navy should strongly recommend officers attend the existing and cost-free personal growth retreats sometime in their career, but prior to assuming their first command.

RECOMMENDATIONS

"When people are entering upon a war they do things the wrong way around. Action comes first, and it is only when they have already suffered that they begin to think."

--Athenian representatives to Sparta 432 BC⁶

Basic Research

Perhaps the most important point to be made by this report is that there is an **overwhelming case for further research** by specialists in a variety of fields. This report has primarily served to highlight the lack of data about navy combat leadership and the ongoing decisions to improve leadership training and education despite our lack of knowledge.

Additional research should consist of the following elements. **First**, the Leadership and Law Department of the U.S. Naval Academy (USNA) is willing and can provide a civilian faculty member to **develop cases** of U.S. Navy combat leadership for use in leadership texts and doctrinal publications. The faculty member has a wealth of knowledge on these issues and is available during the Summer 1995 period to perform funded research for the Naval Doctrine Command (NDC). The output of this funded research would be a technical report, published by NDC, containing the case studies to be used by NDC in future doctrine development and by existing leadership schools and courses.

Second, existing military Leadership and Law faculty members at the USNA are fully capable of performing **supporting research** into certain aspects of Navy combat leadership. If this department is to eventually teach aspects of combat leadership, they need to be brought into the process of development of Navy combat leadership doctrine. However, breaking these faculty members free from expected military duties to perform research for NDC may prove to be difficult. If these military faculty members are made available, they should be encouraged to perform research which NDC agrees to publish as technical reports. Once these reports are published, the authors should be encouraged to seek publication and peer review in regular scholarly journals.

Third, some of the faculty of the **Naval Postgraduate School** might be interested in receipt of NDC efforts on combat leadership for use in their courses. The **Department of Systems Management** is probably the department best-suited to work on combat leadership, since it already addresses leadership in general management courses. Additionally, the Operations Research Department is already being funded by NDC for faculty research in the area of "maneuver"/*manoeuvre* warfare and this research might include a combat leadership element.

Fourth, as the Naval War College further refines its understanding of **navy operational art**, the faculty of the Operations Department should be encouraged to look at the specific and different requirements of combat leaders in general and combat leadership at the operational-level. Supporting research in the form of technical reports prepared for NDC would appear to be possible.

Fifth, there are a number of U.S. Navy officers, performing normal military duties, that have a degree of interest in combat leadership. A number of these **fleet, staff corps, and reserve officers** have requested to contribute with **supporting research** on various aspects of combat leadership. NDC should agree to publish their findings as technical reports and then encourage these officers to publish their findings in scholarly journals where they will be subject to peer review. There are a number of Navy Medical Corps, Medical Service Corps, and Reserve officers with expertise that can and should be mobilized to continue scholarly research into combat leadership.

Sixth, NDC should meet with individuals from the Navy Personnel Research and Development Center (NPRDC) in San Diego, CA; the **Center for Army Leadership** at Fort Leavenworth, KS; and the U.S. Army Research Institute (ARI) for the Behavioral and Social Sciences in Alexandria, VA to ascertain their willingness to perform or sponsor **basic research** into Navy combat leadership. NPRDC should be able to use Office of Naval Research (ONR) funds to conduct research into areas that they are requested to investigate. Any of these organizations might also be able to validate the Herrmann Brain Dominance Instrument (HBDI) for use by the Navy to either ascertain its worth in support of personal growth or to learn more about "maneuver"/*manoeuvre* warfare.

The controversial subjects in this report are fertile areas for further research. For example, the **following research** might be conducted: (1) an in-depth analysis of the demonstrated past promotions of "warriors" during peacetime; (2) determination of the importance of national and other cultural contexts in leadership; (3) determination of whether the U.S. Navy is a unique organization from the perspective of leadership requirements; (4) more in-depth research into the issue of combat vs. non-combat leadership in a maritime environment; (5) an assessment of the differences in leadership skills and behaviors when crossing cognitive preference lines; (6) validation of the Army's findings on leadership differences related to rank and position; and (7) a parallel investigation into enlisted combat leadership requirements.

Seventh, Naval Doctrine Command (NDC) should obtain **copies of all military leadership doctrinal publications** from every military Service and nation. Liaison officers attached to NDC from other Services and nations should be tasked to obtain these

materials. These materials could be useful to ascertain the degree to which combat leadership is addressed elsewhere. An analysis of such materials can be performed with NDC in-house assets.

Navy Combat Leadership Doctrine Development

As the U.S. Navy moves toward a new paradigm for leadership doctrine, training, and education, it might want to consider following the example of the U.S. Army. After the Vietnam War, the Army recognized the need for major changes in leadership doctrine, training, and education. After deciding on the future direction of the Army, the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) published a pamphlet, *Military Operations: U.S. Army Operational Concept for Leadership*, TRADOC Pam[phlet] 525-28.⁷ This pamphlet outlined, in general, the new direction that the Army would take in upgrading its leadership preparation and invited comments prior to publication of any new official doctrine.

Navy Combat Leadership Doctrine Concept Paper

Naval Doctrine Command (NDC) should prepare a **combat leadership doctrine concept paper**, similar to the old TRADOC Pam 525-28, outlining the general directions that Navy leadership development is moving (that direction should include adding personal growth to the traditional leadership paradigm of getting the job done and taking care of your personnel). The concept paper would be the precursor to writing any official Navy combat leadership doctrine. This technical report, and others developed in the basic research program, can serve as the basis for the concept paper and can serve to surface contentious issues before its publication. The combat leadership doctrine concept paper should be designed to stimulate debate and discussion and to build consensus for combat leadership doctrine within the Navy.

As a part of that process, NDC should present these initial research results to various Navy commands interested in combat leadership training. These would include, at a minimum, the prospective commanding officer/executive officer course, the N7 staff in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, the Personal Excellence and Partnerships Division of the Bureau of Naval Personnel, and the Chief of Naval Education and Training (CNET). In order to obtain Army support for basic research, briefings should also be given at the Army Research Institute (ARI), the Center for Army Leadership, and the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC).

Supporting Activities

Supporting **technical reports** and **journal articles** would obtain external support. Technical reports and journal articles

would be issued in the authors' names (not the command's) and would serve to explore issues for which consensus has not been reached. A series of parallel **seminars and conferences** on the subject of Navy combat leadership will help build consensus with both the officers and enlisted men of the Navy, those who must be "empowered" to implement the new direction. Carefully crafted, such conferences and seminars can result in additional technical reports, journal articles, and edited books on the subject of Navy combat leadership.

Conferences and similar meetings can be scheduled as the leadership doctrine concept paper is ready to be published. These are critical to the eventual acceptance of the new leadership paradigm in the U.S. Navy. Locations must include the sites where combat leadership doctrine would be taught within the Navy; the USNA, the Naval Postgraduate School, the Naval War College, locations for department head, and prospective commanding officer/executive officer training, and senior enlisted leadership sites.

As the Naval Doctrine Command prepares technical reports on these issues, it will be critical to obtain peer review outside the military Services from other sources, such as academe. Therefore, **the normal distribution of technical reports to those within the government should be waived** in the interests of the government and copies provided to individuals outside the government to facilitate communications and obtain peer review.

The Industrial College of the Armed Forces (ICAF) is developing a **Joint Center for Strategic Leadership Assessment and Development**, under the auspices of the National Defense University (NDU). NDC should continue its dialogue with Dr. T. Owen Jacobs (formerly of ARI) to ensure the latest efforts at ICAF/NDU are learned by NDC. Current efforts by the **Army Science Board** to investigate new developments in leadership should also be followed--Lieutenant General Walter F. Ulmer, U.S. Army (Ret.), is the primary point of contact.

The **Jepson School of Leadership Studies** at the University of Richmond, Virginia, has an internship requirement for seniors. Seniors are matched to organizations where they can get practical experience in leadership issues for a summer semester. NDC should accept the offer of Dean Howard Prince to send students to this command for such experience. Students would require some supervision and a desk, but would not be paid nor considered government employees. The benefit for NDC is that the student will write a report on some aspect of leadership.

Leadership as a Fundamental Element of Combat Power

Once debate and discussion have produced some degree of consensus, leadership doctrine should then be developed by the

Naval Doctrine Command (NDC). The developed doctrine should focus on the relationship of leadership to combat power. **Leadership should be considered an integral part of combat power**, thus permitting NDC to address the current combat leadership doctrinal void that exists in the Navy and to more fully address combat itself. This should be done in the capstone-level Naval Doctrine Publication (NDP) series (NDP 1-6) by specifically including combat leadership in each publication.

A lower-level Naval Warfare Publication (NWP) dealing with Navy combat leadership should also be developed, similar to *Leading Marines*, FMFM [Fleet Marine Force Manual] 1-0.⁸ This NWP should not be a stand-alone document. The risk of isolating leadership as a separate subject is that the subject might be ignored by those in the Navy who continue to view technical expertise as the more important path to advancement. By integrating leadership into everything that we do in the Navy, we signal its importance for those who desire to be upwardly mobile.

"Maneuver" Warfare

The relationship between "maneuver" warfare doctrine and combat leadership skills is immediately apparent. The present lack of understanding of the Navy role in open-ocean "maneuver"/*manoeuvre* warfare is being addressed by the Naval Doctrine Command (NDC) with project results expected late in 1995. In the meantime, other organizations have expressed an interest in the same issue and have begun to explore them from a ground forces perspective.⁹

To more fully understand the combat leadership requirements of **"maneuver" warfare**, NDC should request that the U.S. Marine Corps allow individuals to be assessed via standard psychological tests, such as the Meyers-Briggs Type Indicator (MBTI), or more innovative instruments such as the Herrmann Brain Dominance Instrument (HBDI).¹⁰ Such tests would ascertain the type of behaviors and learning preferences exhibited by individuals who the Marine Corps considers to be "maneuverists" and others that lack these traits. Careful comparison of both groups is needed to more fully develop the concept of "maneuver" warfare in the U.S. Navy.

Such testing does not support Marine Corps doctrine development, but rather Navy and naval doctrine. Since the two sea services have adopted "maneuver" warfare as their doctrine, the U.S. Navy needs the assistance of the Marine Corps to explore those special traits exhibited by "maneuverists" so that the Navy can develop its own thoughts on the doctrine. Such efforts are already underway at NDC and would greatly benefit from a psychological evaluation of successful "maneuverists."

The Health Services Support Division of NDC should be tasked with ascertaining how to formally obtain the HBDI for evaluation by the U.S. Navy and how to make this tool available within the Navy. Although the Navy already has access to the MBTI, the HBDI appears to have more relevance to both a study of "maneuver" warfare and personal growth efforts within the Navy.

Naval Doctrine Command as the Navy's "Learning Organization"

Naval Doctrine Command (NDC) should take on the role of being the **"learning organization"** within and for the U.S. Navy. Acting in such a capacity, NDC would move beyond codifying how we fight today. NDC could take advantage of the lessons that are being learned, within the armed forces and externally, and to then apply those lessons to new doctrinal concepts and eventual doctrine development.

As the Naval Doctrine Command learns more about combat leadership, it will become a "learning organization" by default. NDC should, therefore, explore what this role entails so that it will more properly perform this function.

Basic research into the concept of the "learning organization" can be accomplished using NDC in-house resources. As a part of this effort, a team of "creative" individuals should be assembled to explore this concept. This team should have individuals from each major division as well as individuals from each quadrant of the Herrmann Brain Dominance Instrument (HBDI)--ensuring all elements of creativity and learning preferences are represented. The HBDI should be used to explore its use in internal team building.

SUMMARY

The desired endstate of combat doctrine development in the Navy is a fleet which can perform the nation's military tasks in the maritime environment. That performance requires leaders which can take charge in combat and get the job done. This research paper has considered the fundamental questions and issues related to the development of combat leaders for tomorrow.

Continued development of doctrine without specific consideration of combat leadership is inadequate. Leadership as a fundamental component of combat power addresses this void and provides the U.S. Navy with the opportunity to prepare combat leaders for military operations in the next century.

NOTES

1. Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan, USN, *The Influence of Sea Power Upon the French Revolution and Empire, 1793-1812*, Vol. I, New

York, NY: Greenwood Press, Publishers, 1968 reprint [original version published in 1892 by Little, Brown, and Co.], p. 102.

2. Headquarters, Department of the Army, *Operations*, F[ield] M[anual] 100-5, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 14 June 1993, p. 2-10 to 2-12.

3. Robert B. Bathurst, *Intelligence and the Mirror: On Creating an Enemy*, London, UK: Sage Publications for the International Peace Research Institute (PRIO), Oslo, Norway, 1993, p. 82.

4. Suggested in a letter to the author from Dr. T. Owen Jacobs, Industrial College of the Armed Forces, February 14, 1995.

5. Indeed, the infamous case of Marcus Aurelius Arnheiter as the commanding officer of the *USS Vance* in 1965-1966 was made even more controversial when it was realized how much his fantasies were dominated by the heroic acts of Admiral Lord Horatio Nelson. See Abraham Zaleznik and Manfred F.R. Kets de Vries, *Power and the Corporate Mind*, Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin, 1975, p. 172-174.

6. Thucydides, *The Peloponnesian War*, Rex Warner, trans., Baltimore, MD: Penguin Books, 1972 p. 82.

7. U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), *Military Operations: U.S. Army Operational Concept for Leadership*, TRADOC Pam[phlet] 525-28, Fort Monroe, VA, 10 March 1983.

8. General Carl E. Mundy, Jr., Commandant of the Marine Corps, *Leading Marines*, FMFM [Fleet Marine Force Manual] 1-0, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, signed 3 January 1995.

9. Richard Stuart Maltz, "Quality Leadership as Maneuver Warfare: A Method of Instructing and Implementing 'Total Quality Management' in the Armed Forces," Oakton, VA: Military Quality Institute, 1 May 1995; and letter to the author dated 22 June 1995.

10. The U.S. Navy has done this type of testing in the past. For example, see Lyle M. Spencer, Jr., Ph.D., "The Navy Leadership and Management Education and Training Program," undated abstract; and David G. Winter, Ph.D., "Navy Leadership and Management Competencies: Convergence Among Tests, Interviews and Performance Ratings," final report, Boston, MA: McBer and Company, November 1978. These reports document a project to use standardized tests to identify leadership and management competencies and the eventual development of training programs to build upon desired competencies.

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